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ABSTRACT
In the Crosshairs: Second Amendment Lawyers and Cases
in
State and Federal Appellate Courts
H. Carl Taylor, III
Judicial behavior, the types of activities and behaviors judges become involved with in their
capacity on the bench, has a profound and lasting impact on the types of decisions rendered by
judges across all courts that comprise the American judiciary (Baum 2000; Baum 2006; Maveety
2002). There is a growing realization that judicial behavior encompasses more than just the making
of good laws and public policy decisions (Baum, 2000; Baum 2006; Hammond, Bonneau, &
Sheehan 2005; Comparato 2003). For example, Songer & Haire (1992) explore integrated
approaches to the study of judicial voting through obscenity cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
Creating an integrated multivariate model that combines five approaches to judicial voting, the
authors find that this new model correctly predicts about 80% of the judges’ votes on obscenity
cases with an error reduction rate of almost 46%. My dissertation focuses on the judicial behavior of
state Supreme Court and U.S. Courts of Appeals judges through the lens of Second Amendment
claims and issues, a polarizing American political issue over the last fifty years.
Through a descriptive and logistic regression analysis of the extent of 488 Second
Amendment court rulings made in state courts of last resort and U.S. Courts of Appeals rendered
between 1960 and 2009, I theorize that state Supreme Court selection methods, the presences of a
state intermediate appellate courts, U.S. Courts of Appeals majority presidential party nomination
panel, along with state and federal appellate circuit political ideology, urban/rural dynamics, gun
ownership percentage, and homicide rates will have an impact on the outcome of Second
Amendment decisions at these various judicial levels. For instance, an elected state Supreme Court
system is more likely to produce a gun rights ruling, while an appellate panel with a majority of
judges appointed by Democratic Presidents would be more likely to produce a gun control ruling.
The results indicate state and appellate circuit political ideology (conservativeliberal spectrum)
and gun ownership percentages affect the outcome of Second Amendment decisions in state
Supreme Courts and the U.S. Courts of Appeals, while homicide rates affect these decisions in state
courts of last resort. As such, a conservative political ideology and high gun ownership percentage
in a state or appellate circuit means that it is more likely for their judges to produce a gun rights
ruling, while a liberal political ideology and low gun ownership percentage means that the state or
appellate circuit is more likely to produce a gun control ruling. One chapter explores these
dynamics at the state Supreme Court level, while a second chapter does the same in the U.S. Courts
of Appeals.
A third substantive dissertation chapter considers the impact of legal participation, litigation
strategies, venue-shopping, along with interest group coordination, networking, and organization, in
planned telephone interviews with pro-gun and gun control Second Amendment interest group
lawyers who have litigated cases in these two levels of the state and federal judiciary between 1960
and 2009. In this chapter, it is theorized that there will be clear differences between gun rights and
gun control interest groups, and heavily funded and lesser funded interest groups, with regard to the
five major interview issues listed above. Twenty-one interviews with interest group lawyers will be
conducted between 24 August and 15 October 2010.
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CHAPTER ONE

CURRENT SECOND AMENDMENT LITERATURE AND INTRODUCTION TO THE
RESEARCH SETTING

The right of bearing arms for a lawful purpose is not a right granted by the Constitution;
neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence.
--Chief Justice Morrison Waite, United States v. Cruikshank, 18761
I agree with the Court that the Second Amendment is fully applicable to the States. I do
so because the right to keep and bear arms is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
as a privilege of American citizenship.
-- Justice Samuel Alito, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 20102
During the last forty years, the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution has
become a focal point of political attention within the executive, legislative, and judicial branches
of local, state, and federal governments across the country. In fact, political attention that
focused on the Second Amendment was amplified after the 2010 United States state and federal
midterm elections as proponents of gun rights made dramatic electoral gains. For instance,
Kansas voters approved an amendment to the state constitution that affirmed the right of state
residents to own firearms. The Kansas “Right to Bear Arms” Amendment passed on 2
November 2010 with the staggering support of 89 percent of the electorate.3 A similar result
occurred in the neighboring state of Oklahoma, as U.S. Representative Mary Fallin (R-OK)
easily won election to the Governor’s office. Fallin’s twenty-point victory (60 percent to 40
percent) over the sitting Lieutenant Governor, Jari Askins (D-OK), ensured that the Oklahoma
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legislature’s bipartisan open carry of firearms bill would not be vetoed again in 2011, as it was
under current Governor Brad Henry (D-OK) in early 2010.4
Focusing on the outcome of federal legislative midterm races, pro-gun candidates won
seven seats in the U.S. Senate, including seats in Arkansas, Indiana, Ohio, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. U.S. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid’s reelection in Nevada assured gun advocates that pro-gun legislation is more likely to make it to the
floor of the Senate then would have been the case under under the number two (Richard Durbin,
IL) or three (Charles Schumer, NY) ranking Democrats in the Senate leadership. According to
David Kopel’s voting math, based on campaign statements or policy positions of candidates, the
Republican election wave that hit the U.S. House of Representatives saw an increase of almost
nineteen pro-gun votes. Congressional candidates endorsed by the National Rifle Association’s
Victory Fund won 85 percent of their House races and 76 percent of their senatorial races.5
If the 2010 elections brought significant legislative gains for gun rights advocates, one
institutional bastion that remains up for grabs is the American judiciary. This dissertation
focuses on how the state and federal courts have dealt with the Second Amendment and
associated issues. It addresses the questions: What factors explain Second Amendment interest
group cause lawyering and the inclusion of Second Amendment issues on the agenda (docket) of
courts, and, second, what political factors effect judges when making Second Amendment
rulings in state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts of Appeals?
To address the first question, Chapter Two considers the impact of legal participation,
litigation strategies, venue-shopping, interest group coordination, networking, and organization
in telephone interviews with gun rights and gun control Second Amendment lawyers who
litigated cases in these two levels of the state and federal judiciary between 1960 and 2009. In
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this chapter, it is hypothesized that there is a clear difference between gun rights and gun control
interest groups, heavily funded and lesser funded interest groups, and local, state, and national
interest groups with regard to legal participation, litigation strategies, venue-shopping, interest
group coordination, networking, and organization.
To address the second question, two chapters of this dissertation is focused on the judicial
behavior of state supreme court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals judges regarding Second
Amendment cases. Judicial behavior, the types of activities and behavior appellate judges
exhibit on the bench, has a profound and lasting impact on the types of decisions rendered by
judges across all courts that comprise the American judiciary.6 There is a growing realization
that judicial behavior encompasses more than just the making of good laws and public policy
decisions.7 Donald Songer and Susan Haire explored integrated approaches to the study of
judicial voting through obscenity cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Creating an integrated
multivariate model that combined five approaches to judicial voting, the authors found that this
new model correctly predicted about 80 percent of the judges’ votes on obscenity cases with an
error reduction rate of almost 46 percent.8 Two chapters of this dissertation focuses on the
behavior of state supreme court and U.S. Courts of Appeals judges through the lens of Second
Amendment claims and issues, a polarizing American political issue over the last fifty years.
Through a descriptive analysis of 488 Second Amendment court rulings made in state
supreme courts and U.S. Courts of Appeals between 1960 and 2009, I theorize that state supreme
court selection methods, political party identification of state supreme court judges, the presence
of a state intermediate appellate court, U.S. Courts of Appeals majority presidential party
nomination panel, along with state and federal appellate circuit political ideology, population
density, gun ownership percentage, and homicide rates will have an impact on the outcome of
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Second Amendment decisions in these two judicial forums. For instance, an elected state court
of last resort system is more likely to produce a gun rights ruling, while an appellate panel with a
majority of judges appointed by Democratic Presidents would be more likely to produce a gun
control ruling. The following sections set the political context for judicial decision-making
regarding the Second Amendment and reviews important Second Amendment works and provide
an introduction to the research setting for my dissertation.
Constitutional Underpinnings
Until the middle of the twentieth century, the Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution was a little-visited and often dormant area of the Bill of Rights. In fact, the annual
commentary regarding the Constitution published by the Library of Congress in 1973 included
less than a page and half of annotations regarding the Second Amendment, while other clauses,
such as the Free Exercise Clause and the Freedom of Speech Clause, included citations of ten
pages or more.9 According to the longtime Cato Institute staffer, Brian Doherty, before the 2008
United States Supreme Court case, Heller v. District of Columbia, in which an ideologically
divided Court overturned the District of Columbia’s gun ban and forbade future gun bans on
federally governed areas,10 there had only been five other significant Second Amendment cases
heard by the U.S. Supreme Court.11
Of the five important Supreme Court Second Amendment cases listed by Doherty, three
played a significant role in state law. After a white militia attacked Republican freedmen
gathered at the Grant Parish Courthouse in Louisiana to protect it from a local Democratic
takeover during Reconstruction, in United States v. Cruikshank, the Supreme Court ruled that the
Second Amendment had “no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national
government”.12 In Presser v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment
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limited only the power of the U.S. Congress and the federal government to control firearms, and
did not apply to the states.13 In Miller v. Texas, the Supreme Court ruled that the Second
Amendment did not apply to state laws, such as the one in Texas that Franklin Miller had
violated when he was convicted and sentenced to be executed for shooting a police officer to
death with an unlicensed handgun.14
While the Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller decisions played a much larger role in state
law and government, another Supreme Court decision was the first to strike at the heart of the
Second Amendment within the sphere of the federal governmental power. In the wake of the
Saint Valentine’s Day Massacre, in United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the National Firearms Act against a challenge Jack Miller and Frank Layton.
Miller and Layton argued that the law allowed the men to keep and use a sawed-off shotgun.
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed.15 The National Firearms Act of 1934 required certain types
of firearms, including automatic rifles, sawed-off shot guns, and semi-automatic firearms, to be
registered and taxes paid to the federal government every time the firearm was sold. The Miller
decision has become a flashpoint in the ongoing debate over the Second Amendment in America,
as gun control advocates and state and federal judges have pointed to this decision for over six
decades when rejecting legal challenges to new federal firearms regulations. Curiously, gun
rights advocates claim the Miller decision as a victory because interpretations of that ruling state
that ownership of weapons for the preservation of a militia in the present day is exclusively
protected by the Constitution.16
Doherty’s fifth important Second Amendment Supreme Court decision struck at the heart
of both state and federal law. Building upon Heller, gun rights interests brought a similar case
before the Supreme Court that was a clear challenge to a local gun ban in Chicago, Illinois. In
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McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010), an ideologically divided Supreme Court ruled that the right
to “keep and bear arms,” outlined in the Second Amendment, was incorporated into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus, applied to all states.17 David Kopel
explored the holdings of twenty-nine other Second Amendment cases handled by the Supreme
Court. None of the twenty-nine other cases have become as legally important as the six cases
presented previously.18 Along with incorporation of the Second Amendment in state law, the
McDonald decision cleared up much of the uncertainty left after Heller regarding the application
of federal laws to states. Landmark cases, such as Heller and McDonald, illustrate the
importance of the policy and the ideological polarization of the Second Amendment issue in the
courts and in American society today.
The deep sectional, cultural, and ideological divide in American life that has been evident
within the Second Amendment debate has often times become expressed in legal terms and
within the judicial arena. The mere existence of the Second Amendment debates exemplifies the
importance of the constitutive function of legality in American life. The legality perspective has
reduced and framed a cultural conflict into easily recognizable rights, constitutional power
terminology, and a manageable and orderly bipolar debate that is often capable of expression in
ideological or partisan terms. Nowhere has this debate manifested itself more than inside the
walls of state and federal courtrooms across the United States.
Regarding this legality perspective, in United States v. Tot (1942), the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed a lower court ruling that convicted Frank Tot of receiving firearms
transported via interstate commerce after he was convicted of a violent crime.19 Tot was decided
in accordance with the Miller decision because the appellate panel reasoned that the Second
Amendment was not adopted with individual rights in mind; however, the panel’s interpretation
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in the case changed Miller in that the case results were solely based on a flawed analysis of
common law and colonial history.20 The Miller legal perspective—which holds that the Second
Amendment does not encompass an individual right to keep and bear arms—was also adopted in
several other Supreme Court and lower federal court decisions. Since the Miller decision, lower
federal appellate courts have interpreted the substance of the ruling differently.
For instance, in Cases v. United States (1942)21, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
created much confusion in the lower federal courts over the substance of Miller. By challenging
the logic of Miller, the Cases panel concluded that any person making a Second Amendment
claim is required to have the maintenance and preservation of a militia as their main concern. As
such, the Cases decision forbade the federal government from prohibiting the possession and
usage of firearms if the prohibition related to the maintenance of a militia.22 The same legal test
was forwarded by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Hale.23
After the Cases and Tot decisions of the 1940s, there was little Second Amendment
litigation until the late 1960s and 1970s, when individuals began to challenge the gun control
legislation passed by Congress in the 1960s. In one of these cases, United States v. Warin
(1976), the Sixth Circuit concluded, without any historical references and in accordance with
Miller, that the Second Amendment does not guarantee an individual right.24 In the case, Francis
Warin was convicted of possessing an unlicensed machine gun in 1970, and he argued that his
ownership of the weapon was legal and in accordance with his official membership in an Ohio
militia. While the Warin decision seemed to have satisfied the tests established in Cases and
Hale, the appellate panel that heard the case disagreed and upheld the initial state court
conviction. Again, like Cases and Tot, Warin changed the implication and interpretation of
Miller in the sense that individuals could no longer possess firearms even in connection with the
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maintenance of a militia.25 Again, these various legal perspectives regarding Miller have since
been overturned by the Heller and McDonald majority, which asserted gun ownership as an
individual right.
In Adams v. Williams (1972), Justice Douglas argued that Miller did not prohibit the
enactment of vigorous gun control laws on the state level.26 In Cody v. United States (1972), the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled, in accordance with Miller, that the Second Amendment guarantees no
right to keep and bear arms that does not have a relationship with the preservation of a militia.27
Similar findings were rendered in United States v. Three Winchester 30-30 Caliber Lever Action
Carbines28, United States v. Johnson29, Lewis v. United States.30
Cases decided over the last fifteen years have also exemplified the same perspective that
appeared in earlier rulings. For instance, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit case, United States v. Emerson (2001),31 the Fifth Circuit rejected the common legal
perspective that the Second Amendment protected the interest of states in order to maintain their
own militias and changed the paradigm of Second Amendment rights to include individual
ownership of firearms.32 Interestingly, only one year later, in Silveira v. Lockyer (2002), the
Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Emerson ruling and found that private individuals do not
possess the personal right to own and operate firearms.33
Seven years after the Silveira ruling, the same Ninth Circuit overturned the Silveira ruling
in Nordyke v. King (2009).34 In Nordyke, the Ninth Circuit affirmed and expanded the Supreme
Court’s Heller decision by clearly stating that the right to keep and bear arms was an individual
right and should be incorporated against all states. Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit set the
decision aside and ordered an en banc rehearing of the Nordyke decision. In the en banc review
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of Nordyke v. King (2009),35 the Ninth Circuit ruled that the original decision should not be cited
as precedent and that the review should be delayed until the Supreme Court ruled in McDonald.
The legal perspective has reduced and framed cultural conflicts in more gun policy areas
than just simple ownership. For instance, since the early 1980s, localities around the nation have
attempted to ban the possession of personal firearms inside city limits in order to decrease
violence and crime, even if an individual was a member of a local militia. In Quilici v. Village of
Morton Grove (1982), the Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the Illinois town of Morton Grove,
which, in 1981, became the first modern American town to prohibit the possession of firearms
inside city limits. The Court ruled that the local gun ban was valid under state and federal
constitutions.36 Two years later, the same Morton Grove firearms ban was legally challenged
once again. In this case, Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove (1984), the Illinois State
Supreme Court agreed with Quicili that the town ordinance did not violate state or federal
constitutional provisions.37
Similar legal findings to Quicili and Kalodimos were made in two other state supreme
court cases. In Arnold v. City of Cleveland (1993), the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that an
ordinance banning the possession and sale of assault weapons inside the city limits of Cleveland
was constitutional.38 In Robertson v. City and County of Denver (1994), the Colorado Supreme
Court ruled that an ordinance that banned the manufacture, sale, or possession of semi-automatic
or automatic assault weapons within the limits of the City and County of Denver was
constitutional.39 Eventually, the findings of the Quicili, Kalodimos, Robertson, and Arnold
decisions were overturned after the landmark Heller decision. State and federal Second
Amendment cases, like the ones discussed above, have framed a cultural conflict in easily
recognizable terms.
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The Problem of “Original Meaning”
Along with important U.S. Supreme Court cases, it is also important to explore the
original intent of the Founding Fathers when they framed the Constitution in 1787, and the
conceptions of the Second Amendment in today’s American society. Possibly no other
amendment in the Constitution has created more interpretive disputes than the Second
Amendment.40 Historical analysis of the right to bear arms has created two competing
interpretations.41 The first interpretation guarantees a personal and individual right to bear arms,
while the second version applies only to the right in association with militias.42 The scope of the
Second Amendment has not traditionally been considered pressing because the approach of the
courts has largely been focused on United States v. Miller, which reads that the Second
Amendment only ensures that formal and organized state militias may remain armed.43
From a constitutional development perspective, the eminent American historian Gordon
S. Wood has eloquently written about the evolution of the sectional, cultural, and ideological
divide in American life since the establishment of the nation. Since the establishment of colonial
America, the North and South regions of the country evolved differently and have been divided
based upon geography, culture, and politics. In one work, Wood illustrated how the American
colonies emerged from a monarchical system, created a republic, and eventually evolved into a
democratic society. Wood’s focus was on representation, beginning with the colonial
assemblies, arguing that the American colonies had a legacy of representative institutions, which
helped in forming the necessary consensus in order to achieve the ultimate goal of
independence.44 Along with the American political system, Wood delved into issues related to
the same cultural and political divide in that different cultures and ideologies were predominate
early on throughout the country. Exemplified in conventions of the people in the states held to
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ratify both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, the fear of governmental
corruption by some citizens forced households to take up arms in order to ensure some level of
security and autonomy from the state.45
Wood examined how the American cultural and political divide was also defined through
ratification of the Bill of Rights. As James Madison proposed the Bill of Rights, ideological
conflict between pro-government Federalists and states rightist Anti-Federalists, dating from the
1787 Philadelphia Convention, threatened the overall ratification of the new Constitution. The
Bill of Rights was adopted in response to the Constitution's influential opponents, including
prominent Founding Fathers, who argued that the Constitution should not be ratified because it
failed to protect the basic principles of human liberty.46
The Bill of Rights was influenced by George Mason's 1776 Virginia Declaration of
Rights and other English lists of rights. Like Anti-Federalist leader Patrick Henry, Mason was a
leader of those who pressed for the addition of explicit States rights and individual rights to the
Constitution as a balance to the increased federal powers, and did not sign the document in part
because it lacked such a statement. Mason’s efforts eventually succeeded in convincing the
Federalists to add the first ten amendments, including the Second Amendment, of the
Constitution. Plainly, the addition and ratification of Bill of Rights was an attempt to soothe
dissent against increased national power by leaders of more conservative, states’ rights-oriented
southern states.47
Linking Founders Views to Firearms Policy History
Prior to the ratification of the Bill of Rights, an American “gun culture” was created in
the years before the American Revolution. In fact, the American Revolution was triggered by a
gun confiscation mission ordered by the British General Thomas Gage, which led to fighting at
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Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts.48 However, many scholars have rightly questioned the
actual original intent of the Second Amendment.49 Does the Second Amendment grant
individual citizens the right to keep and bear arms or does it only allow states to possess the right
to have a militia for the protection of its residents?50
According to Randy Barnett of the Georgetown University School of Law, before
discerning the original intent of a constitutional statute, scholars should ask themselves why it is
important to consult the intentions of the Framers. Consequently, there are two reasons to
examine the original intent of the Framers. The first reason is a view that the Framers are
wardens who issued specific commands to those leaders who were to come after them, and the
meaning of the commands depends upon the Framers intentions. The second reason is a view of
the Framers as designers of the lawmaking machine. To the extent that the Framers were
designers, this view notes that scholars should consult them when it is important to know how
the lawmaking process should work. If scholars would focus on these two principles, they would
be much more likely to hone in on the original intent of the Framers. For instance, the original
intent of the right to keep and bear arms is clearly linked to the maintenance of state militias.51
However, simply looking at the original intent of the words located on the pages of the
Constitution is not enough because what is in the document and the personal feelings of the
Founders sometimes differ significantly. The stance of several of the American Founding
Fathers seem to be split on issues related to personal gun ownership and the Second
Amendment.52 For instance, prominent Virginians George Mason, Richard Henry Lee, and
George Washington presented unequivocal support for the personal right to bear arms after
American independence. During Virginia’s convention to ratify the Constitution in 1788, Bill of
Rights author George Mason said, “I ask, Sir, what is the militia? It is the whole people. To
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disarm the people is the best and most effectual way to enslave them.”53 Although supporters of
the personal right to possess firearm were greater in number, alleged opponents of the Second
Amendment also were very important in the founding of the United States. Both Samuel Adams
and Alexander Hamilton offered only tepid acceptance of the Second Amendment as it was
originally written.54
According to the Second Amendment, the exact meaning of the rights reserved by the
statement is questionable. If the preamble included in the amendment did not exist, then the
amendment would reserve a personal right to keep and bear arms to all American; however, the
preamble is present and can create problems regarding the meaning of the amendment. While
some scholars have interpreted the meaning of the Second Amendment to restrict the keeping
and bearing of arms to members of the militia, others have forwarded a theory of a collective
right for all Americans to bear arms.55
It is clear, according to the constitutional scholar Leonard W. Levy, that “if all it (the
Second Amendment) meant was the right to be a soldier or serve in the military, whether in the
militia or the army, it would hardly be a cherished right and would never have reached
constitutional status in the Bill of Rights.”56 Nonetheless, the right to keep and bear arms is not
unlimited. Public regulations and laws passed over the last fifty years on both the state and
federal governmental levels specify the kinds of firearms that are lawful and the conditions
through which weapons can be used and kept; however, no regulation may subvert that right to
legally possess personal firearms itself.57
According to political scientist Robert Spitzer, “the right to bear arms is prefaced by the
necessity for the government to maintain a militia in order to ensure security for the nation”.58 It
is important to note, as former Chief Justice Warren Burger argued, the word “because” should
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be read as the opening line of the amendment. As such, the amendment should be read as
“[because] a well-regulated militia [is] necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed”.59 The intent of the Founding Fathers was
that the keeping and bearing of arms should stem from a necessity for a government to keep,
organize, and regulate a militia.60
The phrasing of to “bear arms” is connected throughout history to the possession of
firearms and weapons for usage in a military capacity.61 For instance, in Aymette v. State, the
Tennessee State Supreme Court ruled that the right to bear arms had a military sense and no
other.62 Also in Hill v. Georgia, the Georgia State Supreme Court held that the right to bear
arms is guaranteed for members of the local and state militia only.63 This traditional military
conception of bearing arms is much different than the current notion of the Second Amendment
to mean personal possession of firearms for hunting activities or for the protection of ones
person, family, or property.64 Second Amendment matters now encompass issues relating to
hunting activities, personal and familial protection, concealed weapons, gun permits, semiautomatic and automatic weapons, gun bans, along with many others.
Contemporary Legal Constructions of the Second Amendment
According to the historian Garry Wills, the fearful atmosphere of the Cold War and the
first cadre of Second Amendment scholars joined together to create a new paradigm through
which stakeholders in the gun rights/control debate have viewed and argued the ramifications of
Second Amendment political decisions.65 President Dwight D. Eisenhower stoked the flames of
the Cold War and gun ownership at the very end of his term in office.66 On 17 January 1961,
Eisenhower delivered his famed farewell address in which he warned Americans of the creation
of a “military-industrial complex,” a process in which private companies gained increasing levels
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of influence within the United States Department of Defense and federal government in general.
Although an increase in defense spending became an important earmark in the national budget
and provided an important boost to the nation’s flagging economy after war, the military buildup also generated great political debate.67
Eisenhower’s Cold War rhetoric correctly predicted a seemingly endless conflict against
the aggressive communist enemies.68 Communism, a socio-political movement that developed in
the Soviet Union and other satellite nations, attempts to establish a classless and stateless society
that is organized upon collective property ownership.69 The basic tenets of communism directly
conflict with the fundamental doctrine of freedom, life, liberty, and property important to
American life. Although the Cold War and the military-industrial complex did not provide arms
to average American citizens, it did create a sense of suspicion among the populace that was
firmly rooted in reality. During the Cold War, Soviet communism, when judged versus liberal
democracy, was evil, even if people did not know the full scope of the devastation of humane
values, slave labor, and deliberate famine.70 The suspicion of attacks by enemies of the United
States, when coupled with increases in urban gun violence increased personal gun ownership in
America.71
The anxious call during the mid-twentieth century for the need for private gun ownership
stemmed from (or produced) three significant American political assassinations and the fearful
atmosphere promulgated by the Cold War era of the 1950s and 1960s,72 while members of
academia became prominent in the Second Amendment debate between the 1960s and the 1980s
because of their association with gun control interests.73 The assassinations of President John F.
Kennedy in 1963, presidential candidate and U.S. Senator Robert F. Kennedy (D-NY) in 1968,
and civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1968, were each carried out with mail-order,
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military surplus firearms obtained from different foreign and domestic firearms industry
catalogues. With three low-pressure clutches of firearm triggers, the contemporary gun rightsgun control debate in American culture and politics had begun.74
In addition to the three important political assassinations, a horrific shooting brought the
debate over gun rights-gun control to a fever pitch. On 1 August 1966, Charles Whitman, a
mentally-disturbed student at the University of Texas at Austin and former Marine, climbed to
the twenty-ninth floor observation deck of the school’s administrative building and shot fortyeight people with numerous rifles, killing sixteen individuals. Whitman’s victims included
people inside the building and on the campus green below. Directly before the shooting
rampage, Whitman murdered his wife and mother in their homes. Nearly two hours after
shooting began, Austin Police finally reached Whitman on the observation deck. After a short
gun fight, Whitman was killed. As a result of the Whitman shooting rampage, President Lyndon
Johnson called for stricter gun control policies.75
More than two decades after Eisenhower’s farewell address another American President
and his wife stoked the underlying flames relating to firearms through their war on drugs. In
early 1982, First Lady Nancy Reagan began pushing a “Just Say No” to drugs awareness agenda,
which aimed to discourage the usage of recreational drugs among America’s children and
teenagers.76 As the First Lady said, “If you can save just one child, it's worth it…”.77 During the
course of her five year awareness campaign, the First Lady traveled to sixty-five drug and
violence plagued cities in thirty-three states.78 While the First Lady made public appearances on
behalf of her agenda, the President busied himself by helping to enact significant policies
responding to the perceived increased usage of drugs in America.79
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By 1986, Reagan signed a massive drug enforcement bill that funded the war on drugs
and required mandatory minimum sentences for all drug offenses.80 While some critics lauded
this effort as a good first step, others heavily criticized the bill for helping to promote significant
racial disparities in American prisons and doing nothing to reduce the availability of drugs on the
streets.81 Reagan also created the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) through the
Anti-Drug Act of 1988. The goal of the new office was to provide a central coordination point
within the federal government for drug-related legislative, security, diplomatic, research, and
health policy. Headed by a director known as the “Drug Czar,” the office attained cabinet-level
status in 1993 under President Clinton, but has since been demoted within the Executive Office
of the President.82 Even though firearms played a central, active role in the associated violence
of the drug trade, the various anti-drug enactments of the 1980s failed to address any firearmrelated reforms.83
Along with these important political assassinations, the Cold War, and the war on drugs,
three different pieces of federal legislation stoked the flames of the debate over the Second
Amendment. The Firearm Owners’ Protection Act (FOPA) of 1986, passed against the protests
of many gun control advocates and interest groups, was crafted in order to restrain many of the
most rigorous provisions outlined in the federal Gun Control Act of 1968. FOPA allowed
licensed firearms dealers to distribute and sell firearms away from their business location, limited
on-site dealer inspections performed by the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms,
prohibited the creation of a national gun registry, and allowed interstate ammunition sales.84
A second piece of federal legislation, the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, was a
reaction to both FOPA and the attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan and the
shooting of White House Press Secretary James Brady by John Hinckley, Jr. in 1981. The Brady
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Bill, as it was commonly known, required all individuals wishing to purchase a firearm from a
licensed gun dealer to go through a government background check before the sale was
completed.85 The Brady Bill prohibited certain individuals, such as people who were under
indictment, ex-convicts, fugitives from justice, the mentally disabled, illegal aliens, or former
members of the Armed Forces discharged dishonorably, from shipping, transporting, buying, or
owning any firearm.86 Concealed weapons laws are often associated with the Brady Bill;
however, most concealed weapons laws were passed through other statutes, and have created
significant debate within academic circles.87
In the weeks following President Bill Clinton’s signing ceremony for the Brady Bill, the
NRA immediately brought suit in ten states that asked the federal courts to declare the Brady Bill
unconstitutional. This litigation effort culminated in the Supreme Court case, Printz v. United
States. In Printz, the Supreme Court held that a provision of the Brady Bill, that compelled state
and local law enforcement officials to perform mandated background checks for a limited period
of time, were unconstitutional violations of the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. However,
the most important Brady provisions were upheld and the effect of this decision was negligible,
as the vast majority state and local law enforcement officials continued to do the mandated
background checks.88
A third federal law, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, was
passed by a Democratically-controlled Congress and signed into law by President Bill Clinton in
the wake of numerous gang-related killings, school shootings, and public mass killings with
assault weapons in the 1980s and 1990s. The piece of legislation banned the sale, ownership,
and usage of nineteen named guns and 200 other guns that fell under definitions included in the
assault weapons ban. According to the Act, selected pistols, rifles, and shotguns were not
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appropriate for usage by non-military personnel. After the law was enacted, both foreign and
domestic firearms manufacturers were able to skirt the periphery of the provision by making
minor alterations to their firearms that allowed for the guns to be sold to the public. A decade
after the passage of the assault weapons ban, a Republican-controlled Congress and President
George W. Bush allowed the law to sunset without reauthorization.89
Three events that occurred both during and after the life of the assault weapons ban
focused attention on firearms, violence, and the failure of gun control laws in the United States.
In a chilling account of the 1998 Columbine High School shooting, author Dave Cullen reported
that shooters Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold bypassed the assault weapons ban and other gun
laws by having adult friends Robyn Anderson, Phil Duran, and Mark Manes procure their assault
weapons from the Tanner Gun Show in Denver, Colorado, in December 1998.90 This so-called
“gun show loophole” utilized by the friends of the Columbine killers allows private sellers and
individuals who were not engaged in business to sell guns at gun shows without conducting
background checks.91
Following the terrible attack at the high school, the only people ever charged with a crime
for the massacre were Duran and Manes for providing the weapons to the underage shooters,
while a parent of one of the victims of the tragedy, Tom Mauser, became a gun control advocate
for SAFE (Sane Alternatives to the Firearms Epidemic) Colorado. Mauser helped to legally
close the gun show loophole in Colorado. Mauser’s gun control success was limited to his home
state, as the U.S. Congress failed to pass any significant legislation in response to the Columbine
attacks.92
Similar to the Columbine High School attacks, the “Beltway Sniper Attacks” occurred in
Maryland and Virginia a few years later and transpired by circumventing existing gun control
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laws. The spree killings, carried out by the former Army marksman John Allen Muhammad and
his protégé, Lee Boyd Malvo, were perpetrated with a stolen Bushmaster XM-15 semi-automatic
.223 caliber rifle equipped with a holographic sight for ranges of between 50 and over 100 yards.
The Bushmaster rifle used by Muhammad and Malvo was an assault weapon that had been
slightly altered by a foreign firearms distributor in order to conform to the principles outlined in
the assault weapons ban; however, the weapon was still considered a semi-automatic assault
rifle.93 After ten shootings in three weeks in the Washington, D.C. Metro area, the spree killings
have become the perfect example of what can take place through the evasion of gun control
laws.94
Following the expiration of the assault weapons ban in 2004, individuals who could
complete the mandated background checks were then able to again purchase assault weapons.
This is what occurred leading up to the April 2007 Virginia Tech massacre. Seung-Hui Cho, a
U.S. permanent resident, South Korean national, and Virginia Tech undergraduate student, killed
thirty-two people and wounded many more in an attack in two buildings on the Blacksburg,
Virginia, campus. The mentally-ill Cho purchased his selected assault weapons over the internet
from a federally-licensed firearms dealer based in Wisconsin, and then completed the required
background check at a pawnshop in the Blacksburg area. The background check for the guns
was approved because his juvenile mental health records had been sealed after his eighteenth
birthday. The Virginia Tech shooting brought strong calls for gun legislation that would align
mental health officials with those conducting background checks in order to protect the public.95
Four years later, no substantial state or federal laws have been passed in the wake of the
massacre. The various pieces of gun control legislation that have passed are not working and
efforts following tragedies to pass important gun laws have failed, as well. Even when political
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leaders become aware of ineffective gun laws, these leaders have shown a consistent
unwillingness to amend them. Although many of these presidential pronouncements,
congressional statutes, and actions of madmen provide stark examples of the deep sectional,
cultural, and ideological divide in American life, they have also created a sense of need for
greater gun control legislation and increased interest in the Second Amendment.
Roots of the Political and Cultural Debate over the Second Amendment
These historical, legal, and political debates over Second Amendment rights reflect a
deep cultural and ideological divide in American life. For instance, states that possess higher
percentages of gun ownership are also some of the most conservative ideologically, while states
that have the lowest percentages of gun ownership are some of the most liberal ideologically.
Culturally, southern and western states have higher percentages of gun ownership and are more
conservative than their liberal counterparts in the northeast and the Midwest. This cultural and
ideological divide shows that residents of Southern and Western states possess a perspective that
is enamored with individualism and is almost suspicious in its fear of external manipulation and
control of its interests by the state or federal government. The same ideological divide has
created a contrary perspective in the Northeastern and Midwestern states that assumes the need
for civic control of license, greed, and disorderly interests to ensure a civil society through
control over the sale, ownership, and usage of firearms.
Three recent studies published by the non-partisan Pew Research Center for the People
and the Press illustrate the same deep cultural and ideological divide. A 2010 Pew Research
Study on gun ownership and gun control reported that public support for governmental control
over gun ownership is at a twenty-year low, while polling trends support the notion that the
protection of gun rights has increased in support in every region of the country over the last five
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years. However, not every region is created equal when it comes to percentage of support for
gun rights. The Midwestern and Southern regions have overall support for gun rights, while
Eastern and Western states possess a majority of citizens that continue to support gun control
policies. Political conservatives and self-described Republicans support gun rights twice as
much as political liberals and self-described Democrats.96
Another Pew Research Study from 2005 reports that gun ownership is much more
prevalent among Republicans and groups associated with the party than among Democrats or
those associated with the political left. Polling data shows that a solid majority of self-described
political conservatives report that they own guns and keep them in their homes. Gun ownership
among conservatives rested at 59 percent, while gun ownership among liberals was polled at 23
percent.97 Table One (taken from a third Pew Research Study) provides a visual representation
of the deep sectional, cultural, and ideological divide in American life that is clearly reflected in
Second Amendment policy and public debate.98
Table One: Long-Term Trends Regarding Support for Gun Rights

Source: Pew Research Center for the People & Press. (2010). Public Divided Over State, Local Laws Banning
Handguns; Since 2008, Increased Support for Gun Rights. Retrieved 14 August 2010 from http://peoplepress.org/report/599/handguns.
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A Gallup polling trend analysis of stricter gun control laws conducted both before and
after the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,
shows some fluctuation in public opinion. Table Two, below, shows that levels of support for
less strict gun laws two years before the bombing at only seven percent. Two years later, and
right after the bombing, the same poll was conducted and found that the support for less strict
gun laws had almost doubled, while those respondents wanting stricter gun laws decreased by
more than five percent.99
Table Two: Stricter Gun Laws—Gallup Trend
Date

More Strict

Less Strict

Kept as are

Gun Laws

Gun Laws

Now

62 percent

12 percent

24 percent

2 percent

1993

67

7

25

1

1991

68

5

25

2

1990

78

2

17

3

1995 April

No Opinion

23-23

Source: Gallup Organization. (1995). Gallup Polling Trend (May 1995). In Bijlefeld, M., ed. The Gun Control
Debate; A Documentary History. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, p. 104-105.

Because so few important constitutional questions regarding the Second Amendment
were broached within the three branches of government prior to the current era, there was little
scholarly interest in studying the Amendment.100 However, a number of events sparked a
marked increase in interest in the Second Amendment as an assurance of a right to bear arms for
individuals and militias and beyond over the last fifty years. Even before this peaked interest,
the National Rifle Association (NRA) campaigned on the premise that the amendment applied to
private ownership of guns for all Americans. Originally developed in conjunction with the
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National Guard and devoted to military marksmanship, the NRA subsequently condemned the
work of the National Guard as not doing the work of a real militia.101
The Second Amendment and Interest Groups
Typically confusion over the meaning of the Second Amendment, and an important
factor in the formulation of the current notion of the Second Amendment, stems from the
politically motivated reading of only a selected portion of its text.102 The Executive Director of
the National Rifle Association (NRA), and a gun rights lobbyist Wayne LaPierre has either
written or ghost-written numerous works in which he has only cited in error the second part of
the Amendment. In one instance, LaPierre, argued that interests outside the United States have
attempted to have the right to bear arms taken out of the Bill of Rights,103 while LaPierre
provided his understanding of the Second Amendment since ratification of the Bill of Rights in
another work.104 LaPierre and other authors have increasingly focused solely on the second part
of the Amendment, in which the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be taken
away, while not acknowledging the first part of the Amendment, where it clearly mentions the
importance of militias to the statute.105
A cursory view of the NRA’s website, the preeminent American gun rights group, reveals
no mention of the need for a well-regulated militia. Instead, the NRA focuses its unwavering
attention on the need for firearms programs that foster safe and responsible gun ownership and
usage.106 It is clear that the process that crafted the Bill of Rights, and thus the Second
Amendment, included numerous individuals and was established through a number of
compromises essential to produce a document that was acceptable to a majority of the states in
convention and was able to win the support of a majority of members of Congress. Through
these compromises within the legislative process, the conceptions of the language within the
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Second Amendment have changed and are exposed to significant debate and
misunderstanding.107
Although Spitzer and other scholars have focused on the rights and liberties associated
with the Second Amendment, other authors have attempted to examine the public policy
consequences of the debate over the Second Amendment. Legal scholar Mark V. Tushnet argues
that in order to fully understand the debate over gun rights and gun control it is important to
consider and examine public policy, as well as the law.108 From Tushnet’s analysis, it is clear
that gun-related policies that survive political processes will do little to reduce violence and will
be more likely to side with the arguments of gun rights groups, such as the NRA. The argument
that making it harder to buy guns at stores or gun shows will decrease gun ownership and
violence is just not true. When advocates of gun control win political or legal battles, typically
they find it difficult to enact or sustain strong gun-control policies because a culture war over
American civil liberties occurs. Opponents of the passage of the Brady Bill helped to mobilize
support for the Republican takeover of the U.S. Congress in the 1994 midterm elections.109
Comparatively, other authors have focused on policies that center upon the ownership of
firearms in relation to the Second Amendment. For instance, Dennis Henigan, Vice President of
the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, was the first author to link the increased gun
ownership in America with the slogans of the gun lobby. For more than forty years, the gun
lobby has had remarkable success in blocking the passage of gun control legislation.110 Harcourt
also considers firearms ownership, and the associated violence, from the perspectives of youth.
Through structured interviews with youths detained in correctional facilities, the author finds that
public policy and the law do not focus on the two issues that could help high risk youth,
recidivism and gun ownership.111
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According to Philip Cook and Jens Ludwig, the ever increasing percentage of gun
ownerships in the United States has, in turned, swelled the number of individuals injured or
killed by firearms.112 John Lott, Jr. examined Second Amendment gun ownership policy from
the viewpoint of whether or not owning a gun saves or costs lives. Tracking gun ownership and
crime rate data for all U.S. counties between 1977 and 1994, John Lott, Jr. found that gun
ownership has grown across all demographic groups, while national crime rates have been falling
at the same time as gun ownership has been growing. States that have experienced the greatest
reductions in crime rates also possess policies that have allowed for the fastest growing
percentage of gun ownership.113
Alternately, Philip Ludwig and Jens Cook consider the policies related to the Second
Amendment from a protective policy perspective. In an offering published by the non-partisan
Brookings Institute, the authors compare the United States with other developed nations, as the
U.S. is clearly unique in that it has high rates of both gun ownership and homicides. Although
widespread gun ownership does not have an automatic increasing effect on the overall crime
rate, gun use does make violence related to criminal activity more lethal, more prevalent, and has
a unique capacity to terrorize the public. Gun crime accounts for most of the costs of violent
crime in the United States, which is more than $100 billion per year.114
While authors, such as Lott, Ludwig, and Cook, have focused their scholarly attention on
support for a particular public policy position, others have explored Second Amendment policies
associated with the various aspects of gun ownership. For instance, in a new work, Robert
Spitzer observes that in the United States someone is murdered every twenty-one minutes by
firearms. According to the author, if gun policies were narrowly tailored to prevent guns from
falling to the hands of those who would do harm then fewer people would killed by firearms.115
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Instead of focusing directly on gun ownership, Colin Loftin, Milton Heumann, and David
McDowall explored alternatives to gun control legislation. The main alternative to passage of
legislation that focuses explicitly on gun control is mandatory sentence laws. Mandatory
sentence laws would allow legislators to punish individuals who commit gun crimes without
supporting legislation that infringes upon the right to bear arms.116
Lott and John Whitley explored gun ownership through the lens of safe-storage laws.
While many safe storage advocates voice the opinion that these types of laws save lives, the
authors of this work provide a strong rebuke to that notion.117 Thomas Marvell examined the
numerous 1994 federal and state laws that piggybacked the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act and banned the possession of handguns by individuals under the age of eighteen years old.
Estimating the laws’ impacts on various crime measures, such as juvenile gun homicide rates and
suicide rates, the author finds that even with many different crime measures and regression
specifications, there is little to no evidence that suggests that the new gun laws had the intended
effect of reducing gun violence and homicides prior to the application of the sunset provisions of
the federal and state laws.118
Conversely, Glenn Pierce and William Bowers explore the groundbreaking 1981
Massachusetts-based Bartley-Fox Gun Act, which made the illegal carrying of any firearm
within the state borders punishable with a mandatory one-year prison sentence. Using FBI crime
data inside interrupted time series analysis, the authors found that the law substantially reduced
the amount of gun assaults; however, the law seemed to have increased the number of non-gun
related armed assaults. The authors also found that this law produced a reduction in gun
robberies, while it also increased the amount of non-gun related armed robberies. Many of the
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non-gun related armed assaults and armed robberies were carried out with other weapons, such
as knives and other sharp objects.119
Interest groups have also helped to shape the litigation over the Second Amendment. In
particular, interest groups have attempted to shape litigation in a number of different ways. Lee
Epstein and Joseph Kobylka argued that abortion and death penalty-related interest groups
helped dramatically shape the debate over their respective issues. Focusing on amicus curiae
briefs, the authors found that interest groups affected abrupt legal change be offering numerous
briefs that had a direct impact on the rulings made justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.120
Second Amendment interest groups have also played important roles in changing the
legal perspectives of firearms law. Brian Doherty’s gun rights account of the behind-scenes
action before and during the consideration of the Heller decision provides significant background
for understanding the thinking of Supreme Court justices on critical constitutional and policy
issues. Accordingly, Doherty provides extensive background about the maneuvering that
allowed Associate Justice Antonin Scalia to deliver the majority opinion in Heller. There seems
to be a consensus among scholars that the four other justices in the majority forced Scalia to
blunt the original language of the proposed decision or there was the potential for a defection,
which would have been lethal to the outcome of the 5-4 decision. Scalia’s original view on the
case was that an individual right to own and possess firearms could be clearly established by the
legal application of historical interpretation, grammar, and common sense.121
Doherty provides other compelling stories about the plaintiffs' fight for the right to
protect themselves and their families from violent, crime-ridden neighborhoods, the activist
lawyers who worked exhaustively to affirm that right, and the forces that fought to stop the case
from being heard, including city officials and the NRA. For instance, Dick Heller, the eventual
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plaintiff in the Heller case, was an avid firearms collector, weapons expert, and a licensed special
police officer for the District of Columbia, who had to carry a gun in the federal office buildings
in which he worked; however, he was unable to have one in his possession at home. Living in a
high-crime area of southeastern D.C., Heller had seen the area transform from a family-friendly
environment to a rampant drug haven. Heller was the natural choice in the case once the Cato
Institute had completed its vetting process to determine the best possible plaintiff.122
Although Doherty, Levy, and Mellor provide impenitent support for gun rights, others
have published work about the horrors of gun violence in the streets of the United States. For
instance, in a fascinating personal account of horrors of gun violence in the streets of America,
Geoffrey Canada notes that firearms are the reason why inner cities in New York, Los Angeles,
Chicago, and beyond are so violent. Essentially, the explosion of killings across the inner city is
based upon decades of ignoring issues associated with guns, the failure to reign in the power of
gangs, and collapse of support for increased sentencing on gun crimes.123 Alexander DeConde
outlined many of the events that lead up to the passage of the Brady Bill and continued efforts in
the U.S. Congress and state legislatures to pass increased gun control legislation. For instance,
in late 1999, a masked gunman short and killed three people in an Anaheim Medical Center.
Three days later, investigators found that the total amount of money spent on treating gunshot
victims was a sum equal to the spending on guns. Once the California Assembly came back into
session, they debated and ultimately rejected proposals to make gun crimes punishable by
tougher sentences.124
As the illustrated in this section, debate over the right to own firearms has affected
American presidential policy, congressional public policy, and the judicial opinions, along with
culture, cultural conflict, ideology, and academic interest. From each of these different
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perspectives, the deep sectional, cultural, and ideological divide in American life apparent within
the debate over the Second Amendment is easily discernable. The same firearms debate has
often times been expressed in legal terms and also exemplifies the importance of the constitutive
function of legality in American life. Nowhere has this debate and legality perspective
manifested itself more than inside the walls of state and federal courtrooms across the United
States. This dissertation focuses on the Second Amendment debate inside the state and federal
judiciary across the country. The following section provides an introduction to the research
setting for the dissertation.
Introduction to the Research Setting
Every day federal, state, and local judges across the United States render decisions on
issues ranging from mundane municipal parking violations to the polarizing political issue of the
constitutionality of unlimited political campaign expenditures made by large private
corporations. These decisions, especially those regarding polarizing political issues, are crafted
and affected by a number of internal and external forces, including the judge’s personal interests,
his/her colleagues on the bench, the professional and personal circles the judges interact with
outside the walls of their chambers or courtrooms, the presidential nominations that allowed the
judges to achieve their professional standing, and the political and ideological forces that the
judges must obey in order to maintain their professional standing, among many others.
These internal and external factors affect judicial rulings, American public policy
outcomes, and even the way the public goes about their lives on a daily basis. Although relevant
in so many ways, judicial behavior and the forces that affect that behavior have failed to
determine differences in behavior between the many institutions of the state and federal
judiciary. Second, scholarship has failed to provide a descriptive analysis of the extent of
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judicial rulings at the various levels of the judiciary. Third, the literature has not explained the
judicial outcomes of polarizing public policies, such as the Second Amendment. Fourth,
scholars have been unable to explain the behavior of the lawyers who litigate these important
cases. This dissertation attempts to do all four of these tasks. The following paragraphs explain
the research setting, objective, theory, and design of each chapter included in this dissertation.
The second chapter will consider Second Amendment interest groups, cause lawyers, and
strategic litigation through the lens of legal participation in firearms-related cases, the litigation
strategies of Second Amendment interest groups and lawyers, the avenues through which Second
Amendment interests and lawyers shop for court venues, the coordination and networking efforts
of these related groups, and the interest group and legal team organization. This chapter utilizes
telephone interviews with both gun rights and gun control Second Amendment cause lawyers
and group leaders litigating state and federal firearms cases for reputable firearms interest
groups.
The list of potential candidates for the leader and lawyer interviews was culled from data
collected regarding state supreme court and federal courts of appeal cases in which a legal party
either made a Second Amendment claim or cases where the central issue involved in the case
centered upon Second Amendment issues that were litigated between 1 January 1960 and 31
December 2009. In this chapter, I theorize that there will be clear differences between gun rights
and gun control interest groups, between heavily funded and lesser funded interest groups, and
between local, state, and national Second Amendment interest groups, with regard to legal
participation, litigation strategies, venue-shopping, coordination, networking, and organization.
Sixteen interviews with both interest group leaders and lawyers were conducted between 24
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August and 15 October 2010. The literature review, research design, results of these interviews,
discussion, and conclusions are presented in chapter two.
The third chapter of the dissertation considers the extent of state supreme court decisions
in which a legal party either made a Second Amendment claim or cases where the central issue
involved in the case centered upon Second Amendment issues that were litigated between 1
January 1960 and 31 December 2009 through usage of logistic regression analysis. Case-level
data was collected from the legal search engine within the LexisNexis Academic database.
Search terms for data collection included the following phrases: Second Amendment, concealed
weapons, concealed weapons permits, automatic weapons, semi-automatic weapons, gun
violence, gun show loophole, background checks, right to bear arms, sawed-off shot gun, assault
weapon, convicts and firearms, and gun bans. After data collection, a total of 269 cases fit these
selected criteria.
The dependent variable was the actual gun control or gun rights rulings, while the
independent variables included state supreme court judge selection method, the presence of a
state intermediate appellate court, state political ideology scores, state population density, state
gun ownership percentage, and state homicide rate. Logistic regression commands for the
variables mentioned above were used within Stata, the statistical analysis program. In this
chapter, I theorize that elected state supreme court judicial selection methods, the presence of a
state intermediate appellate court, a conservative state political ideology, low state population
density, high gun ownership percentages, and low homicide rates increase the probability of a
Second Amendment decision that will favor gun rights, while non-elected state supreme court
judicial selection methods, the absences of a state intermediate appellate court, a liberal state
political ideology, high state population density, low gun ownership percentages, and high
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homicide rates increase the probability of a Second Amendment decision that will favor gun
control. The literature review, research design, results of this statistical analysis, discussion, and
conclusions are presented in chapter three.
The fourth chapter of the dissertation considers federal appellate decisions in which a
legal party either made a Second Amendment claim or cases where the central issue involved
centered upon Second Amendment issues that were litigated between 1 January 1960 and 31
December 2009 through usage of logistic regression analysis. As with the previous chapter,
case-level data was collected from the legal search engine within the LexisNexis Academic
database. Search terms for data collection included the following phrases: Second Amendment,
concealed weapons, concealed weapons permits, automatic weapons, semi-automatic weapons,
gun violence, gun show loophole, background checks, right to bear arms, sawed-off shot gun,
assault weapon, convicts and firearms, and gun bans. After data collection, a total of 219 cases
fit these selected criteria.
The dependent variable was the gun control or gun rights rulings, while the main
independent variable was the majority appellate panel presidential nomination, which means that
if a panel had two Democratic-appointed judges and one Republican-appointed judge then that
case was coded as a Democratic appellate panel decision. Additional independent variables
include appellate panel political ideology, population density, gun ownership percentage, and
homicide rate. Logistic regression commands for the variables mentioned above were used
within Stata, the statistical analysis program.
In this chapter, it is theorized that circuit courts that have panel decisions with a
Republican majority, a conservative political ideology, low population density, high gun
ownership percentages, and low homicide rates increase the probability of a Second Amendment
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decision will favor gun rights, while circuit courts that have panel decisions with a Democratic
majority, a liberal political ideology, high population density, low gun ownership percentages,
and high homicide rates increase the probability of a Second Amendment decision that will favor
gun control. The literature review, research design, results of this statistical analysis, discussion,
and conclusions are presented in chapter four. The fifth chapter of the dissertation presents a
summary of the findings in my dissertation, the research implications, and conclusions.
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CHAPTER TWO

SECOND AMENDMENT CAUSE LAWYERS

As long as there are guns, the individual that wants a gun to commit a crime is
going to have one and is going to get it.
 --3UHVLGHQW5onald Reagan, 1984
If I could have banned them all—“Mr. and Mrs. America turn in your guns”—I
would have!
--U.S. Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA), 1995
Emboldened by the 2008 U.S. Supreme Court ruling, District of Columbia v. Heller,
which affirmed an individual Second Amendment right to own and operate firearms inside a
federal district and found several portions of the D.C. Firearms Control Regulation Act of
1975 unconstitutional, the Second Amendment Foundation filed another suit in federal
court. Known as McDonald v. Chicago, the Second Amendment Foundation suit challenged a
controversial municipal handgun ban within the City of Chicago, IL.1 In preparation for the
McDonald case, the Second Amendment Foundation obtained the legal services of Alan Gura
of the law firm of Gura & Possessky, P.L.L.C. A rising star within the civil rights legal arena,
Gura had also successfully represented Dick Heller in D.C. v. Heller.2
Leading up the U.S. Supreme Court decision, Gura handled the McDonald case in the
circuit court, wrote the pleadings, devised hundreds of legal arguments, developed a litigation
strategy, and filed the petition for certiorari before the U.S. Supreme Court.3 Working with
the Second Amendment Foundation, the Illinois State Rifle Association, and Chicago attorney
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David Sigale on the case, Gura’s arguments explicitly challenged only parts of the Chicago
firearms ban. In particular, Gura confronted the Chicago prohibition on handgun registration,
the requirement that guns be registered prior to their acquisition by Chicago residents, the
mandate that guns be re-registered annually, and the permanent inability to register a firearm
that had its registration lapse.4
In McDonald v. Chicago, Gura’s knowledge of the case subject matter and the
conservative bent of the U.S. Supreme Court paid off. Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the
majority, sided with Gura and the Second Amendment Foundation, concluding “that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right
recognized in Heller.”5 Not only did the Supreme Court agree with Gura regarding the
unconstitutionality of the Chicago handguns ban, but the majority ruling incorporated, or
applied the Second Amendment to state law. With the skilled assistance of the Second
Amendment Foundation in McDonald and the National Rifle Association in Heller, Alan Gura
has become one of the preeminent gun rights and libertarian-affiliated lawyers in the United
States. The work of local, state, and federal gun rights and gun control cause lawyers, such as
Gura, is the focus of this study.
This study concentrates on state and federal Second Amendment cause lawyers
through the lens of legal participation in firearms-related cases, the litigation strategies of
Second Amendment interests and lawyers, how Second Amendment cause lawyers shop for
court venues, the coordination and networking efforts of related interests, and legal team
organization. This study utilizes telephone interviews with gun rights and gun control Second
Amendment cause lawyers litigating state and federal firearms cases. This study theorizes that
there will be distinct differences between gun rights and gun control cause lawyers, between
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heavily funded and lesser funded interest groups, and between local, state, and national
Second Amendment cause lawyers, with regard to legal participation, litigation strategies,
venue-shopping, coordination, networking, and organization. The following section reviews
important literature regarding cause lawyering.
Styles of American Cause Lawyering
The average American private practice lawyer is often seen as a “hired gun.” These
individuals are thought to possess shifting values based on the cases they are preparing for and
arguing in a legal setting. However, some practicing attorneys do enjoy an established set of
values that transfer into their working legal relationships. These attorneys, known as cause
lawyers, are committed legal professionals who pledge their time and legal skills in an attempt
to further the establishment of a better society. Essentially cause lawyers, motivated by their
own personal beliefs, attempt to elevate the legal profession beyond a simple tool through
which lawyers peddle their services for a fee without regard for the potential ends a case might
create. By attempting to connect personal morals with the legal profession, cause lawyers
attempt to improve humanity by challenging what they perceive to be wrong with society.6
Individual Client Lawyering
Four styles of cause lawyering have been proposed in order to better understand their
efforts. The first style of lawyering is known as individual client lawyering. The foundation
of the legal profession is the fundamental responsibility of an attorney to focus on the legal
needs of their clients. The simple goal of this form of cause lawyering is to provide clients
access to legal services who might not have representation otherwise. Most of the time, these
clients simply cannot afford legal representation because of their financial situation, and thus
have little to no access to the American justice system.7
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Individual client lawyers have been a mainstay within several different societal
litigation movement efforts over the last fifty years. For instance, Susan Olson found that the
litigation strategy surrounding the individual client lawyers that served the disabled have been
more decentralized at the state and local levels and featured greater client participation than
was apparent in the 1950s and 1960s.8 Neal Milner found that the lawyers who worked on the
legal protection of mentally disabled clients coped with what Stuart Schiengold labeled a
“myth of rights,” which referred to having faith in the protective and transformational
character of legal rights. However, lawyers of the mentally disabled have also established a
liberation ideology that accepted Schiengold’s “politics of rights,” which refers to rights as an
instrument or resource that can alter one’s life and the behavior of others.9 According to
Robert Mnookin and Robert Burt, children dealing with foster care, pregnancy, abortion,
school discipline problems, the welfare system, and mental retardation have seen mixed rates
of success when their cases were brought before the state and federal judiciary. Essentially,
success came down to resources. Individual client lawyers that had resources were more
successful.10
Individual cause lawyers also played important roles in the anti-poverty movement.
According to Joel Handler, Ellen Hollingsworth, and Howard Erlanger, anti-poverty lawyers
piggybacked on top of President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society anti-poverty initiatives. By
litigating cases at the same time as many of the Great Society programs, anti-poverty lawyers
were much more successful.11 Beth Harris argued that lawyers played a secondary role in the
anti-poverty movement by providing the resources and strategies for litigation, and lobbying
elected officials on behalf of clients and regarding poverty issues.12 Providing a different
perspective about cause lawyers fighting for the rights of the poor and disadvantaged, John

43

Kilwein argued that, contrary to the findings of other scholars, individual client lawyers in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania did play an integral role in the lives of the needy. Specifically, Kilwein
argued that poverty lawyers tailored different litigation strategies to the types of issues faced by
clients and groups.13
Cause lawyers have also been productive in fighting for the rights of workers, the
condemned, the convicted, and animals. Michael McCann powerfully illustrated that even when
lawyers were unsuccessful in wage discrimination and pay equity battles on behalf of female
workers, the battles helped to raise public consciousness about the rampant gender-based
discrimination in the workplace.14 In a different work, Austin Sarat considered the impact of
lawyers on the rights of condemned individuals. Arguing that capital punishment lawyers
created a political claim of “democratic optimism,” Sarat disagreed with the notion that the death
penalty was rooted in reality, but founded on ignorance and misunderstanding, of which
individual lawyers attempted to expose.15
Alternately, Susan Sturm explored the legacy and future of litigation surrounding
corrections and convicted individuals. Sturm investigated four main assumptions: that
corrections litigation has contributed to a greater understanding of institutions; leadership and
staff have contributed to American bureaucracy, and is associated with institutional order
through the help of lawyers. Sturm created these assumptions through careful review of
important corrections cases from the 1970s and 1980s.16 In a final piece, Helena Silverstein
examined the animal rights movement from the perspective of litigation practices. The most
important aspect of the work focused on the way litigation and associated strategies influenced
the activities and opportunities of the movement for success. She concluded that greater

44

societal reform regarding the rights of animals has been established through the work of
individual animal rights lawyers.17
Impact Cause Lawyering
The second style of lawyering is known as impact cause lawyering. This style of
lawyering is often punctuated by the litigation of class action lawsuits or deliberately chosen
cases. In particular, impact cause lawyers have sought to solve unjust conditions within
society through their litigation efforts. In many of these rulings, a favorable decision will
solve current societal problems, as well as future collective problems. According to John
Kilwein, effective impact litigation efforts should bring legal change to some practice,
institution, or group of individuals who have been negatively affected by certain elements of
society.18
The effects of impact cause lawyering have long been seen within the AfricanAmerican Civil Rights Movement. In fact, some of the first impact cause lawyers served
groups affiliated with the civil rights movement. In particular, scholars have focused on the
attempts by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal
Defense Fund during the 1940s and 1950s to overturn institutional segregation in public
education across the country. Richard Kluger outlined how cause lawyers, such as the future
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall, helped the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
litigate a number of educational segregation cases culminating in the Brown v. Board of
Education (1954) decision that prohibited racial segregation in educational facilities. Calling
the Brown decision one of the five most important U.S. Supreme Court rulings of all time,
Kluger established the fact that Thurgood Marshall became the principal hero of the fight for
civil rights for all people. Instead of directly confronting the Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)
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decision that upheld the constitutionality of racial segregation, Marshall decided that smaller
court victories within the sphere of the “separate but equal” legal edict would be a better
tactic. This litigation strategy created by Marshall resulted in a string of smaller victories that
eventually encouraged the NAACP legal team to challenge Plessy head on and succeed.19
Mark Tushnet emphasized the internal workings of the NAACP’s Legal Defense
Fund’s organization and their cause lawyers. Tushnet’s basic argument suggested that the
dedication, along with the significant political connections and legal skills of the NAACP
legal team and other staff members of the Legal Defense Fund, were responsible for the
ultimate success of this important interest group litigation effort. Individuals including Walter
White, Charles Hamilton Houston, and Thurgood Marshall, possessed the ability and
perseverance to topple one of the foremost social and institutional arrangements in America,
educational segregation.20
Jack Greenberg provided additional insight into the inner workings of the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund, as the author worked as Marshall’s legal assistant and eventually led the
fund after Marshall’s departure. While the author focused on the abilities of the lawyers he
worked with, Greenberg also made sure to note that organizational conflict did undermine the
group on several occasions when case representation and support were hotly debated.
However, Greenberg argued that these instances of conflict only brought their colleagues
closer together to fight against institutional segregation.21
Like Greenberg, Michael Meltsner was a cause lawyer from inside the NAACP Legal
Defense fund as an assistant under Thurgood Marshall and Jack Greenberg. During his time
with the Legal Defense Fund, Meltsner witnessed and participated in important litigation
supporting the African-American Civil Rights movement across the United States, and the
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South, in particular. While Meltsner participated in the potent efforts associated with the
Brown litigation, Meltsner also took part in other cases that tugged at his soul. In particular,
these litigation efforts surrounded cases, such as Griffin v. County School Board of Prince
Edward County (1964) and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971),
which attempted to dismantle the re-segregation efforts across the country in the years
following the first Brown decision.22
Stephen Wasby explored the litigation strategies of the American Civil Rights
Movement between the late 1960s and the 1980s. Wasby argued that earlier litigation strategy
studies overemphasized the planned nature of the NAACP’s and other strategic litigation
campaigns, and presented a different picture of what occurred during their litigation efforts.
The picture of the NAACP civil rights litigation strategy created by Wasby focused attention
on the problems faced by the lawyers litigating cases and noted how numerous aspects of the
strategy were not planned, simple, or linear, in nature, as other scholars have argued.23 In a
final piece, David Kairys became one of the preeminent civil rights cause lawyers living in the
North between 1960 and 1970. Kairys’ work focused on several successful race
discrimination cases from Philadelphia he brought against the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), and positively impacted the lives of local African-Americans.24
Impact cause lawyering has also been a part of the American Women’s Rights
Movement. In particular, the lawyers of the movement focused on lobbying efforts at the
executive and congressional levels for measures that helped gain more rights for women. For
instance, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 was a successful federal attempt to
outlaw racial and gender discrimination by employers and unions.25 In another effort, Title IX
was passed, after intense congressional and executive lobbying efforts by lawyers, to end
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gender-based discrimination in education.26 The culmination and, ultimately, the failure of the
Women’s Rights Movement resulted in congressional passage of the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA), an amendment that would have added gender-based discrimination
protection to the U.S. Constitution. However, the ERA failed to gain ratification by the states
before the deadline passed.27 However, Alice Echols argues that, even though lawyers lobbied
Congress on behalf of the equal employment act and the ERA, cause lawyers played
secondary roles in the movement. Lawyers who supported women’s rights joined local
feminist organizations represented women in legal cases that challenged the status quo.28
Impact cause lawyers have also been successful within welfare reform litigation efforts.
Martha Davis argued that cause lawyers played a significant role in the welfare rights movement.
In the movement, lawyers developed and implemented an ambitious litigation strategy that
fought for and won a “right to live” that required the federal government to guarantee a
minimum standard of living for all individuals.29 Barbara Sard made the case that the state and
federal courts, and in turn lawyers, played an important role in welfare reform. By helping to
establish a minimum wage, welfare rights lawyers were integral to the success of this
movement.30
Mobilization Cause Lawyering
The third style of lawyering is known as mobilization cause lawyering. Mobilization
lawyers attempt to give their clients a greater understanding of their class and group.
Attorneys attempt to communicate with their client that they are part of a historically
oppressed group within society. In order to achieve both of these goals, lawyers must create a
new dialogue with clients and establish a better understanding of what the legal profession can
achieve. Along with performing their normal legal functions for clients, mobilization lawyers
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engage clients in dialogue to create a state of collective affirmation. Mobilization lawyers
develop discussions between a number of clients in order for them to be made aware that they
are part of a larger group of individuals who suffer comparable difficulties in society.
Essentially, mobilization cause lawyers create dialogue between social group clients and the
community that aides the growth of group mobilization.31
One social group that has been able to establish a greater understanding of themselves
through litigation was the gay, lesbian, and transgender movement. According to Patricia
Cain, cause lawyers played a prominent role in the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
movement. These cause lawyers often successfully took on state sodomy laws, which were
one of the chief ways states targeted homosexual lifestyles and defined them as being deviant.
For instance, Abby Rubenfeld, legal director of Lambda Legal, a civil rights organization
focusing on homosexual communities, said that “sodomy laws are the bedrock of legal
discrimination against gay men and lesbians”.32
Patricia Cain explored the role of lawyers inside the gay and lesbian civil rights
movement in a separate volume. In particular, Cain provided a detailed examination of the
legal strategies used by gay rights cause lawyers in court. The litigation strategy employed by
many gay rights cause lawyers tried to emulate the success of the African-American Civil
Rights Movement by focusing on smaller local and state cases and achieving victories in these
cases. Unfortunately, the rate of success of gay rights cause lawyers was much less than that
of the NAACP because of the social stigma of the gay community. Cain argued that through
many of these early litigation efforts the lawyers helped to mobilize the gay community in to
being a cohesive unit when in court.33
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Client Voice Lawyering
The fourth style of lawyering is known as client voice lawyering. According to John
Kilwein, client voice lawyering involves more than a simple translation of a client’s story into
a legal case. Client voice lawyering involves clients gaining the ability to express their own
personal story outside the scope of a courtroom. Client voice lawyering scholars have argued
that this style retains some usefulness, but the lawyering process could be improved if the
voice of the clients could be heard. This dialogue between clients, lawyers, and the public
allows clients to learn about themselves and their social group, about the litigation process,
and about mobilizing activities.34
Scholarship regarding cause lawyering styles, civil rights, and social movement
litigation practices raises the question. How have cause lawyers dealt with issues related to
civil liberties? These four lawyering styles help us to explain how lawyers have helped civil
rights groups and other movement, but little work has been produced regarding civil liberties
cause lawyering. In particular, one of the most polarizing political issues in America today are
those often associated with firearms. Not only have firearms issues been legislated in
Congress, but firearms policies have also been handed down from the White House. Most
importantly, Second Amendment issues have been brought to court by cause lawyers
following different styles of lawyering with varying levels of success.
Why explore litigation to address issues related to firearms? Often times American
social and political movements, such as the African-American civil rights or the gun rights
movement, begin with noble expressions of outrage and employ what Stuart Scheingold
labeled a “myth of rights,” which refers to having faith in the transformational character of
legal rights, and the “politics of rights,” which refers to rights as an instrument or resource that
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can alter one’s life and the behavior of others. In particular, Schiengold argued that the
enduring faith most Americans place in constitutional government is the foundational point for
making sense of the contours of the American political community. Thus, Scheingold argued
that American law is a principal and responsive element of American national identity and
American politics itself.35
Scheingold argued that the symbolic life of law surfaces as a “myth of ULJKWV
Scheingold’s “myth of rights” refers to the common assumption that litigation can evoke
a declaration of rights from courts, that it can be used to assure the realization of these rights, and
that realization is equivalent to meaningful legal, political, and social change. In this way, the
myth of rights expressed a faith in the promises of constitutional government. Arguing that most
Americans are responsive to the law, Scheingold thus suggested that the “myth of rights”
augments American life in distinctive and creative ways.36
Scheingold argued that the “myth of rights” facilitates a “politics of rights” in three
important ways. First, a claim of rights may activate political consciousness, and a belief in
rights can help groups visualize and focus grievances and perceptions of unfairness that might
otherwise remain unclear. Second, a claim of rights could be useful for political organizations
that would like to increase their publicity. Third and finally, the cumulative impact of
consciousness and simplicity can encourage a realignment of resources and values at the public
policy level.37 This study explores Scheingold’s “politics of rights” through the participatory
practices, litigation strategies, venue-shopping, coordination/networking, and organization of
local, state, and national gun rights and gun control cause lawyers.
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Design of the Research
This study examines the participation, litigation strategies, venue-shopping, coordination
and networking, and organization of local, state, and national Second Amendment cause lawyers.
These five main issue areas strike at the heart of cause lawyering and policy litigation. The five
main issues became the focal point of the questions asked during interviews with Second
Amendment gun control and gun rights cause lawyers in this study. The following few sections
outline these five important interview areas, along with providing a rationale for the creation of
hypotheses and specific questions to be used in interviews with Second Amendment cause
lawyers.
Interest Group Case Participation
Interest group participation in the policy process and in case litigation in the courts has
long been a part of the strategy employed by interests that want to get ahead on certain policy
goals. For instance, Paul Collins and Lisa Solowiej analyzed pluralistic, competitive, and
conflictual interest group amicus curiae participation is in the U.S. Supreme Court. They found
that the federal appellate courts were open to an array of interests and that particular types of
groups did not dominate amicus activity. Nonetheless, when interests engaged in this express
form of participation, they played a clear role in shaping the flow of information.38 Karen
O’Connor and Lee Epstein updated a previous interest group amici participation study and found
that amicus briefs are filed in more than half of all non-commercial cases, and in two-thirds of
the cases when criminal cases are excluded. The authors also concluded that even from their
brief analysis, amicus curiae participation by interests has become the norm for legal
participation by groups.39
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Interest group participation in case litigation can take many forms. Susan Olson argued
that the use of case litigation is more generally a function of an interest group's political and legal
resources and participation. Thus, patterns of interest-group litigation might parallel patterns of
group participation in other arenas. A survey of interest-group litigation in private civil cases in
the Minnesota federal district courts found that cases involving regulatory policy attracted the
highest frequency of group participation efforts, but a greater number of cases involving
redistributive policy attracted more group activity overall. District court litigation also included
more citizen groups relative to occupational groups than a survey of interest groups at the
national level found.40
Richard Kluger argued the strategic participation of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in
certain litigation efforts was paramount in their success. Instead of confronting the Plessy v.
Ferguson (1896) head on, Marshall and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund decided that smaller
court victories within the sphere of the “separate but equal” legal statute would be a more
successful tactic. This litigation strategy created by Marshall resulted in a number of smaller
victories that eventually encouraged the NAACP legal team to challenge Plessy head on and
succeed. The strategic participation in local and state cases allowed the NAACP to ultimately
succeed in their efforts to achieve equality.41
Kristin Goss argued that the National Rifle Association (NRA), the preeminent American
Second Amendment interest group, has engaged in both preemptive and reactive legal action on
behalf of gun rights clients. The NRA employed preemptive legal action against the Chicago,
IL, suburb of Morton Grove when it decided, by action of the town council, to ban the ownership
and possession of firearms inside the municipal limits of the town. The NRA engaged in
reactive legal action most of the time. In particular, the NRA flexed its legal muscle when the
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group successfully sued Handgun Control, Inc. over postal discounts the group enjoyed in the
early 1980s, and when the NRA unsuccessfully sued the Washington, D.C., city council over a
local gun ownership and possession ban.42
Osha Davidson argued that while the NRA focused their attention on litigating certain
cases and issues, the majority of their participation rested in lobbying the U.S. Congress. For
instance, when the NRA was attempting to have the 1986 Gun Control Act repealed, the NRA
concentrated on lobbying members of Congress rather than bringing lawsuits.43 Scott Melzer
argued that the NRA was an active participant in policy litigation from the 1980s to the present.
In particular, Melzer argued that once foreign and domestic gun manufacturers started to produce
guns that bypassed certain provisions of the Brady Bill, the NRA began an assault on the statute,
as well as the manufacturers. In the end, the effort amounted to little as the NRA failed to have
the bill ruled unconstitutional in the courts.44
I suggest a similar dynamic is at work regarding interest group participation in the courts,
as there is a potential dichotomy between gun rights and gun control interests and their use of the
judiciary. I hypothesize that there will be clear differences between gun rights and gun control
interest groups, between heavily funded and lesser funded Second Amendment interest groups,
and between local, state, and national Second Amendment interest groups with regard to way the
interest groups decide to participate in cases. This work and hypotheses propelled me to pose
questions on the topic of legal participation during telephone interviews with Second
Amendment interest group cause lawyers. Interview questions for case participation focused
attention on participation in Second Amendment case litigation, how cases get to certain interest
groups, how and why interest groups decide to become involved with cases, and the factors that
determine interest group participation in certain cases.
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Interest Group Litigation Strategies
The litigation strategies used by various legal teams in the African-American civil
rights movement, lesbian and gay civil rights movement, and other ideologically-based
movements have been a central issue of study within the literature of interest group and
judicial-based literature. Stephen Wasby suggested that the common picture surrounding civil
rights interest group litigation was one of success with ease after a planned and crafted
litigation campaign was inaccurate. Instead, Wasby argued that the majority of civil rights
litigation that occurred after the Brown decision should be characterized as unplanned
litigation activities that occurred throughout the “humps and bumps” of the civil rights
movement.45 Mark Tushnet's classic study of the civil rights movement provided a history of
this strategic litigation campaign in the years before the Brown decision. Tushnet elucidated
the NAACP’s litigation strategy during this period as one that focused on cases that the
lawyers thought that they could win, along with great success and relative ease after a planned
and carefully crafted litigation campaign both before and after the Brown decision.46
Since the mid-1970s, litigation within the civil rights arena was most notably carried
out by Morris Dees and Joseph Levin of the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) through
lawsuits against racist organizations and by taking on controversial discrimination cases. In
particular, Dees became the primary creator of an advanced discrimination litigation strategy.
Using civil lawsuits to gain court judgments for monetary damages against discriminatory
organizations for illegal practices, Dees then used the court system to gain access to
organizational assets, such as money or property, to have the judgment paid out. SCLC
lawyers used this innovative litigation strategy to hold the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) responsible
for the acts of its followers. By the early 1980s, Dees and the SPLC successfully sued the
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KKK for the family of Michael McDonald, the black victim of a lynching in rural Alabama
carried out by KKK members. In the judgment, the McDonald family was awarded seven
million dollars.47 Eventually, the United Klans of America were forced into bankruptcy
because of the judgment, and it caused their national headquarters to be sold in order to fulfill
the judgment.48
Patricia Cain explored the role of lawyers and their strategies inside the gay and
lesbian civil rights movement. For instance, lesbian and gay civil rights attorneys have relied
on similar legal arguments and strategies that were developed by earlier civil rights lawyers
fighting for racial and gender equality. These lesbian and gay civil rights lawyers challenged
discrimination against homosexuals through use of planned and carefully crafted litigation
campaigns that focused on constitutional equal protection theories that were rooted in the
Fourteenth Amendment.49 Much like Cain, Rebecca Salokar provided an in depth
examination of the litigation strategy utilized by the gay and lesbian civil rights movement.
Calling the litigation strategy used by the gay rights movement “systematic” in nature, Salokar
noted that the litigation strategy was not national in scope; however, it was focused on cases
that the various litigators could win in friendly judicial arenas.50
In one of the first articles focusing on conservative cause lawyers, Karen O’Connor and
Lee Epstein argued that, in fact, conservative interest groups do use the courts to litigate in a
strategic fashion. In particular, O’Connor and Epstein found that the strategic litigation
employed by conservative groups mostly consisted of the use of amicus curiae briefs since the
1970s.51 In a later work, Lee Epstein compared three types of conservative interest groups,
including economic, social, and public interest groups, to determine how each conducts litigation
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activities. In her comparison, Epstein found that conservative social and public interest groups
were more likely to utilize amicus curiae briefs than economic interest groups.52
Steven Teles explored the nature of The Federalist Society, a preeminent American legal
reform organization for conservatives and libertarians. Teles argued that the rapid growth of The
Federalist Society forced the organization to adopt unorthodox legal strategies to advance their
conservative agenda. Instead of working for direct legal change through the court system,
members of The Federalist Society choose to act as an intellectual organization focused on
networking between entrepreneurs who would bring legal action in the courts.53 Kim Scheppele
and Jack Walker developed a model of interest group litigation that included organizational
resources, conflict structure, sensitivity and structure of the political issue, strategies that gain
influence, and universe of the political issue. The authors discussed the two main litigation
strategies utilized by interest groups: lawsuits and amicus curiae brief filings.54
Lee Epstein and Joseph Kobylka also established the fact that the success and failure of
litigation strategies by interest groups, and litigators in general, can greatly affect how those
interests move forward inside and outside the courtroom. As the authors noted, litigation
strategies and tactics evolve over time, not just within the litigation of a case, but with a series
of cases over time that might be litigated by a diverse set of individuals and groups.55
Literature, such as the work reviewed above, drives this study to question whether gun
rights and gun control interest groups utilize different strategies during litigation. This study
hypothesizes that there will be distinct differences between gun rights and gun control interest
groups, between heavily funded and lesser funded Second Amendment interest groups, and
between local, state, and national Second Amendment interest groups with regard to the
strategies used during litigation. This work and hypotheses propelled me to ask certain
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questions on these topics during telephone interviews with Second Amendment interest group
cause lawyers. Interview questions for litigation strategies placed on emphasis the types of
litigation strategies used by Second Amendment interest groups, the productivity of litigation
strategies, and the level of influence opposing counsel has on litigation strategies.
Interest Group Judicial Venue-Shopping
The issue of venue-shopping in the policy process and in other political spectrums is a
relatively modern topic that has ramifications on both the success and failure of interest groups
regarding the policy issues that they support. Douglas Besharov examined the idea of forum
shopping with regard to tort reform. Focusing on individuals injured abroad, returned home,
and resorted to the American court system for remedy, Besharov found that these individuals
shopped between forums because of antiquated jurisdictional rules.56
The Harvard Law Review defined forum shopping as “a litigant’s attempt to have his
action tried in a particular court or jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most
favorable judgment or verdict”.57 The American legal system has tended to treat forum
shopping as unethical or inefficient. Often times, interest groups that shop for forums are
accused of abusing the adversary system and squandering precious judicial resources.
However, this law review note from Harvard University argued that these traditional notions
about forum shopping might be incorrect as the process is much more complex than these
characterizations suggest.58
Andreas Lowenfeld explored the idea of forum shopping in concert with international
litigation, arguing that less than two decades ago forum shopping in international litigation
efforts was a little used tactic. By the 1990s, forum shopping in litigation regarding
international issues had become a fine art. While forum shopping used to be a dirty tactic, it
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has become a litigation method used in almost 70 percent of international cases.59 Paul Rubin,
Christopher Curran, and John Curran examined how litigants in rent discrimination cases
shopped between different judicial venues. In particular, the authors argued that litigation
forum shopping, as opposed to lobbying a legislature, was a better method of helping
individuals injured during rent discrimination cases. Shopping between judicial venues helped
rent litigators find forums where their cases would be heard by a preferential court.60
In a litigation-based venue-shopping effort, Andrew Bell argued that the rules by
which a judicial venue is selected and settled upon for the resolution of any given
transnational dispute have created a complex body of laws of great commercial significance.
Venue-shopping allows for both plaintiffs and defendants to try to win their case in a selected
forum. Accordingly, Bell examined the fascinating competition to win the battle for venues in
transnational litigation, finding that venue-shopping within the judiciary and for interests is a
vital pre-trial process.61
Thomas Holyoke argued that most research on the lobbying strategies of organized
interests is venue specific. Yet organized interests frequently lobby in many different kinds of
institutional venues, including the judiciary, often on a single issue, such as the Second
Amendment. In testing a model regarding venue decision-making, Holyoke found significant
variation in the levels of lobbying performed by different organizations on issues in different
legal venues, while expectations of opposition from other interests are a significant factor in
the decision to lobby or take a case to a particular venue.62
Marc Busch examined the alternative dispute resolution legal process used in the
World Trade Organization (WTO) for preferential trade agreements between foreign nations, a
process that allowed for a rise in forum shopping because the WTO allows complaints to be
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filed with local, regional, or multilateral legal venues. Busch found that countries engaged in
these legal complaints discriminated along overlapping international membership lines.63
The scholarship regarding venue-shopping in general, and judicial venue-shopping
specifically, concentrated attention on the notion that interest groups do shop between judicial
venues when engaging in litigation. Consistent with the literature, this study hypothesizes that
there will be distinct differences between gun rights and gun control interest groups, between
heavily funded and lesser funded Second Amendment interest groups, and between local,
state, and national Second Amendment interest groups with regard to judicial venue-shopping.
Interview questions for interest group venue-shopping focused on whether or not certain
interest groups shop for venues, if certain levels of the judiciary are favored, and whether or
not litigation strategy changes based on the venue selected for litigation.
Interest Group Coordination and Networking
Interest group coordination and networking is a part of the strategy employed by
interest groups in pursuit of policy goals. An example of interest group coordination and
networking on behalf of litigation efforts comes from the gay and lesbian civil rights
movement. According to Patricia Cain, the gay and lesbian legal community developed solid
communication networking systems to keep each lawyer and interested group apprised of
important developments in cases involving lesbian or gay rights around the country and in
developed democracies across the world. This legal communication network that was
developed after the Stonewall riots helped to create a legal services program for the
homosexual community named Lambda. The Lambda network helped to create a gay and
lesbian legal strategy that was regional in scope because of the great geographical disparity in
the rights given to gays and lesbians between states.64
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Interest group coordination and networking has also been important within the
conservative legal movement. Focusing on the Pacific Legal Foundation, the preeminent
conservative/libertarian public interest legal group in the United States, Oliver Houck
provided the background for the creation and early work of the legal group. In particular,
Houck argued that the Pacific Legal Foundation was integral in the creation of a much larger
network of connected conservative interest groups with their eye on the state and federal court
system as a means to forward a right-leaning agenda.65
Ann Southworth argued that conservative interest groups and lawyers coordinated with
other interest groups and lawyers, business leaders, clergy, and other conservative activists in
support of conservative political issues, such as opposition to new regulatory policy, abortion
regulations, separation of church and state boundaries, liberalized criminal laws, pro-busing
laws, and opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment. This coordinated network of
conservative interest groups and lawyers gained critical support and resources for their legal
efforts from foundations, such as the Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute, and the
Federalist Society, committed to supporting these causes and from an emerging policy
research network capable of translating conservative and libertarian ideas into legislative and
litigation campaigns.66
John Heinz, Anthony Paik, and Ann Southworth found that conservative interest
groups used extensive interest group networks to gain legal success. In particular,
conservative interest groups, including those from diverse areas of religious conservatives,
libertarians, nationalists, and business interests, to litigate cases in state and federal
courtrooms.67 In a later work focusing on the networks and organizations of conservative
cause lawyers, Anthony Paik, Ann Southworth, and John Heinz argued that right-leaning and
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libertarian interest group cause lawyers organize with interests that they agree with politically.
The network of relationships established between lawyers and interest groups has helped to
establish and maintain local, state, and national conservative coalitions between groups.68
David King and Jack Walker argued that interest groups have attempted to carve out
their own policy niche through decentralized coordination with other interest groups.
According to a survey completed by the authors, nearly 90 percent of interest groups claimed
to coordinate all of their organized activities with other interests. This high level of
organization was fostered by the extent to which existing groups have joined together to help
pay the initial expenses of newly formed organizations. Coordination and communication
between and among groups were also enhanced to the extent that staffers move between
groups, as about three-quarters of groups employ permanent staff members who also held staff
positions in other groups.69
Ken Kollman explored when and why interest group leaders in Washington sought to
mobilize the public in order to influence policy decisions in Congress. Of particular
importance to this study was Kollman’s assertion that there is a distinct relationship between
interest group lobbyists and legislators on policy issues on which they agree. Coordination on
policy goals between interest groups and politicians extended into the judiciary, as well.70
This body of literature has focused attention on the potential for coordination and
networking between different types of interest groups to occur in a dissimilar fashion. This
study hypothesizes that there will be distinct differences between gun rights and gun control
interest groups, between heavily funded and lesser funded Second Amendment interest
groups, and between local, state, and national Second Amendment interest groups with regard
to coordination and networking. Interview questions regarding this issue emphasized interest
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group coordination and networking in the legal spectrum, coordination in general,
coordination between both state and national organizations, along with interest group
networking interdependencies and its effect on interest group litigation.
Interest Group Legal Team Organization
The organization of legal teams of local, state, and national interests has been a
defining variable in the success of interest groups in the attainment of their public policy goals
since interest group litigation started. An example of the importance of interest group legal
team organization comes from litigation efforts on behalf of the underprivileged. Robert
Moonkin and Robert Burt explored five case studies involving the underprivileged and the
role and effectiveness of test case litigation brought by public-interest attorneys and resultant
judicial policymaking in promoting the welfare and rights of children. In each instance, the
organization of the litigation team for each interest group was crucial in the success or failure
of each case study and interest group. Interest groups that had access to significant resources
were much more successful that than those that did not have the same access.71
In a seminal work on interest groups in American politics, E.E. Schattschneider argued
that the scope of political conflict is an aspect of the scale of political organization and the
extent of political competition. Of particular importance are pressure groups. Pressure groups
are small-scale organizations while political parties are large-scale organizations. Hence, the
outcome of the political process depends on the scale on which it is played. Since pressure
groups are not universal, when conflicts are played out in narrow scope, most of the people are
not represented. Business-related groups dominate the pressure system, leading to an upperclass bias. This bias was strengthened by the tendency for participation in voluntary
organizations to be related to upper social and economic status. Thus, heavily-moneyed
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interest groups have dominated the policy process.72 Agreeing with Schattschneider, Kevin
Leyden examined the types of organized interests that get included in the policy-making
process. The analysis demonstrates that if a group expected to testify on specific policy
issues, it must have had a substantial degree of organizational resources.73
Monetary resources and staff-based work has also dominated the cause lawyering
organizational literature. Lynn Jones argued that one of the most important parts of a legal
organization is its monetary resources. Unfortunately, lawyers within many social movements
have often been thought to have a negative impact on these movements for several reasons.
First, litigation is costly because of the time, energy, and money needed for it to be completed.
Second, spending monetary resources on litigation is inefficient because institutional issues
hinder the ability of the courts to promote reform. Third, the tendency of lawyers to prevent
alternative social movement strategies exhausts resources.74
Lynn Jones contended that cause lawyers bring several things to social movements.
Most importantly, cause lawyers provide a certain set of resources to social movements.
These resources include legal skills, prestige within the legal arena, organizational leadership,
and monetary resources.75 This issue of monetary resources has also illustrated the differences
between the funding levels of organizations. Sandra Levitsky found that legal advocacy
organizations within the gay community in Chicago, IL, had both the monetary resources and
drive to dominate the gay movement because of their significant size, sophistication, and
visibility within the media. Smaller grassroots gay organizations simply did not have the same
legal access as larger legal advocacy groups. In fact, these smaller groups had less money and
human resources to make the same difference as larger groups.76
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Tim Howard examined how a small group of Florida cause lawyers brought down the
big tobacco companies during the controversial Florida tobacco liability litigation efforts
between 1993 and 1997. Prior to this significant victory, big tobacco was thought to be
unbeatable. However, the author and five legal associates started with only a small
organization, and eventually helped craft Florida’s Medicaid Third Party Liability Law, which
created the foundation for the largest settlement in a civil case in U.S. history. During the
height of the litigation process, Howard and his law growing law firm amassed representation
of more than 10,000 clients who sued large tobacco companies over the four year litigation
period.77
The important issue of organizational staffing has often been broached in the literature.
Stephen Meili found that lawyers on staff in Argentine public interest groups were scarce. In
fact, fewer than twenty full-time cause lawyers worked for interest groups in the entire
country.78 Susan Coutin argued that the legal staff of immigration interests played an
important role in the daily operation of CARECEN and El Rescate, two Central American
immigration interest groups, provided potential clients with initial legal consultations, gave
legal advice, provided legal brief services, and collected information that helped to decide if
the group would represent the client in legal proceedings.79
Lucie White argued that FIDA-Ghana (Federacion Internacional de Abogadas), the
first free legal aide services program in Ghana exclusively for women and children who
otherwise could not afford it, created a nationwide network of legal services offices. These
offices were staffed by full-time lawyers, and provided direct legal assistance in civil cases.80
Kevin den Dulk examined the culture of cause lawyers within the evangelical movement,
arguing that conservative and evangelical organizations took major steps forward in the 1990s
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by increasing the number of staff members and sponsoring major high profile cases, such as
Paula Jones’ civil lawsuit against Bill Clinton. Without the unwavering support of skilled
staff members evangelical groups would have been unable to support the cases they
sponsored.81
This work regarding interest group cause lawyering organization suggests that the
organizational structure of an interest group’s legal team is a crucial variable to the success or
failure of litigation efforts. This study hypothesizes that there will be distinct differences
between gun rights and gun control interest groups, between heavily funded and lesser funded
Second Amendment interest groups, and between local, state, and national Second
Amendment interest groups with regard to organizational structure. Interview questions
regarding this issue centered upon interest group organization in the legal spectrum,
organization of interest group legal teams, levels of organization, the types of people
employed by interest group legal teams, the types of organizational strategies utilized by
interest groups, and the sources of funding for interest group legal teams.
Methodology and Data Collection Format of the Study
Telephone interviews were used to collect empirical data regarding Second Amendment
interest group cause lawyer participation, litigation strategies, venue-shopping,
coordination/networking, and organization. According to Ronald Czaja and Johnny Blair,
telephone interviews typically have low administrative costs, provide for a short period of study,
and a wide geographic distribution for sampling. Like administrative issues, questionnaire
concerns vary significantly in telephone interviews. Based on the type of questions asked, a
telephone interviewer can use a lengthy survey instrument, employ questions of increasing
complexity, and control the order of questions asked. Scholars that use telephone interviews are
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able to use open-ended questions and personal records. On a personal level, telephone
interviews provide for a good rapport between interviewer and respondent, allow sensitive topics
to be broached, and allow non-threatening questions to be considered. Overall, telephone
interviews provide researchers with a high-quality empirical research method that has few
administrative, survey, and data quality issues.82
The data collection format for this study regarding the factors that help explain Second
Amendment interest group cause lawyers to participation in litigation, the strategies used in
litigation efforts, court venue-shopping, coordination and networking between interest groups,
and legal team organization utilized telephone interviews for the issues discussed in the
preceding pages. The list of potential candidates for the cause lawyer interviews was culled from
data collected regarding state supreme court and U.S. Courts of Appeals cases in which a legal
party either made a Second Amendment claim or cases where the central issue involved in the
case focused on Second Amendment issues. All interviews were conducted with lawyers who
litigated a firearms-related case for a Second Amendment interest group between 1 January 1960
and 31 December 2009 in these two levels of the judiciary. Because of the date limitations
represented in this study, no interview respondent litigated a case in the sample prior to 1980.
Twenty-one total Second Amendment cause lawyers were interviewed. Eleven gun
rights and ten gun control Second Amendment cause lawyers were included in the interview
pool. Eighteen interview participants were taken from the cases in the samples used in Chapter
Three and Four. Three other interviews were completed as part of a snowball sample of
potential cause lawyer names who were given to me during the first eighteen interviews. All
twenty-one interviews were conducted between 24 August and 19 November 2010. While the
telephone interviews were not timed, the average interview lasted forty-four minutes with the

67

shortest lasting eight minutes and the longest lasting sixty-two minutes. Interview recordings
totaled fifteen hours and forty minutes.
Dates and times were scheduled at least one week before the interview occurred and were
completed between 10AM and 4PM on the dates specified with the respondents. With the
approval of the respondents, interviews were recorded using a small recording device. Four of
the twenty-one interview respondents asked that their names and interest groups not be used in
this study. As such, I have decided to simply number the respondents in interview date order and
refer to each simply as “Respondent Six” or “Respondent Fourteen” in the text of this study.
Without this pledge of anonymity, these respondents were reluctant to give any relevant
information during interviews.
Questionnaire design was completed, in conjunction with members of my dissertation
committee, based on Second Amendment interest group participation in litigation, litigation
strategies, judicial venue-shopping, coordination and networking between interest groups, and
organization. The questionnaire used in the interview included only relevant questions regarding
these five topics. The questionnaire employed both open-ended and closed-ended questions that
allowed interview respondents to provide the interviewer with accurate and insightful responses.
To fully engage the interview respondent, few notes were taken during the interview process.
After completion of all the interviews, between 17 December and 23 December 2010, the
interview recordings were reviewed and coded based on the responses given by the respondents
in order to create a complete picture of the data collected. The interviews conducted for this
study fully conformed to the guidelines for research performed on individuals prescribed by the
West Virginia University Office of Research and Economic Development.
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Second Amendment Interest Group Cause Lawyering: Results and Analysis
Although the previous sections have described important literature, theories, and methods
that characterize interest group participation, litigation strategies, venue-shopping,
coordination/networking, and organization as critical components of the operations of Second
Amendment interest groups and their litigation efforts, a direct connection between the suggested
issues and Second Amendment interest group cause lawyers also needs to be established.
Table One illustrates the relevant demographic background of the interview respondents,
as they relate to this study.
Table One: Relevant Demographics of Gun Control Interest Group Cause Lawyers
National

State

Local

Interest Group

Interest Group

Interest Group

Total Gun Control Lawyers

5

3

2

Interview Respondents

4, 12, 13, 19, 20

8, 9, 17

7, 15

Funding Level

High

Moderate

Low

Table Two illustrates the relevant demographic background of the interview respondents,
as they relate to this study.
Table Two: Relevant Demographics of Gun Rights Interest Group Cause Lawyers
National

State

Local

Interest Group

Interest Group

Interest Group

Total Gun Rights Lawyers

6

3

2

Interview Respondents

2, 3, 10, 11, 14, 18

5, 6, 21

1, 16

Funding Level

High

Moderate

Low

Taken as a whole, the interview sample provides an interesting view of the litigation
efforts of Second Amendment interest groups across the country. Eleven interviews were
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conducted with interest group cause lawyers that possess a national scope, while six were
completed with state-level interest group cause lawyers and four with local-level interest group
cause lawyers. In total, eleven cause lawyers representing gun rights interest groups were
interviewed, while ten gun control cause lawyers were interviewed.
Six different national-level interest groups (three gun rights interest groups; three gun
control interest groups) were represented in the respondent pool, while five state-level interest
groups and four local-level interest groups were also represented in the pool of interview
participants. In total, fifteen different gun rights and gun control interest groups (seven gun
rights interest groups; eight gun control interest groups) were represented in the respondent pool.
Funding levels were taken from figures available on the websites of the represented interest
groups. The demographics outlined in Table One show that the interview respondent pool is
representative of the interest groups and lawyers that currently practice law in favor of gun rights
or gun control.
Cause Lawyer Philosophy
From a philosophical standpoint, the twenty-one gun rights and gun control interest group
cause lawyers interviewed for this study largely agreed with the philosophy espoused by interest
group they worked for. In fact, the seventeen interest group cause lawyers representing state and
national Second Amendment interest groups reported that they always supported their interest
group from a philosophical position. Comparatively, the three of the four local interest group
cause lawyers represented in this study reported that they did not always support the philosophy
advocated by their interest group. These two lawyers, one national gun control cause lawyer and
one local gun rights cause lawyer, vividly illustrated the differences, or lack thereof, in their
philosophical point-of-view:
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I almost always support the policies important to my superiors. I am fully invested
in our agenda, and have a special interest in working cases that…that forward this
plan. (Respondent Thirteen)
If my group advocates for a particular philosophy that I cannot support, I would
go into the (group) director’s office and tell him about it. In no way, am I going
to neglect my personal values and goals to promote an agenda that I don’t think
works or isn’t correct. (Respondent One)
The three local interest group cause lawyers (one gun rights; two gun control), who
reported that their support for the philosophy of their interest group wanes at times, made it clear
that only certain issues affect their levels of support. For instance, even though the local gun
rights cause lawyer supports Second Amendment rights, he also supports legislation that would
strengthen the background check process, so that individuals with mental illnesses have no
chance to obtain a firearm. His support for increased background check laws stem from an
incident where a family member was harmed by an unregistered firearm brandished by an
unstable individual. The issues that affect support of the local gun control interest group cause
lawyers differed. For instance, these two lawyers explained the reasons and issues that affect
their wavering philosophical support:
Sometimes, I think, that the powers that be (in the interest group) aren’t worried
about expanding gun registration laws. I really wish that they would. It pains me
everyday to flip on CNN only to see lunatics shooting up schools.
(Respondent Seven)
I think that the gun control movement as a whole, needs to focus on increasing
awareness towards lackadaisical gun control laws…My guys need to be tougher
on these laws. (Respondent Seventeen)
Though philosophical issues are important issues covered in the interviews, the focus of
the interviews was Second Amendment interest group participation, litigation strategies, venueshopping, coordination/networking, and organization. The following pages outline the interview
responses in these areas.
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Interest Group Participation
For this study, interest group participation interview questions attempted to determine
how Second Amendment cases get to interest groups for litigation purposes, how interest groups
decide to participate in litigation, and why interest groups decide to participate in certain cases
and not in others. Table Two outlines important responses regarding how cases get to an interest
group for litigation purposes.
Table Three: How Cases Get to Second Amendment Interest Group Cause Lawyers
Respondent(s)

Cases Referred from

Central Team

Intervene

Local Chapters

Searches for Cases on Appeal

X

X

X

X

X

1, 6, 7, 9, 15, 16, 17, 21
2, 3, 10, 11, 12, 14, 19, 20
4, 13
5

X

8

X

18

X

X
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Source: Interview Respondents One through Twenty-One .
Note: n=21 interviews;
Note 1: Respondents 4, 12, 13, 19, 20 national level gun control interests, respondents 8, 9, 17 state level gun control
interests, and respondents 7, 15 local level gun control interests; Respondents 2, 3, 10, 11, 14, 18 national level gun
rights interests, respondents 5, 6, 21 state level gun rights interests, and respondents 1, 16 local level gun rights
interests.
Note 2: National interests have high funding levels, while state interests have moderate funding levels and local
interests have low funding levels.

According to Table Three, the most significant dividing line between the participatory
litigation efforts of Second Amendment interest groups was money. Consequently, Second
Amendment interest groups that possessed a national scope, and significantly more monetary
resources than their state and local counterparts, controlled more avenues that allowed groups to
participate in gun-related litigation. For instance, nine of the eleven national-level cause lawyers
interviewed reported that they had cases referred from locally affiliated organizations. Similar
ratios are representative of the responses regarding central team searches for Second Amendment
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cases and the ability or willingness to intervene in cases on appeal. There were few differences
between the participation efforts of gun rights and gun control cause lawyers and interest groups.
According to two interview respondents, the reasons for these participatory efforts differ:
Sometimes, we have one person looking for cases, other times we have bunches
of people trying to find cases that fit our model and the issues we support.
Regardless of our sources, we are always looking. (Respondent Thirteen)
Our local guys know what they are doing. In fact, I’ve practiced law with a few
of them. We trust a lot of their judgments regarding cases. They know what
we want and, most of the time, they won’t waste our time with trivial (cases).
(Respondent Three)
Responses from the interviewed state and local cause lawyers regarding participation
efforts differed wildly. Taken as a whole, none of the three potential responses regarding
participation received an affirmative reply from the four local lawyers. State level cause lawyers
reported similar findings. Because of lesser funding and different organizational formats, state
cause lawyers had fewer avenues where cases could get to them. Given this, cases are still
litigated by local and state interest groups; however, cases get to these groups through a number
of back-channels, including the offering of informal legal advice and the acceptance of a case on
a pro bono basis. Accordingly, several local and state interview respondents outlined the reasons
they used the specific avenues for participation outlined in Table Three:
We have a couple of local groups…they work hard. They aren’t paid. They
give us some (cases) every once and awhile. In fact, I think, we’ve been
able to change the result of couple they have given us. (Respondent Eight)
Unfortunately, we only can do what we can do. Realistically, we can offer
help during the appeals process if we think we can be of service. Otherwise,
its tough for us. (Respondent Five)
This study also posed questions to interview respondents regarding the process through
which interest group legal teams decide to litigate cases. Larger, national and state interests have
continually followed potential cases that warrant consideration for litigation. Because of this,
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interest groups must decide which cases to take and which cases to decline. In doing so,
interview accounts reported that there was a clear distinction between levels of interest groups.
In particular, large state and national Second Amendment interest groups decide to take more
cases because they have the resources available to litigate them. Winning was the most
important component of deciding to participate in Second Amendment cases. Nine of the eleven
national interest group respondents reported that the potential of winning a case was most
important factors in deciding to participate in litigation.
For smaller, state and local interest groups, the decision to participate in cases was much
more complex. For instance, not only did smaller interests have to consider the monetary aspect
of participation, but they also had to consider the potential outcomes after litigation. As a small,
local Second Amendment gun control cause lawyer reported:
It’s hard for us. We don’t have the resources of the Brady group or the NRA.
If we get involved, we have to consider tangible outcomes…after litigation.
You know…potential television coverage of a case or membership drives
afterwards would benefit. I worry about the solvency of our group all the time.
(Respondent Fifteen)
According to this local gun control lawyer, the decision to participate in litigation could
potentially come down to the financial solvency of the group. In the end, the group would be
better off if they were able to capitalize on the news of their litigation. Essentially, if the group
was unable to guarantee news coverage or increased giving, then the likelihood of participation
in a case would be small.
Interview respondents were also questioned about the most important factors in deciding
to participate in cases. Responses regarding participatory factors created the first clear
distinction between gun rights and gun control interest groups. Of the eleven gun rights cause
lawyers interviewed, ten responded that along with winning cases, the most important factor that
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determines their participation in Second Amendment cases is ensuring constitutional standards
are followed. In fact, one national-level gun rights lawyer was adamant:
It’s really about the legitimacy of the law. It’s clearly laid out in the Constitution
that we have “the right to bear arms”…In my opinion, any violation of that is
unfair. (Respondent Eighteen)
The words of this national gun rights lawyer strike at the heart of majority of his brethren. It is
evident that most gun rights lawyers focus on the constitutional perspective when determining
participation in cases.
From a comparative perspective, gun control lawyers responded with a mix of responses
regarding the most important factor determining participation in cases. Five of the ten gun
control lawyers responded that changing a unjust law was the most important factor regarding
participation, other responses included making legal and constitutional history and the potential
for winning the case. Most gun control lawyers worried about the potential for increased crime
with regard to more guns on the streets. In particular, one national gun control lawyer invoked
the Heller decision to make his point clearer:
I am of the opinion that a place like D.C. needs the laws that were in place prior to
Heller. More guns on the streets mean more violence. It doesn’t seem fair to force
citizens to live in what could amount to a war zone in several years.
(Respondent Four)
The differing views regarding the most important factors that determine participation couldn’t be
more striking. Gun rights lawyers consider participation from the much larger perspective of
constitutional standards, while gun control lawyers mostly focus on individual laws and cases.
Because of these results, two of the three hypotheses associated with Second Amendment
interest group cause lawyer legal participation are accepted. Specifically, data shows that there
are distinct differences between heavily funded and lesser funded Second Amendment interest
groups with regard to legal participation. The study found that there were distinct differences
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between local, state, and national Second Amendment interest groups with regard to legal
participation. Based upon the data collected, the legal participation hypothesis regarding
differences between gun rights and gun control interest groups with regard to legal participation
could not be accepted. Thus, the null hypothesis could not be rejected. The next issue area
covered in interviews for this study was litigation strategy.
Interest Group Litigation Strategies
For this study, Second Amendment interest group litigation strategy questions sought to
discover what litigation strategies are most productive for gun rights and gun control interest
groups, what litigation strategies are least productive for gun rights and gun control interest
groups, if litigation strategies change over time, and what level of influence different factors
have over litigation strategies and tactics. Table Four outlines the different litigation strategies
used by Second Amendment interest groups and their cause lawyers.
Table Four: Litigation Strategies Used by Second Amendment Interest Group Cause
Lawyers
Respondents(s)

Amicus Curiae

Test Cases

Financial Support

X

X

Other

7, 9
2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 X
1, 6, 15
8, 16, 17

X
X

5
12

X
X

X

21

X

X

Source: Interview Respondents One through Twenty-One84.
Note: n=21 interviews.
Note 1: Respondents 4, 12, 13, 19, 20 national level gun control interests, respondents 8, 9, 17 state level gun control
interests, and respondents 7, 15 local level gun control interests; Respondents 2, 3, 10, 11, 14, 18 national level gun
rights interests, respondents 5, 6, 21 state level gun rights interests, and respondents 1, 16 local level gun rights
interests.
Note 2: National interests have high funding levels, while state interests have moderate funding levels and local
interests have low funding levels.
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In focusing on the litigation strategies of Second Amendment interest groups, it is important to
note that major differences between local, state, and national level interest groups. Interview
responses indicate distinct differences between the litigation strategies of local, state, and
national level interest groups. In particular, local and state interests focused on litigation
strategies that were most economically feasible. For instance, one state level gun control lawyer
reported:
We tend to focus on legal briefs...Why? Well, they are relatively cheap, easy
to produce, and have little standard format. My lawyer could produce a brief
in an afternoon if the need arose. We just don’t have substantial resources.
(Respondent Seventeen)
According to the responses to litigation strategy questions listed in Table Four, the most
popular strategy was the filing of non-binding amicus curiae, or “friend of the court” briefs,
which provide judges with information to help decide cases. In fact, 67 percent of interview
respondents referred to amicus curiae briefs as primary litigation strategies. A comparable
percentage of 62 percent of interview respondents reported the usage of test case litigation
strategies as challenges to established state and local gun rights and gun control laws, while 48
percent of respondents reported that their interest group provided financial support to various
Second Amendment litigants. Four of the twenty-one interview respondents reported the usage
of other litigation strategies as part of their Second Amendment efforts. In particular, the other
strategies used by these cause lawyers focus upon the lack of resources available to interest
groups in question:
I don’t know if you would call it a (litigation) strategy or not, but most
of the time we try to match lawyers up with cases…if you know what
I mean. Some lawyers are more likely to take cases on a pro bono basis
if they agree with our groups standing on the matter. (Respondent One)
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Focusing on the litigation strategies of the national Second Amendment interests included
in the study, ten of the eleven national level cause lawyers reported that their interest group legal
team used all three of the main litigation strategies mentioned previously. The main reason for
the usage of all three strategies was financial resources. The national level interest groups have
more financial resources. In turn, these interests put much more money back into their litigation
efforts. For instance, two national level Second Amendment interest group cause lawyers, one
gun rights lawyer and one gun control lawyer, provided similar answers regarding the
importance of finances in litigation strategies:
We have used all three strategies you mentioned. We believe that we owe it to
the millions of members we serve to look into all potential litigation strategies
to fight harmful laws across the country. We have few limits when it comes
to spending. (Respondent Eleven)
Because of the generous support of our donors, we are able to use multiple
approaches to gain traction in the courts. Briefs, financial support, and case
testing in different jurisdictions are the main strategies we utilize.
(Respondent Thirteen)
In regard to litigation strategies, major differences exist between local, state, and national Second
Amendment interest groups. The main focus of the usage of differing litigation strategies was
made apparent through numerous interview responses about the lack of financial resources at
local and state interest group levels. National level Second Amendment interest group cause
lawyers made it clear that because of their higher levels of financial resources they are able to
use different litigation strategies and to litigate more Second Amendment cases. Differing
litigation strategies between gun rights and gun control interest groups were not apparent.
It is also important to consider the different types of factors that influence litigation
strategies. Table Five outlines the different influences regarding litigation strategies reported by
Second Amendment interest group cause lawyers.
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Table Five: Influences on the Litigation Strategy of Second Amendment Interest Group
Cause Lawyers

Respondent(s)

Opposing

Judicial

Counsel
X

Existing

Legis./Exec.

Legal Expert/Soc./

Attitudes Law

Policy

Sci. Evidence

X

X

1, 7, 15, 16
2, 3, 10, 11, 14, 18

X

4, 8, 9, 12, 13, 17

X

5, 6

X

19

X

20

X

21

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

Source: Interview Respondents One through Twenty-One85.
Note: n=21 interviews.
Note 1: Respondents 4, 12, 13, 19, 20 national level gun control interests, respondents 8, 9, 17 state level gun control
interests, and respondents 7, 15 local level gun control interests; Respondents 2, 3, 10, 11, 14, 18 national level gun
rights interests, respondents 5, 6, 21 state level gun rights interests, and respondents 1, 16 local level gun rights
interests.
Note 2: National interests have high funding levels, while state interests have moderate funding levels and local
interests have low funding levels.

In focusing on the influences on litigation strategies of Second Amendment interest
groups, it is important to note major differences exist between gun rights and gun control interest
group cause lawyers. Gun rights lawyers reported that they were much more likely to be
influenced by the existing local, state, or federal law governing the case. In fact, nine of twentyone interview respondents reported being influenced by existing law when deciding on Second
Amendment litigation strategies. All eight of these respondents represented gun rights interest
groups, while no gun control cause lawyers were a part of the group influenced by existing law.
In comparison, a similar data point was established with regard to the influence that legal
experts, social science evidence, and hard science evidence has upon the litigation strategies of
Second Amendment interest group cause lawyers. Specifically, interview responses from gun
control lawyers representing interest groups of all scopes reported that they were much more
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likely to be influenced by legal experts, social evidence, and hard science evidence when
deciding how to litigate Second Amendment cases. In fact, eight of the twenty-one interview
respondents reported being influenced by legal, social, and hard science evidence when deciding
litigation strategies. All eight of these respondents represented gun control interest groups, while
no gun rights cause lawyers were a part of this group influenced by legal, social, and hard
science evidence. Regarding each of these findings, one gun rights and one gun control cause
lawyer provided particularly colorful responses regarding both influential perspectives:
We don’t follow that fluff (social science evidence) stuff. We follow the
law. What is on the books is what we are fighting for or against. Just
because a Ph.D. tells me something about guns doesn’t mean it has much
value in the real world. (Respondent Two)
Above all it is important for us to follow the published research about
the importance of gun control. Even though judges might not work with
these studies, it is important for us that our legal points are backed up by
evidence. (Respondent Twelve)
Focusing on the particular interview responses regarding influences on litigation strategy,
the data shows that influences were split relatively evenly between the five influential options
outlined in the survey questionnaire. For instance, 62 percent (thirteen of twenty-one) of
interview survey respondents reported that legislative and executive politics and policies
influenced their decision regarding litigation strategy regarding Second Amendment cases. 48
percent (ten of twenty-one) of the cause lawyers surveyed reported that the opposing counsel and
changing judicial attitudes influenced decisions about strategy for litigation. From a comparative
perspective, the two cause lawyer litigation influences that had the lowest level of affirmative
response were existing laws (43 percent; nine of twenty-one) and legal experts, social evidence,
and hard science evidence (38 percent; eight of twenty-one). These results show that political
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influences, the opposing counsel, and the judge sitting for a case were the most important factors
when Second Amendment cause lawyers decided what strategies would be used during litigation.
Analysis of the data collected regarding Second Amendment cause lawyering litigation
strategies during interviews found acceptance for all three research hypotheses associated with
this section. More specifically, distinct differences were found between the litigation strategies
of gun rights and gun control interest groups, between heavily funded and lesser funded Second
Amendment interest groups, and differences between local, state, and national Second
Amendment interest groups. All three of these hypotheses are accepted and the associated null
hypotheses are rejected. The third issue area covered in interviews for this study was judicial
venue-shopping.
Interest Group Judicial Venue-Shopping
For this study, Second Amendment interest group judicial venue-shopping questions
attempted to discover the level of Second Amendment interest groups venue-shopping during the
litigation process and whether or not litigation strategy changes depending upon the venue
selected for litigation. Table Six outlines the different aspects of venue-shopping regarding
Second Amendment interest groups and their cause lawyers.
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Table Six: The Judicial Venue-Shopping of Second Amendment Interest Group Cause
Lawyers
Respondent(s)

Shop for

Favored Shop

Venue Shop in

Venue-Shopping

Venues

Judicial

Between

Diversity Cases

Important Lit.

Level

Urban/Rural

Process

1, 5, 7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17

No

--

--

--

--

2, 3, 10, 14, 18

Yes

Federal

Rural

Yes

Yes

12, 13, 20

Yes

Federal

Urban

Yes

Yes

4, 19

Yes

State

Urban

Yes

Yes

6, 21

Yes

State

Rural

No

No

11

Yes

State

Rural

Yes

Yes

Source: Interview Respondents One through Twenty-One86.
Note: n=21 interviews.
Note 1: Respondents 4, 12, 13, 19, 20 national level gun control interests, respondents 8, 9, 17 state level gun control
interests, and respondents 7, 15 local level gun control interests; Respondents 2, 3, 10, 11, 14, 18 national level gun
rights interests, respondents 5, 6, 21 state level gun rights interests, and respondents 1, 16 local level gun rights
interests.
Note 2: National interests have high funding levels, while state interests have moderate funding levels and local
interests have low funding levels.

Do Second Amendment interest groups shop for judicial venues? The answer is both yes
and no. Thirteen of twenty-one interview respondents reported that their interest groups legal
team does shop for venues. However, simply looking at that percentage can be misleading. All
four (0 percent) of the local level Second Amendment cause lawyers reported that their low
levels of funding prevented any level of shopping for a judicial venue, while two (33 percent) of
the six state level Second Amendment cause lawyers reported that they did shop for a judicial
venue. All eleven (100 percent) of the national level Second Amendment interest group cause
lawyers shop for judicial venues.
It is also important to determine which levels of the judiciary and what types of judicial
districts are favored. Of the thirteen cause lawyers who reported that they do shop for judicial
venues, five responded that they favored the state courts system, while eight responded that they
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favored the federal court system. Second Amendment interest group cause lawyers favored state
court systems when venue-shopping was fairly evenly distributed between gun rights (three
respondents) and gun control (two respondents) interest groups. Lawyers that favored the
national courts system as five of the eight respondents represented gun rights organizations,
while the balance (three respondents) represented gun control groups.
In regard to the types of judicial venues favored by respondents, cause lawyers
interviewed created a clear delineation between gun rights and gun control lawyers. Gun rights
lawyers favored rural jurisdictions, while gun control lawyers preferred urban jurisdictions.
With these legal perspectives in mind, one gun rights and one gun control cause lawyer
explained the reasons behind their preferences:
Because of the prevalence of gun owners in rural areas, we certainly prefer
rural jurisdictions. Guns are much more a part of the culture in these areas
and make it more likely that the outcome will favor us. (Respondent Three)
I like the stricter gun laws that mostly come in urban areas. We are more likely
to succeed with cases in these types of situations rather than in rural (locations).
(Respondent Nineteen)
Coupled with judicial venue-shopping, favorite judicial levels, and types of venues are
whether or not an interest group legal team shops for venues in diversity cases and the
importance of venue-shopping in the litigation process. Ten of the thirteen cause lawyers who
did venue-shop did so diversity cases, as well. The diversity cases litigated by the cause lawyers
centered upon gun-related corporations. For instance, one national level gun rights cause lawyer
reported that by moving a Second Amendment diversity case from one jurisdiction to another
helped their litigation efforts in a major way because the litigant gun manufacturer had a large
assembly operation in the jurisdiction the case was moved to and still had plenty of goodwill in
the judicial district.
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Ten of the thirteen Second Amendment interest group cause lawyers in the interview pool
reported that shopping for venues was an important part of their litigation process. For a number
of reasons, national and state level Second Amendment interest groups reported that venueshopping was or was not an important part of the their litigation process. In particular, one
national gun control lawyer supported the notion that venue-shopping was important to litigation,
while one national level gun rights lawyer noted that his group disagreed:
For us, a court hearing a case can be the factor between winning and losing.
We want to win every case we take on, so picking the right court is probably
the most important factor of the litigation process for us.
(Respondent Nineteen)
Like I said, we do consult different judicial venues, but we don’t focus on it
when we are litigating a case. I am more worried about the law, the
opposition, resources, the client, potential witnesses…the nuts and bolts
of a trial. Court selection is important, but I don’t lose sleep over it.
(Respondent Eighteen)
Results of the data collected that focused on Second Amendment interest group cause
lawyering judicial venue-shopping led to the acceptance of all three research hypotheses
associated with this section. Specifically, clear differences were established between the ways
gun rights and gun control interest groups, between heavily funded and lesser funded Second
Amendment interest groups, and differences between local, state, and national Second
Amendment interest groups shopped between judicial venues. All three of these hypotheses are
accepted and the associated null hypotheses are rejected. The next issue area covered in
interviews for this study was Second Amendment interest group coordination and networking.
Interest Group Coordination and Networking
For this study, Second Amendment interest group coordination and networking questions

ought to discover the levels at which Second Amendment interest group cause lawyers
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coordinate with other interest groups, determine the organizational levels of the surveyed Second
Amendment interest group cause lawyers, and networking efforts between similar state and
national organizations. Table Seven reports the different aspects of coordination between local,
state, and national Second Amendment interest groups and their cause lawyers.
Table Seven: Coordination between Second Amendment Interest Groups and Legal Teams
Respondent(s)

Have

Levels of Groups Types of Groups

Coordinated

Level of
Coordination

7, 8, 15, 16, 21

No

--

--

--

3, 18

Yes

State/National

Gun Rights

High

5, 14

Yes

State/National

Gun Rights

Moderate

12, 19

Yes

State/National

Gun Control

High

1

Yes

State

Gun Rights

Low

2

Yes

National

Conservative/Gun Rights

High

4

Yes

National

Progressive/Gun Control

High

6

Yes

Local/National

Gun Rights

Low

9

Yes

Local

Liberal/Gun Control

Low

10

Yes

State

Conservative/Gun Rights

Moderate

11

Yes

National

Gun Rights

High

13

Yes

National

Gun Control

High

17

Yes

Local/National

Gun Control

Moderate

20

Yes

State

Gun Control

High
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Source: Interview Respondents One through Twenty-One .
Note: n=21 interviews.
Note 1: Respondents 4, 12, 13, 19, 20 national level gun control interests, respondents 8, 9, 17 state level gun control
interests, and respondents 7, 15 local level gun control interests; Respondents 2, 3, 10, 11, 14, 18 national level gun
rights interests, respondents 5, 6, 21 state level gun rights interests, and respondents 1, 16 local level gun rights
interests.
Note 2: National interests have high funding levels, while state interests have moderate funding levels and local
interests have low funding levels.

Table Seven outlines the basics of legal coordination between Second Amendment
interest groups. In particular, a large majority of interest group cause lawyers surveyed (76.2
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percent) reported that they had, in fact, coordinated with other interest groups at some level.
Results show that the types of groups with which a particular interest group coordinates depends
upon the level of the interest group in question. Local level interest groups are more likely to
coordinate with state interest groups because of the lack of other local groups in a given
geographical area. Similarly, state level interest groups are more likely to coordinate with other
state or national interest groups for litigation purposes, while national level interests are more
likely to coordinate with other state and national level organizations
There are significant differences between gun rights and gun control interest groups when
it comes to the levels of coordination. Gun rights interest groups coordinated with other gun
rights groups, while gun control interest groups coordinated with other gun control interest
groups. Both gun rights and gun control groups reported coordination efforts with other
politically-oriented groups:
I have worked with other gun rights groups, along with (conservative) groups…
We do this because they want the same things that we do. All in all, they believe
in the “right to bear arms” just as much as we do. (Respondent Two)
I started off working with progressive organizations back in the 1980s, so for
me, it was second nature to work with the people I have known for more than
twenty years. Not only do I know those guys, but I know that they are fighting
hard. (Respondent Four)
Five respondents reported that they had coordinated, in some ways, with conservative,
liberal, or progressive interest groups in order to move a particular agenda forward. This finding
is particularly striking because it shows just how intertwined gun interest groups are inside the
American political system. Questions were also posed to interview respondents regarding the
level of coordination that existed between organizations. Not surprisingly, all eleven national
level interest group cause lawyers reported that a moderate to high level of organization existed,
while local and state level respondents reported moderate to low levels with interest groups.
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Table Eight outlines the different aspects of interest group networking between local,
state, and national Second Amendment groups and their cause lawyers.
Table Eight: Networking between Second Amendment Interest Groups and Legal Teams
Respondent(s)

Have

Types of

Help Litigation

Affect Patterns

Networked

Interdependencies

Efforts?

of Litigation?

1, 7, 15, 16, 21

No

--

--

--

2, 4, 13

Yes

Common Interest

Sometimes

Yes

10, 12, 19

Yes

Common Interest

Yes

Yes

3

Yes

Similar Beliefs

Yes

Not Sure

5

Yes

Similar Beliefs

Yes

No

6

Yes

Common Interest

Yes

No

8

Yes

Friendship

Sometimes

No

9

Yes

Financial Exchange

Yes

Yes

11

Yes

Similar Beliefs

Sometimes

No

14

Yes

Similar Beliefs

Yes

No Response

17

Yes

Financial Exchange

No

No

18

Yes

Similar Beliefs

No

No

20

Yes

Friendship/Interest

Yes

Yes

Source: Interview Respondents One through Twenty-One88.
Note: n=21 interviews.
Note 1: Respondents 4, 12, 13, 19, 20 national level gun control interests, respondents 8, 9, 17 state level gun control
interests, and respondents 7, 15 local level gun control interests; Respondents 2, 3, 10, 11, 14, 18 national level gun
rights interests, respondents 5, 6, 21 state level gun rights interests, and respondents 1, 16 local level gun rights
interests.
Note 2: National interests have high funding levels, while state interests have moderate funding levels and local
interests have low funding levels.

Interview responses regarding Second Amendment interest group networking provided
similar results as those given regarding coordination. A significant majority of interest group
cause lawyers surveyed (76.2 percent) reported that they networked with other interest groups.
When asked what types of interdependences propel interest groups towards forming networks of
cooperation and understanding, 44 percent of respondents (seven of sixteen) reported that
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common interests inspired networking, 31 percent of respondents mentioned similar beliefs, and
13 percent of respondents reported that friendship or financial exchange spurred networking to
occur:
We do not have the money that other groups have, so we reached out to a group
from a neighboring state for help. They came through big time. Their (financial)
support allowed us to change things (legally) throughout Colorado.
(Respondent Nine)
While our opponents were out raising money, we doubled-down and formed
relationships with other groups that helped us litigate cases that we truly felt
needed to be argued. I guess you would call that “common interest.”
(Respondent Six)
When asked whether or not networks helped litigation strategies or affected patterns of
litigation, nine (56.25 percent) of the sixteen respondents suggested they did. Five (31.25
percent) of the respondents reported that their networking efforts sometimes helped their
litigation efforts, but only two (12.5 percent) reported that networking did not aide their litigation
efforts:
Like I said before, our networking efforts through several financial dealings most
definitely helped our litigation efforts. Not only were we able to litigate cases
we wouldn’t have been able to otherwise, but I honestly feel we made a difference
in the lives of those who would have been harmed with more guns on the streets.
(Respondent Nine)
My results presented a muddled picture of whether or not networking efforts affected
patterns of Second Amendment litigation. Seven (43.75 percent) of the sixteen respondents
reported networking with other interest groups also reported that their networking efforts did
affect patterns of gun-related litigation. The same result, seven (43.75 percent) of the sixteen
Second Amendment interest group cause lawyers, reported that their networking efforts did not
affect patterns of litigation, while one interview respondent provided no response and one was
not completely sure. This result shows a mixed view on the importance of networking with other
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groups. For several respondents, networking directly affected litigation, while others possessed
the view that there was no affect.
Results from the interviews illustrate the fact that two of the three hypotheses associated
with Second Amendment interest group cause lawyer coordination and networking are accepted.
More specifically, data showed that there were distinct differences between heavily funded and
lesser funded Second Amendment interest groups with regard to legal coordination and
networking. The study found that there were distinct differences between local, state, and
national Second Amendment interest groups with regard to legal participation. Based upon the
data collected, the legal coordination and networking hypothesis regarding differences between
gun rights and gun control interest groups with regard to legal participation could not be
accepted. Thus, the null hypothesis could not be rejected. The next issue area covered in
interviews for this study was litigation strategy. The fifth issue area covered in interviews for
this study was interest group organization.
Legal Team Organization
For this study, Second Amendment interest group organization questions attempted to
examine the importance of organization in the Second Amendment interest group, the
organization of the interest group legal team, the level of organization of the interest group legal
team, the types of organizational strategies employed by the interest group and its legal team,
and how the legal team is funded. Table Nine reports the different aspects of organization inside
local, state, and national Second Amendment interest groups and their legal teams.
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Table Nine: Second Amendment Interest Group Legal Team Organization
Respondents(s)

Internal

Adjunct Legal Group

Pro Bono

Outside

Legal

Organization

Devoted to

Legal

Legal

Legal Change

Counsel

Counsel

X

X

Counsel
1, 5, 7, 8, 15, 16, 21
2, 4, 10, 14, 20

X

3, 11, 12, 13, 19

X

6, 9

X

X
X

X
X

17
18

X
X

X

X

X
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Source: Interview Respondents One through Twenty-One .
Note: n=21 interviews.
Note 1: Respondents 4, 12, 13, 19, 20 national level gun control interests, respondents 8, 9, 17 state level gun control
interests, and respondents 7, 15 local level gun control interests; Respondents 2, 3, 10, 11, 14, 18 national level gun
rights interests, respondents 5, 6, 21 state level gun rights interests, and respondents 1, 16 local level gun rights
interests.
Note 2: National interests have high funding levels, while state interests have moderate funding levels and local
interests have low funding levels.

Table Nine demonstrates that finances are important to the organization of Second
Amendment interest groups. National level interest groups are more likely to possess internal
legal counsel, possess an adjunct legal organization, or lean on a group devoted to legal change
as their litigation team, while local and state level interest groups are more likely to rely on pro
bono or outside legal counsel as the organization of their legal team. Obviously, this speaks
directly to the funding levels of Second Amendment interest groups. Second Amendment
interests that work on the national level have the funding available to keep internal legal counsel,
have an adjunct legal organization, or a group devoted to legal change, all of which require
significant monetary resources. State level Second Amendment interests typically focus on
obtaining pro bono or outside legal counsel, which can typically be had for free or at a significant
discount. One national level gun rights lawyer and one local level gun control lawyer reported:
Essentially, we have the first three (organizational structures) you mentioned. I
see our connected legal organization as one that fights for legal change, so in my
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mind we have all three. For a long time, it has been no secret that that we have
the money, so we use it. Our organization is second to none. (Respondent Eleven)
Our organization is quite small. In fact, you could say we don’t have one, other
than me. I am the director and head legal counsel…A number of times I have
used pro bono representation…or I have received a discounted rate from an
outside lawyer who believed in what we were doing. This is really how we get
by. (Respondent Fifteen)
Thirteen (61.9 percent) of the twenty-one respondents reported that their interest group
employs an internal legal counsel. Twelve (92.3 percent) of the thirteen respondents also
represented national level interest groups. Similar findings were apparent with regard to adjunct
legal organizations and groups devoted to legal change. Six (28.6 percent) of the twenty-one
interview respondents reported that their interest group has used adjunct legal organizations as
their legal team, while ten (47.6 percent) of the respondents reported that they have employed the
usage of groups devoted to legal change. In both respects, each (100 percent) of the affirmative
interview respondents on these two organizational characteristics represented national level
Second Amendment interest groups.
Two other legal organization arrangements, pro bono legal counsel and outside legal
counsel, are most often used by local and state Second Amendment interest groups. In
particular, nine (42.9 percent) of the twenty-one survey respondents reported they had utilized
pro bono legal counsel as their legal organization in Second Amendment litigation. All nine
(100 percent) of these respondents represented local or state level interest groups. Eleven (52.4
percent) of the survey respondents reported they use outside legal counsel as their legal
organization, ten (91.9 percent) of which represent local or state level interest groups.
One local level gun rights lawyer provided some interesting insight into this
phenomenon:
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Over the course of the last twenty-three years, we have received both pro bono
and outside legal counsel. Our perspective is…‘Why pay for something we can
have for free?’ In any form, counsel isn’t cheap and we don’t have the money
to have additional counsel on staff, other than myself. (Respondent Sixteen)
Twenty (95.2 percent) of the twenty-one respondents reported that they used more than one of
the five organizational features mentioned above, while eight (38.1 percent) of the respondents
reported that they three of the five organizational structures mentioned above.
Table Ten provides responses regarding the different ways in which Second Amendment
interest groups and their legal teams are funded publicly and privately.
Table Ten: Second Amendment Interest Group Legal Team Organizational Funding
Respondent(s)

Mass Membership

Few Donor

Drives

Contributions

Corporate Funding

7, 15
1, 5, 8, 9, 16, 17, 21

X

2, 3, 10, 14, 18

X

4, 12, 13, 19

X

11, 20

X

X

X

X

6

X

X

Source: Interview Respondents One through Twenty-One90.
Note: n=21 interviews.
Note 1: Respondents 4, 12, 13, 19, 20 national level gun control interests, respondents 8, 9, 17 state level gun control
interests, and respondents 7, 15 local level gun control interests; Respondents 2, 3, 10, 11, 14, 18 national level gun
rights interests, respondents 5, 6, 21 state level gun rights interests, and respondents 1, 16 local level gun rights
interests.
Note 2: National interests have high funding levels, while state interests have moderate funding levels and local
interests have low funding levels.

Table Ten illustrates clear differences between the funding of local, state, and national
level interest groups, and between gun rights and gun control interest groups. In particular,
national level interest groups are much more likely to be funded through mass membership
drives or through corporate donors, while local and state Second Amendment interests are more
likely to be funded through the contributions of a few donors. Gun rights groups are much more
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likely to be funded by corporate contributions then their gun control counterparts. One national
level gun rights lawyer and one state level gun control lawyer reported:
We definitely get contributions from the gun industry. Because we do this, it is
probably not surprising that we support gun rights. Even though they have a
financial stake in the game, they are supporters of our (movement) and maintain
monetary support of our team. (Respondent Ten)
There are definitely strong distinctions between gun groups. One of the biggest is
how we are funded. Obviously, we don’t have connections to corporations and
have few people willing to contribute money from out of state. Our lone source of
funding is a small, committed group of donors who believe in our (gun control)
agenda. (Respondent Seventeen)
Twelve (57.1 percent) of the twenty-one interview respondents reported that their interest
group and legal team were funded, in part, through the efforts of small donation mass
membership drives. Not surprisingly, the only interest groups with the organizational capacity to
complete mass membership drives were national level Second Amendment groups. No local or
state interest group reported the usage of mass membership drives as being a significant part of
their organizational funding efforts.
The most popular form of organizational funding, beyond mass membership drives,
according to interview respondents was few donor contributions. Fifteen (71.4 percent) of the
twenty-one interview respondents reported that a small group of donors provided their interest
group and legal team with important financial resources. Of the fifteen affirmative respondents,
eleven represented gun rights groups and four represented gun control organizations. This result
shows that gun rights organizations are almost three more likely than gun control organizations
to use small group donor contributions to fun their organization.
The final organizational structure that was considered in the Second Amendment interest
group cause lawyer study was the importance of corporate funds to the financial support of gunrelated organizations. In particular, six (28.6 percent) of the twenty-one interview respondents
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reported that their interest group receives the monetary support of corporate groups and industry.
All six affirmative respondents represented gun rights organizations. This finding is not
particularly striking considering the fact that the gun industry has a financial stake in continuing
to support gun rights legislation and litigation, and gun control does not have an industry that
explicitly supports their agenda. Eight (38.1 percent) of the twenty-one interview respondents
utilized at least two of these organizational funding mechanisms, while five (23.8 percent)
respondents reported that their interest group used all three instruments.
Analysis of the data collected regarding Second Amendment interest group cause
lawyering legal team organization led to the acceptance of all three research hypotheses
associated with this section. Specifically, distinct differences were found between the legal
organization of gun rights and gun control interest groups, between heavily funded and lesser
funded Second Amendment interest groups, and differences between local, state, and national
Second Amendment interest groups. All three of these hypotheses are accepted and the
associated null hypotheses are rejected.
Conclusions
This study posed the research question, how have Second Amendment interest group
cause lawyers dealt with case participation, litigation strategies, judicial venue-shopping,
coordination and networking between interest groups, and legal team organization, 1960-2009?
This study theorized that there will be distinct differences between gun rights and gun control
interest groups, between heavily funded and lesser funded interest groups, and between local,
state, and national Second Amendment interest groups, with regard to legal participation,
litigation strategies, venue-shopping, coordination, networking, and organization. This theory
was operationalized into five distinct interview independent variable areas, including legal
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participation, litigation strategies, venue-shopping, coordination, networking, and organization,
with the actual Second Amendment interest group cause lawyer being the dependent variable.
Using telephone interviews, this study found that there were clear differences between
local, state, and national Second Amendment interest groups with regard to legal participation,
litigation strategies, judicial venue-shopping, coordination and networking, and organization.
More specifically, local, state, and national Second Amendment interest groups deal with all five
of the interview areas differently. As such, the five research hypotheses associated with these
variable relationships are accepted and the null hypotheses are rejected. This study found that
there were distinct differences between heavily funded and lesser funded interest groups with
regard to legal participation, litigation strategies, judicial venue-shopping, coordination and
networking, and organization. In particular, heavily funded and lesser funded Second
Amendment interest groups deal with all five of the interview areas differently. Because of this,
the five research hypotheses associated with these variable relationships are accepted and the
null hypotheses are rejected.
Along with the first sets of theories, this study found that there were distinct differences
between gun rights and gun control interest groups with regard to litigation strategies, judicial
venue-shopping, and organization. More specifically, gun rights and gun control interest groups
deal with these three interview areas significantly different ways. As such, the three research
hypotheses associated with the variable relationships are accepted and the null hypotheses are
rejected. Interview responses regarding legal participation and coordination/networking showed
that gun rights and gun control lawyers actually participate and coordinate in similar manners,
and thus, the two research hypotheses associated with these two variable relationships cannot be
accepted and the null hypotheses cannot be rejected.
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The most important find of this study is not that there were differences between local,
state, and national Second Amendment interest groups or that there were differences between
heavily funded and lesser interest groups, but that there were not differences between gun rights
and gun control interest groups with regard to legal participation and coordination/networking.
In focusing on what we know about interest groups, this finding shows that in some ways interest
groups do not act in the ways we often expect them to. For instance, because gun rights and gun
control lawyers both participate in the legal arena for vastly different reasons, we should expect
them to participate in different ways as well. However, complied results of the interviews for
this study show that gun rights and gun control, in fact, act very similarly when deciding whether
or not to participate in Second Amendment cases.
This study found that gun rights and gun control lawyers coordinate network with other
interest groups in similar ways and for similar reasons. While both sets of lawyers strive to win
in the courtroom, they are attempting to attain totally different legal goals. One set of lawyers
want fewer gun laws, while the other wants more, and to find that they actually coordinate and
network in similar fashions is very interesting. One would think that coordination and
networking techniques between the two different types of lawyers would be completely different
because of their competing legal efforts. The best answer that this study can give as to why they
have similar process with regard to legal participation and coordination/networking is that they
are both working the legal system. Each lawyer knows what they have to do get ahead, and
regardless of what they are fighting for, they have to follow the legal system that has been laid
out for so many years.
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CHAPTER THREE

SECOND AMENDMENT DECISIONS IN STATE SUPREME COURTS

(President Clinton) boasts about 186,000 people denied firearms under the Brady
Law rules. The Brady Law has been in force for three years. In that time, they have
prosecuted seven people and put three of them in prison. You know, the President
has entertained more felons than that at fundraising coffees in the White House, for
Pete’s sake.
--Charlton Heston, former actor and N.R.A. President, 1997

This (the attempted assassination of U.S. Rep. Gabrielle Giffords) is clearly an
illustration of why we must all work together to fight gun violence in America
and keep dangerous weapons out of the hands of the wrong people…I will
immediately be offering legislation further limiting gun possession laws.
--U.S. Representative Carolyn McCarthy (D-NY), 2011

In the fall of 1967, Arthur Burton, Louis Benton, Edmond Shuler, Al Toth, Herman
Treptow, and George Schlelke brought litigation that challenged the constitutionality of the
New Jersey Gun Control law passed earlier in the year. This coalition of sportsman club
members and gun dealers felt that the new restrictive law infringed upon the rights of
individuals to own and operate legal firearms. The New Jersey Gun Control law provided new
guidelines for the ownership and operation of firearms, forced firearms sellers to comply with
new standards and qualifications for licenses to sell firearms, and gave the New Jersey
Superintendent of Police broad powers to ensure the safety, health, and welfare of the public
from the misuse of firearms. The litigants formally asked the New Jersey Supreme Court to
declare the new gun law unconstitutional and forbid its enforcement.1
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Following a hearing before the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the newly-passed gun control law. The written opinion, by a Democraticmajority, was quite striking as the majority felt that without legal protections, including gun
law in question, could create scenarios through which political assassinations, the killing of
law enforcement officers, and increased sniper attacks would occur with a higher frequency.
With this opinion, membership in New Jersey gun clubs declined and many gun dealers found
other ways to pedal their firearms. Burton v. Sills (1968) has become known as one of the first
legal opinions to be held as evidence in support of the American gun control movement, as
well as one of the most overt legal attempts to take the gun ownership rights away from
American by the gun rights movement in America.2
This study focuses on the decision-making and judicial behavior of judges of state
supreme courts through the lens of Second Amendment claims and issues, such as those
outlined in the introductory example that focused on the Burton v. Sills case. This study
attempts to do two different things. First, I will provide readers with a descriptive study of
state Second Amendment decisions between 1960 and 2009. Second, I present readers with an
explanatory analysis that estimates whether electoral accountability, party affiliation of the
court, institutional factors, public opinion, and specific exogenous factors affect the way
judges who sit on state supreme courts rule on polarizing political issues, such as the Second
Amendment between 1960 and 2009.
Potential Influences on State Supreme Court Judicial Behavior and Decision-Making
In this study, I am interested in the political aspects that affect Second Amendment
decisions in state supreme courts from 1960 to 2009. This study theorizes that electoral
accountability, party affiliation of the court, institutional factors, public opinion, and specific
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exogenous factors affect the way state supreme courts judges rule on cases that encompass the
polarizing political issue of Second Amendment rights. Rejecting the legal model of decisionmaking and building upon recent studies of state supreme courts produced by Melinda Gann
Hall, Paul Brace, Chris Bonneau, and others, this study attempts to uncover specific institutional
and state-level political aspects that make it more or less likely for a state supreme court judge to
rule in favor of gun rights or gun control.
State supreme courts are an important part of this study because of their position as an
integral part of the public policy-making process. The Second Amendment policy area gives this
study particularly good mileage towards understanding state supreme courts because the right to
bear arms is integral within the Bill of Rights, and consequently also is a civil liberty that the
federal government should be unable to take away from American citizens. Since the 1970s,
scholarship regarding state supreme courts has focused on judicial decision-making on particular
cases, the composition of specific state courts, and policy-making.
One of the barriers to the study of decision-making in state supreme courts has been the
differing ideological composition of membership on state supreme courts. According to Donald
Songer and Susan Tabrizi, the connection between political ideology, religiosity, and judicial
decision-making has always been difficult to measure empirically. In an attempt to create a new
model for the study of state supreme courts decision-making, Songer and Tabrizi found that
practicing Christian Evangelicals judges were significantly more conservative than regular
Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish justices regarding death penalty, gender discrimination, and
obscenity cases.3
In one of the first attempts to empirically measure the decision-making of state supreme
courts judges, Stuart Nagel explored the connection between state supreme court judges and
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political party affiliation regarding decision-making. Nagel found that Democratic state supreme
court judges were much more likely to support the liberal argument in a case than their
Republican counterparts. Democratic judges were more likely than Republican judges to support
the defense in criminal cases, the administrative agency in business regulation cases, and
broadening position in free speech cases.4
John Patterson and Gregory Rathjen explored the social, political, and legal backgrounds
of state supreme courts judges and how they affected the judicial decision-making processes
when the judges rendered decisions. Patterson and Rathjen found that partisanship, tenure on a
court, religion, and career patterns were each significant factors that helped determine how state
supreme court judges decided cases. In particular, partisanship and religion were the two most
important variables that helped to determine how state supreme court judges decided cases.5
Through analysis of the demographic background of state supreme court judges, Robert
Kagan, Bobby Infelise, and Robert Detlefsen produced a model that outlined the distinctive
patterns of the decision-making of judges. The study found that the judges who served on state
supreme courts between 1900 and 1970 were relatively diverse, drawn from a variety of legal
and political backgrounds with significant or no experience, and attended an assortment of elite
and non-elite law schools. Unfortunately, the model used by the authors found no connections
between selected judge background characteristics and judicial trends in judicial decisionmaking.6
Gerard Gryski and Eleanor Main measured the importance of social demographic
backgrounds on the judicial decision-making of state supreme court judges in sexual
discrimination cases. The authors found that state supreme court judges who decided in favor of
a sexual discrimination claim were most likely a Democrat who studied law at an out of state or
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public law school.7 Craig Emmert used a wide-ranging set of three thousand state supreme court
decisions to create an integrated model of judicial decision-making. Statistical analysis revealed
that the case issue raised, the identity of a challenging party, types of constitutional arguments
advanced, centrality of legal challenge, and the lower court ruling all impact the decision-making
process used by state supreme court judges.8
Melinda Gann Hall and Paul Brace explored the political nature of the burden of death
penalty cases in state supreme courts within the context of judicial decision-making. The model
of decision-making created by Hall and Brace found that age and partisanship significantly
affected how judges ruled on death penalty cases. In particular, Republican-affiliated judges
were more likely to approve a death sentence than Democratic judges, while the same
phenomenon was apparent with older judges. Older state supreme court judges were much more
likely than younger judges to support the death penalty.9
Paul Brace, Laura Langer, and Melinda Gann Hall created a better measure of party
affiliation to examine the judicial decision-making of state supreme court judges. The new
measure, party-adjusted surrogate judge ideology measure (PAJID), was exposed to a number of
analyses, and was found to be a valid, stable measure of the preferences of state supreme court
judges that is much better than party affiliation. Not only did the new PAJID measure improve
explanations of judicial decision-making across areas of law, but also across 52 different state
supreme courts.10
Donald Songer and Kelley Crews-Meyer examined the effects of a judge’s gender on
decision-making in state supreme courts across the United States. This decision-making effort
found that regardless of political ideology, female judges on state supreme courts collectively
supported greater rights when a case regarding women’s issues was decided. The study found

106

that there was no connection between gender and judicial decision-making in criminal rights and
economic liberty cases.11 Sara Benesh and Wendy Martinek found that the decision-making of
state supreme court judges is influenced by the U.S. Supreme Court and state-level political
elites.12
David Caplan provided some analysis regarding the decision-making of the Indiana and
Oregon state supreme courts as they decided several important Second Amendment decisions. In
Oregon v. Kessler (1980), the Oregon Supreme Court handed down a unanimous decision in
which struck down a state statute banning the private possession of weapons. A month after the
Kessler decision, in Schubert v. DeBard (1981), the Indiana Supreme Court declined to review a
lower state court ruling that the Indiana State Superintendent of Police may provide gun licenses
to individuals with a reason for carrying a weapon after they passed a background check. These
early decisions show how state supreme court decision-making regarding the Second
Amendment have changed to include the potential for greater gun ownership.13
David Hardy addressed state supreme court decision-making as it relates to the Second
Amendment. In the work, Hardy found that many of the early state supreme court Second
Amendment cases (1820-1940) were decided in accordance with the prevailing cultural
conception of the Second Amendment as allowing firearms to owned and operated only in
circumstances in which a state or local militia was the central focus.14 Michael Quinlan explored
numerous early state supreme court Second Amendment cases and how judges came to a
decision. Through analysis of early state supreme court Second Amendment decisions, the
author found that the cases surveyed show that almost all early state supreme court judges who
decided a case regarding the Second Amendment favored the right to bear arms in conjunction
with a militia.15
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David Kopel, Clayton Cramer, and Scott Hattrup systematically outlined the Second
Amendment judicial decision-making process in the Ohio, Oregon, and Colorado supreme
courts. First, Oregon’s original intent test states that all Second Amendment cases brought
before the court must be closely associated to firearms usage by militias to be satisfied when
judges are deciding a firearms-related case. Second, Colorado’s fundamental right to bear arms
test states that firearms cases must be connected with individual ownership in order to be
satisfied when judges are deciding a Second Amendment case. Third, the new “reasonableness”
standard of review created by the Ohio Supreme Court states that a Second Amendment claim
must be deemed reasonable by the Court before an affirmative ruling can be rendered.
According to the authors, each of these standards help to explain how state supreme court judges
decide Second Amendment cases in Oregon, Colorado, and Ohio.16 Using this work as a starting
point, this study suggests that electoral accountability, party affiliation of the court, institutional
factors, public opinion, and specific exogenous factors affect the way state supreme court judges
decide polarizing political issues, including the Second Amendment.
From this scholarship, it is obvious that there is expansive work regarding the many
issues that encompass the study of decision-making and judicial behavior in state supreme
courts, and state appellate decision-making regarding Second Amendment cases. However,
research for this study suggests that no literature has focused on a statistical analysis of the
political aspects of Second Amendment decisions in state supreme courts. This study attempts to
fill this void in the literature regarding analysis of the political characteristics of state supreme
court firearms-related decision. Since this topic has never been the focus of scholarship, it is my
hope that this chapter will, in its own small way, be successful in encouraging discussion of and
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improve descriptions of the explanations of the issues that affect decision-making regarding
Second Amendment decisions in state supreme courts.
Design of the Research
In this study, I am interested in the political aspects that explain the judicial decisionmaking and behavior of judges on Second Amendment cases in state supreme courts.
Specifically, this study elaborates on the theory that political context and the political values of
judges, including electoral accountability, party affiliation of the court, institutional factors,
public opinion, and specific exogenous factors, affect decision-making on Second Amendment
decisions. The dependent variable for the study is the Second Amendment case decision,
whether a state supreme court ruled in favor of gun control or gun rights. Although scholars
have not created a dependent variable in this manner before, there is precedent for the usage of
case outcomes as the central focus of judicial scholarship.
John Kilwein and Richard Brisbin examined a sample of more than 1,000 state supreme
court decisions that focused on intensified scrutiny doctrine.17 In second work, Sidney Ulmer
created a methodical approach to the study of judicial behavior of U.S. Supreme Court justices
that focused racial discrimination case outcomes during the Civil Rights Movement.18 In third
work, Nancy Scherer and Banks Miller created a logistic regression model to determine if
membership in the Federalist Society affected the political ideology and decision-making of U.S.
Courts of Appeals judges through usage of the Harold Spaeth database on U.S. Supreme Court
decisions. After surveying case law, the authors argued that federal appellate judges who were
members of the Federalist Society were significantly more conservative than non-members.19
A model, similar to that of the Schrer and Miller study, was created for this chapter. This
new model estimates the effects of electoral accountability, party affiliation of the court,
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institutional factors, public opinion, and specific exogenous factors on state supreme court
Second Amendment decisions. Second Amendment case decisions were gathered from the
LexisNexis Academic Legal search engine, between 1 January 1960 and 31 December 2009, for
a total of 269 cases from all state supreme courts. Search terms for data collection in LexisNexis
included the following phrases: Second Amendment, concealed weapons, concealed weapons
permits, automatic weapons, semi-automatic weapons, gun violence, gun show loophole,
background checks, right to bear arms, sawed-off shot gun, assault weapon, convicts and
firearms, and gun bans. The dependent variable was created so that if a case ruled in favor of
gun control, then the case was labeled “0.” If a case favored gun rights, then the case was labeled
“1.” The mid-range theory of this study was disaggregated into seven independent variables,
each including specific hypotheses, to estimate their effect on the dependent Second Amendment
decision variable.
Electoral Accountability
Electoral accountability provides reasoning for the way state politicians vote and act, and
state supreme court judges are similar. Each of the judges sitting on the fifty state supreme
courts across the United States were either elected or appointed. Recent scholarship has
suggested that the judicial decision-making of state supreme court judges is partly influenced by
the type of judicial selection method that propelled them into office. According to Melinda Gann
Hall, the low rate of dissenting opinions authored by state supreme court judges can be
accounted for because some judges are forced to face reelection, and constituent values suppress
the expression of dissent on important policy issues for certain judges. Hall argued that instead
of voting in agreement with their personal policy preferences, state supreme court judges want to
retain their positions do not offer dissenting opinions in order to avoid being singled out in an
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election.20 Gregory Huber and Sanford Gordon found that judges who stand for election become
more punitive in sentencing as re-election approaches.21
Melinda Gann Hall and Paul Brace argued that the method of judicial selection in a state
affected how state supreme court judge’s decided cases. In particular, Hall and Brace argued
that state supreme courts with appointive selection methods promoted consensus decisionmaking, while elective methods promoted disagreement. The authors found that in states with
appointive judicial selection methods had 7.5 percent lower dissenting opinion rates than state
with elective judicial selection.22 Paul Brace and Melinda Gann Hall argued that non-elected or
appointed judicial selection methods encouraged decision-making by state supreme court judges
in a consensual fashion, while elected judicial selection methods did not. In the article, the
authors found appointive judicial selection methods were associated with fewer dissenting
opinions regarding important state courts of appeals policy decisions.23
Melinda Gann Hall argued that state supreme court judges act in a strategic fashion when
deciding cases in order to minimize opposition when they face an election. Focusing on death
penalty decisions between 1983 and 1988 in four southern state supreme courts, Hall found that
the influence of voters on state supreme court judges was enhanced when an environment of
competitive elections were present.24 Daniel Pinello came to a similar conclusion when
exploring business law policy decisions made in state supreme courts. The author found that
popularly elected judicial selection methods led to cost-stabilizing business decisions, while
appointed judicial selection methods led to cost-increasing business decisions.25
Paul Brace and Melinda Gann Hall explored the connection between institutional rules
and structures, including state judicial selection method, and judicial behavior and decisionmaking. After estimating several models of judicial voting on the death penalty cases in state
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supreme courts, Brace and Hall found that state judicial selection method did impact how judges
voted on death penalty cases. In particular, the authors found that state supreme courts with an
elected selection method were more likely to support the death penalty than judges selected
through appointments or commissions.26
Paul Brace and Melinda Gann Hall examined the linkage between electoral politics and
judicial decision-making in state supreme courts. Using probit estimations of death penalty
decisions in eight state supreme courts between 1983 and 1988, Brace and Hall found that state
supreme court judges do have predispositions that are consistent with a state’s electoral and
ideological situation. In particular, the authors found that a judge’s support for the death penalty
in a decision was directly linked to more competitive judicial election situations.27 Elisha
Savchak and A.J. Barghothi tested the effects of merit plan judicial selection on judicial
decision-making. Using a larger sample than previous studies, Savchak and Barghothi found that
judges facing retention elections act in a similar manner to those who face partisan or nonpartisan elections. In fact, the authors concluded that judicial decisions were influenced more by
the public voting in retention elections than the commission who original appointed the judge.28
Roughly half of all state supreme court judges across the country face either partisan or
non-partisan elections in order to retain their seats on the bench. According to Adam Long, over
the past twenty years judicial elections have been transformed into races that are
indistinguishable from other political campaigns. Fueled by contributions from industry,
corporations, companies, businesses, the legal bar, and doctors, candidates running for seats on
state supreme courts have become pawns in the political game to become the best judge money
can buy.29
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Because of these contributions, justices elected, in part, with the money given to their
campaigns from these interests are seen as being beholden to their contributors when deciding
tough cases they are litigating or cases that involve policy aspects of their interests. For instance,
during the 2000 Ohio Supreme Court race, a pro-business organization accused incumbent
Justice Alice Robie Resnick “of having an anti-business bias, encouraged by the donations of
trial lawyers…”30 In West Virginia, incumbent supreme court Justice Warren McGraw (D) lost
his 2004 re-election race to Charleston private practice lawyer Brent Benjamin, in what the
Washington Post called “a rancorous contest…one of the nastiest (races) in the nation…”31
Special interest groups spent more than $3.5 million on the 2004 West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals race, while the candidates raised a total of $2.8 million. In 2004, the two major
party candidates for state supreme court in Illinois raised more than $8.9 million in campaign
contributions, which was the most money ever contributed for a state judicial election, and it was
not even statewide race, as supreme court justices are elected from districts across the state. The
winner, lawyer Lloyd Karmeier (R), raised nearly $4.6 million, while the loser, Gordon Maag
(D), brought in $4.4 million.32
Other state supreme court judges who do not face election are either selected through a
commission process, which is often similar to the Missouri Plan, or through lifetime
appointments.33 In stark contrast to hyper-political state supreme court elections, judges sitting
on the bench through Missouri Plan processes or gubernatorial lifetime appointments are
supposed to be independent of political interests with regard to potential case outcomes.34
Elected state supreme court judges possess the added weight of being supported by political
interests through elections, while selected judges are independent of the political fray.35
Connecting this work together, it should be noted that the method through which state supreme
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court judges are selected can have a direct impact on how they decide important cases. As such,
this study hypothesizes that elected state supreme courts increase the probability of a Second
Amendment decision that will favor gun rights, while selected or appointed state supreme courts
increase the probability of a Second Amendment decision that will favor gun control.
The electoral accountability variable, judicial selection method, estimated the effect of
judicial selection methods on state supreme court Second Amendment decisions. This
dichotomous variable was labeled “0” in cases where a state supreme court judicial selection
method was elected on a partisan or non-partisan basis, the variable was labeled “1” in cases
where the state supreme court judicial selection method was not elected. Data regarding state
supreme court selection method was collected from the American Judicature society, and
accounted for changes in state judicial selection methods between 1960 and 2009.
Political Party Affiliation of the Court
The political party affiliation of the judges who hear a case might affect the way a state
supreme court decides Second Amendment cases. This hypothesis suggests that a judge’s
political party affiliation can affect how judges’ rule on important cases in state supreme courts.
In particular, several studies have advanced the argument that party affiliation affects judicial
decision-making. In one of the first works that linked judicial party affiliation to the decisionmaking of judges, Sidney Ulmer found that U.S. Presidents were interested in appointing U.S.
Supreme Court justices that possessed a background in public office. Ulmer found that all of
President Dwight Eisenhower’s appointees had previous public experience on either the state or
federal judiciary or as the attorney general of a state. The author argued, with the exception of
Earl Warren, that justices with previous experience in an elected office typically mirrored the
opinion of the president who nominated them when deciding a case.36
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In an attempt to explore the judicial role of state supreme court judges, John Wold found
that the political ideology, social background, and political party associations helped to model
personal and professional views of the judicial role of state supreme court judges.37 Philip
Dubois found that the political party affiliation of state supreme court judges was at the center of
judicial decision-making. Dubois found that one of the key factors that helped to explain how
state supreme court judges behaved was the political party that they had often been associated
with.38
Melinda Gann Hall and Paul Brace surveyed death penalty cases from 1980 to 1988 in
four states to determine factors that helped explain judicial decision-making in state supreme
courts. Specifically, Hall and Brace found that the individual preferences regarding death
penalty cases mirrored the perceived party affiliation of state supreme court judges in the four
state sample.39 Paul Brace and Melinda Gann Hall explored the connection between electoral
politics and judicial decision-making in state supreme courts. Using statistical analysis of capital
punishment decisions in eight state supreme courts between 1983 and 1988, Brace and Hall
found that state supreme court judges did have political predispositions that were consistent with
association with a political party.40
Using a meta-analysis of numerous judicial politics studies, Daniel Pinello found that
political party affiliation of state supreme court judges was a dependable measure of ideology
and judicial decision-making. In the study, Pinello found that state supreme court judges who
were affiliated in some way with the Democratic Party were much more liberal when dispensing
justice than their Republican Party affiliated counterparts, who were far more conservative in
their rulings.41
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Because this literature argues that party affiliation affects judicial decision-making in
general, and state supreme court judicial decision-making in particular, this study contends that
party affiliation will affect how state supreme court judges rule on Second Amendment
decisions. Consistent with commonly held conceptions about the policy preferences of the two
parties, this study hypothesizes that the number of state supreme court judges affiliated with the
Democratic Party increase the probability of a Second Amendment decision that will favor gun
control, while state supreme court associated with the Republican Party increase the probability
of a Second Amendment decision that will favor gun rights.
The party affiliation of the court variable estimated the effect of a state supreme court’s
majority political party affiliation on Second Amendment decisions. This dichotomous variable
was labeled “0” in decisions where the ruling majority of a state supreme court was affiliated
with the Democratic Party. The variable was labeled “1” in decisions where the ruling the
majority of a state supreme court was affiliated with the Republican Party. Variable data
regarding state supreme court political party affiliation was collected from the Richard Brisbin
and John Kilwein state supreme court judicial biography dataset created in the early 1990s,
updated to 2006, and spanning the years 1970 to 2006. Data for Second Amendment cases used
in this study decided before 1970 or after 2006 was taken from the on-line judicial database,
Judgepedia.
Institutional Factors
Specific institutional factors might also affect the way a state supreme court decides
Second Amendment cases. In state supreme courts, literature has addressed the importance of
institutional arrangements and their effect on the decision-making of judges. Robert Sickels
argued that the high level of judicial consensus in the decisions of the Maryland Court of
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Appeals was a product of the institutional process that rotated case assignments randomly
between the sitting judges of the court. According to Sickels, this arrangement was reinforced
by the judicial compliance of the opinions of others.42 Edward Beiser found a similar result
within the Rhode Island Supreme Court. Because of a high degree of integration, the judges of
the court rarely disagreed with one another because of the institutional process of randomly
assigned case assignments.43
Bradley Canon and Dean Jaros, like Sickels and Bieser, examined the importance of
several institutional factors on the rate of dissent in state supreme courts. Institutional factors
used in the study included: the method of state judicial selection, the method of office retention,
length of tenure in office, and presence or absence of an intermediate appellate court. Canon and
Jaros found that institutional factors, in the form of the presence of absence of intermediate
appellate courts, did create conditions for an increase in the behavior of dissenting behavior of
state supreme court judges.44
Elliot Slotnick found that, according to the personal and professional perceptions of a
number of state supreme court chief justices, a randomly-selected system of opinion assignments
maintained social and political cohesion of a state supreme court. Slotnick also argued that
methods of discretionary case assignments promoted social and political conflict within a state
supreme court.45 Roger Handberg argued that there was a direct connection between institutional
factors and the writing of dissenting opinions in state supreme court decisions. In particular,
Handberg found that states with an intermediate appellate court just below the state supreme
court had significantly higher levels of dissent.46 Henry Glick and George Pruet found a similar
result. Glick and Pruet found that the presence of a state intermediate appellate court
significantly increased the potential for dissenting opinions in state supreme court decisions.47
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Later work also focused on the institutional arrangement of the presence of state
intermediate appellate courts, coupled with other institutional factors. Melinda Gann Hall and
Paul Brace argued that in addition to state intermediate appellate courts, the method of judicial
selection in a state affected how state supreme court judge’s decided cases. In particular, Hall
and Brace argued that state supreme courts with appointive selection methods promoted
consensus decision-making, while elective methods encouraged disagreement. The authors
found that in states with appointive judicial selection methods had 7.5 percent lower dissenting
opinion rates than state with elective judicial selection. Results of the study found that the use of
random opinion assignments and the presence of a state intermediate appellate court were
associated with higher levels of dissenting opinions in state supreme courts.48
Paul Brace and Melinda Gann Hall argued that judicial selection methods influenced the
judicial decision-making of state supreme court judges. In particular, Brace and Hall found that
appointive judicial selection methods and voting rules were associated with fewer dissenting
opinions and behavior. In fact, in states with an appointed the governor or the legislature, the
number of cases that possessed dissenting opinions dropped by 4 percent. The authors found that
the presence of an intermediate appellate court produced significant dissent in state supreme
courts. In states with intermediate appellate courts, dissenting opinions were expected in 8.5
percent more cases each year than in states without this institutional arrangement.49
Much of this scholarship suggests that institutional factors in general, and the presence or
absence of state intermediate appellate courts in particular, affect state supreme court judicial
decision-making. This study contends that the presence or absence of state intermediate
appellate courts will affect how state supreme courts judges decide Second Amendment
decisions. Specifically, this study hypothesizes that the presence of a state intermediate appellate
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court increase the probability that state supreme courts will rule in favor of gun control in Second
Amendment decisions, while states without an intermediate appellate court increase the
probability that state supreme courts will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment
decisions.
The state intermediate appellate court variable estimated the effect of the presence or
absence of state intermediate appellate courts on Second Amendment decisions. This
dichotomous variable was labeled “0” in decisions that had an operative state intermediate
appellate court at the time of the ruling. The variable was labeled “1” in decisions that did not
have an active state intermediate appellate court at the time of the ruling. Variable data
regarding state intermediate appellate courts was collected from the American Judicature
Society, and accounted for changes in the presence or absence of state intermediate appellate
courts between 1960 and 2009.
Public Opinion
Public opinion might also affect the way judges who sit on state supreme courts rule on
polarizing political issues. Because a significant amount of state supreme court judges across the
country are elected on a partisan and non-partisan basis, they act in a manner similar to regular
politicians. As these judicial campaigns are bankrolled by wealthy political interests, there is
evidence to suggest that the judges have become beholden to these interests.50 Similarly, much
like politicians who routinely face election and re-election, there is scholarship that proposes that
one of the main concerns of these judges is to be re-elected like their legislative counterparts.51
For instance, the intake of campaign contributions into elections for state supreme court has
drastically increased over the last fifteen years. Judges who are up for re-election and actively
seek campaign contributions illustrate their desire to win re-election.52
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One of the key aspects of winning re-election for any politician, as outlined by David
Mayhew, is to take credit for particular policies and to take positions on issues.53 For state
supreme court judges who face elections, this desire is no different. Even though state supreme
court judges are politicians, they are governed by very different ethical rules and professional
norms. The West Virginia State Code of Judicial Conduct states that candidates for State
Supreme Court should refrain from making policy statements regarding issues that the court
might hear and should abstain from endorsing or opposing candidates for other offices. During
his 2004 re-election campaign, former West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Warren McGraw
violated both statutes of the code. At a time when West Virginia was dealing with numerous
changes to its criminal law statutes, Justice McGraw made it clear, during a campaign speech in
Kermit, WV, that he was at least partly responsible for many of the tougher criminal laws
coming on to the books. At another campaign speech in Williamson, WV, Justice McGraw
noted that, “If I were going to do so, I’d be endorsing Joe Manchin for Governor of West
Virginia.”54 This example shows that not only did McGraw violate the judicial code of conduct
he was supposed to uphold, but he also took credit for the new, tougher criminal laws created in
West Virginia directly before his re-election effort.
This idea of state judicial credit claiming has extended to other states. Incumbent
Wisconsin State Supreme Court justice David Prosser (R) was running for re-election against
challenger JoAnne Kloppenberg (I), a prosecutor in the Wisconsin Department of Justice, during
the spring 2011 race. During a campaign forum at the Marquette University Law School
between the candidates, Prosser made a number of statements where he seemingly claimed credit
for the outcomes of cases he presided over. Prosser said:
In 12 years, I participated in more than 900 published decisions. I have written 132
majority opinions, plus many concurrences and dissents. I have written decisions on
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virtually every area of Wisconsin law from anti-trust to zoning, including constitutional,
contempt, criminal, environmental, family, insurance, labor, and tort law. Many of my
opinions have significantly influenced Wisconsin law.55
While state supreme court judges have started to make statements regarding policies, it wasn’t
until 2002 that it was protected speech under the First Amendment. In Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, an ideologically divided U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Minnesota’s
requirement that judges not discuss political issues was unconstitutional. The case successfully
challenged the Minnesota Code of Judicial Ethics that constrained candidates seeking election as
a judge from discussing issues that could come before them if elected.56
Taking credit for rendered decisions speaks specifically to the point that judges, while
they are typically seen as being insulated from the pressures of the public, are affected by what
the public thinks because of their interest in being re-elected. Research has shown that
politicians and elected judges in particular, must focus on changes in public opinion over time.
In particular, variation and stability patterns in political ideology and public policy change in
states as national ideological trends manifest themselves in states.57 The system of judicial
selection at the state supreme court level has created elections that are virtually the same as
executive and legislative contests where money and public opinion affects the policy positions
taken by candidates because each are interested in getting re-elected.
Like Mayhew outlines for members of Congress, elected state supreme court judges are
able to point to specific decisions in regard to policy decisions and issue positions in their reelection fights in order to show attentiveness to public opinion and political ideology. This
literature shows that public opinion can affect how cases are ruled upon in state supreme courts
because of changing opinions of the electorate and because of institutional arrangements that
force judges to stand for election. In particular, state supreme court judges might be inclined to
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rule in favor of gun rights or gun control on Second Amendment cases given the timeline and
their re-election interests. Depending upon the state, the closer to an election a case is
determined might mean a gun rights ruling if a state favors firearms rights or a gun control ruling
if a state does not.
The public opinion variables estimated the effect of state political ideology and
population density on Second Amendment state supreme court decisions. This study
hypothesizes that state supreme court Second Amendment decisions will be significantly
affected by state political ideology and population density. In particular, states with a liberal
political ideology increase the probability that their state supreme court will rule in favor of gun
control in Second Amendment decisions, while states with a conservative political ideology
increase the probability that their state supreme court will rule in favor of gun rights in Second
Amendment decisions. States with high population density increase the probability that their
state supreme court will rule in favor of gun control in Second Amendment decisions, while
states with low population density increase the probability that their state supreme court will rule
in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions.
Accordingly, the state political ideology measure was taken from the Berry, et. al. citizen
political ideology dataset. The variable was continuously measured between 1 and 100 with
lower numbers representing conservative political ideologies and higher numbers representing
liberal political ideologies. The appellate circuit population density measure was taken from the
U.S. Census Bureau dataset. This continuously measured variable represents the number of
people per square mile in each state. Lightly populated states have lower population densities,
while densely populated states have higher population densities.
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Specific Exogenous Factors
Specific exogenous factors might affect the way state supreme court judges decide
Second Amendment cases. This hypothesis suggests that factors from outside the judicial system
affect state appellate firearms cases. In particular, several studies have advanced the argument
that specific exogenous factors have influenced judicial decision-making. One of the first studies
that considered this external argument was produced by James Gibson. In the study, the author
found that particular exogenous factors did affect the way judges decided cases. According to
Gibson, the exogenous factors that had an effect were contact with constituents and the potential
for electoral defeat. Focusing on the circuit system used in the Iowa trial courts, Gibson found
that this involvement from outside factors was essential when judges ruled offered important
decisions.58
Philip Fetzer argued that extralegal factors helped to explain complex American Indian
legal decisions rendered in tribal jurisdictions. Through analysis of case law, Fetzer found that
that the extralegal factor of tribal sovereignty had a particular impact on these Indian legal
decisions. Previously, scholars had questioned much of the confusing legal reasoning that was
established in prior tribal decisions. According to Fetzer, tribal sovereignty was the outside
factor that helped explain why judges ruled the way that did in several of these unusual
decisions.59 James Gibson argued that one of the biggest failings of early judicial behavior
literature was that few considered multiple exogenous concepts. In several of these studies, the
authors employed exogenous measures that considered the personal lives of judges. Gibson
argued that personal factors were exogenous in nature.60
John Ferejohn and Barry Weingast created a spatial model that connected personal and
professional judicial goals with distinct judicial behavioral and decision-making outcomes.
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According to the Ferejohn and Weingast model, external factors included those outside the scope
of a judge’s career.61 Pragati Patrick and Thomas Bak found that a federal law involving
increased sentences for individuals who were arrested for violent firearms-related drug crimes
affected the amount of firearms cases decided by the federal court system. For Patrick and Bak,
this finding was of specific interest because judges in the sample appeared hesitant to get
involved with cases that concerned these new sentences.62
Gretchen Helmke and Mitchell Sanders argued that external factors helped to shape the
behavior of judges on the Argentine Supreme Court. The exogenous factors that shaped the
behavior of Argentine judges included loyalty to the national government and specific policy
interests. The model created by Helmke and Sanders linked specific exogenous factors to the
behaviors of judges in their role on the Argentine Supreme Court.63 In a final work, Matthew
Henry and John Turner created a patent litigation case dataset from the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals from the last fifty years. In the study, the authors found that exogenous factors have
affected these decisions. Decisions made by other judicial levels were the outside factor that had
a particular impact on patent decisions.64 This literature shows that specific exogenous factors
have affected judicial rulings made at various levels of the state and federal judiciary.
Specific exogenous factor variables estimated their effect on state supreme court Second
Amendment decisions. Two firearms-related external factor variables, state gun ownership
percentage and homicide rate, were created. State gun ownership percentage was continuously
measured from each state based on the findings from Washington Post gun ownership surveys
completed in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000. Lower gun ownership rates meant that fewer state
residents own firearms, while higher gun ownership reflected elevated rates of gun ownership.
State homicide rate was a continuous measure of the total number of homicides committed per
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100,000 people in a state population per year. Variable data regarding state homicide rate was
collected from the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics. Lower homicide rates meant that the state
had fewer murders, while more murders reflected elevated rates of homicides in an appellate
circuit.
This study hypothesized that states with high gun ownership percentages increase the
probability that their state courts of appeals will rule in favor of gun rights in Second
Amendment decisions, while states with low gun ownership percentages increase the probability
that their state supreme court will rule in favor of gun control in Second Amendment decisions.
This study hypothesized that states with low homicide rates increase the probability that their
state supreme court will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions, while states
with high homicide rates increase the probability that their supreme court will rule in favor of
gun control in Second Amendment decisions.
Study Methodology and Data Collection Format
Logistic regression analysis was the method used for the analysis of the political aspects
of Second Amendment court rulings made in state supreme courts. The dependent variable for
this study was the state-level Second Amendment case, where cases that favor gun control will
be labeled zero and cases that favor gun rights will be labeled one, so it was important to use
logistic regression because this variable was dichotomous.65 Logistic regression allows
researchers to predict outcomes from a set of variables that may be continuous, discrete,
dichotomous, or a mix of the three types. In particular, the dependent variable was dichotomous,
such as presence/absence or success/failure.66 Logistic regression analysis is designed to analyze
the relationship between independent variable data and a dichotomous dependent variable. A
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dichotomous variable can assume only two values and are just like the indicator dummy
variables used throughout the political science literature.67
Second Amendment case data used for this study spanned the last fifty years, between 1
January 1960 and 31 December 2009. The starting point of this study was significant because it
started several years before Second Amendment issues burst onto the American political
landscape. Case coding was noted after reading the case twice to determine if the respective
state supreme court ruled in favor of gun rights or in favor of gun control cases. Only cases in
which a Second Amendment claim was forwarded or where an important Second Amendment
issue was broached were used in this study.
Predicted probability estimates were tabulated for average and interesting observations
within the data in order to interpret the affect of the independent variables on the dependent
variable and create observations that varied values and showed which variables were significant.
Inter-coder reliability for this study was established. Fifty cases of the 269 full case sample were
randomly selected and coded by another reader. A Cronbach’s α statistic was tabulated based on
the random sample case codes and the reader’s code in order to establish a measure of internal
consistency and reliability between the two codes. The following section provides the results
and analysis of this study.
Political Aspects of Judicial Behavior and Second Amendment Cases: Results and Analysis
The previous sections have described important literature, theories, and methods that link
electoral accountability, institutional factors, public opinion, and specific policy interests to the
types of Second Amendment decisions rendered by state supreme court judges; however, a direct
connection between the independent variables and Second Amendment state supreme court
decisions needs to be established.
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Table One reports the estimated logistic regression coefficients of the state supreme court
Second Amendment case model that was clustered for states, along with several logistic
regression model performance measures presented at the bottom of the table, 1960-2009.
Table One: Logistic Regression Analysis of State Supreme Court Second Amendment
Decisions, 1960-2009
State Supreme Court Independent Variables

Estimated Coefficients

Judicial Selection Method

0.173 (0.396)

Party Affiliation of the Court

0.017 (0.013)***

Presence of Intermediate Appellate Court

-0.251 (0.477)

Political Ideology

-0.071 (0.014)***

Population Density

0.153 (0.289)

Gun Ownership Percentage

0.101 (0.021)***

Homicide Rate

0.093 (0.059)

Log-Likelihood Statistic

-127.664

Chi-Squared Statistic

0.021

% Correctly Predicted

0.887

Proportional Reduction of Error

0.313

R2P

0.917

PCP

0.906

AIC

212.6614

BIC

244.6645

***p<0.05
Sources: LexisNexis Legal Database, the American Judicature Society, Brisbin & Kilwein dataset; Judgepedia; the
Federal Judicial Center, Berry, et. al., four Washington Post gun ownership surveys, the U.S. Census Bureau, and
the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics68.
Note: n=269 cases.

The first variable, judicial selection method (X1), had an estimated coefficient of 0.173.
The estimated coefficient of judicial selection method was not statistically significant because
zero was included in the 95 percent confidence interval. Because this variable was not
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statistically significant, the null hypotheses associated with this variable cannot be rejected. The
two specific directional hypotheses, elected state courts of last resort increase the probability of a
Second Amendment decision that will favor gun rights and selected or appointed state courts of
last resort increase the probability of a Second Amendment decision that will favor gun control,
cannot be accepted.
Second, the state supreme court party affiliation variable (X2) had an estimated
coefficient of 0.017. The estimated coefficient of the party affiliation variable was statistically
significant because zero was not included in the 95 percent confidence interval. Because this
variable was significant, the null hypotheses associated with this variable can be rejected. The
two specific directional hypotheses, state supreme court judges affiliated with the Democratic
Party increase the probability of a Second Amendment decision that will favor gun control and
state judges affiliated with the Republican Party increase the probability of a Second
Amendment decision that will favor gun rights, are accepted. Anticipated relationships between
judicial political party affiliation and state supreme court Second Amendment decisions are
consistent with my hypotheses.
Third, the presence of a state intermediate appellate court variable (X3) had an estimated
coefficient of -0.251. The estimated coefficient of the intermediate appellate court variable was
not statistically significant because zero was included in the 95 percent confidence interval.
Since the appellate court variable was not statistically significant, the null hypotheses related to
this variable cannot be rejected. The two specific directional hypotheses, the presence/absence
of a state intermediate appellate court increase the probability that state supreme courts will rule
in favor of gun control/rights in Second Amendment decisions, cannot be accepted.
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Fourth, the state political ideology variable (X4) had an estimated coefficient of -0.071.
The estimated coefficient of the state political ideology variable was statistically significant
because zero was not included in the 95 percent confidence interval. Because this variable was
significant, the null hypotheses associated with this variable are rejected. The two specific
directional hypotheses, states with a liberal/conservative political ideology increase the
probability that their state supreme court will rule in favor of gun control/gun rights in Second
Amendment decisions, are accepted. Anticipated relationships between state political ideology
and state supreme court Second Amendment decisions are consistent with my hypotheses.
Fifth, the state population density variable (X5) had an estimated coefficient of 0.153.
The estimated coefficient of the variable was not statistically significant because zero was
included in the 95 percent confidence interval. Since the homicide rate variable was not
statistically significant, the null hypotheses related to this variable cannot be rejected. The two
specific directional hypotheses, states with high/low population density increase the probability
that their state supreme court will rule in favor of gun control/gun rights in Second Amendment
decisions, cannot be accepted.
Sixth, the state gun ownership percentage variable (X6) had an estimated coefficient of
0.101. The estimated coefficient of the variable was statistically significant because zero was not
included in the 95 percent confidence interval. Because this variable was significant, the null
hypotheses associated with this variable are rejected. The two specific directional hypotheses,
states with high/low gun ownership percentages increase the probability that their state supreme
court will rule in favor of gun rights/gun control in Second Amendment decisions, are accepted.
Anticipated relationships between state gun ownership percentages and state supreme court
Second Amendment decisions are consistent with my hypotheses.
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Seventh, the state homicide rate variable (X7) had an estimated coefficient of 0.093. The
estimated coefficient of the variable was not statistically significant because zero was included in
the 95 percent confidence interval. Since the homicide rate variable was not statistically
significant, the null hypotheses related to this variable cannot be rejected. The two specific
directional hypotheses, states with high/low homicide rates increase the probability that their
state supreme court will rule in favor of gun control/gun rights in Second Amendment decisions,
cannot be accepted.
The chi-squared statistic, 0.021, allows this study to reject the null hypothesis that all
variables in the model jointly equal zero. This also refers to the finding that the null hypothesis
of the model does not improve upon simply picking the model outcome. The percent correctly
predicted statistic for this study is 0.887, which means that the model predicts 88.7% of all cases
in the model. This high statistical value refers to the fraction of cases where the actual outcome
corresponds to the predictions described in the model. The third and final statistic that needs to
be addressed is the proportional reduction of error statistic, which is 0.313. This statistic refers
to the percentage of errors that occur from just picking the modal outcome. The reduction of
error is the percentage of these errors that your model eliminates. Because of this statistic, the
model presented in this study reduced chance error by 31.3%
Regarding the performance by the logistic regression model, the R2P value for the linear
probability model was .901. This value reflects that the logistic model makes correct predictions
90 percent of the time, which is forty percent better than pure chance. The PCP value for the
logistic regression model was .897. This value reflects that the logistic regression model makes
correct predictions about 90 percent of the time, which means that the model predicts potential
outcomes much better than chance. The AIC and BIC values for the logit probability model are
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low. This means that the logistic regression model has a good fit. The logistic regression model
was shown to predict outside the bounds of zero and one because the minimum and maximum
summation values for the predicted value of dependent variable of the model were -1.271 for the
minimum value and 1.683 for the maximum value. These model performance values were
estimated following the initial execution of the model.
In order to measure the inter-coder reliability and to measure the soundness of the coding
schema for this study, fifty cases of the full 269 case sample were randomly selected and coded
by another reader. A Cronbach’s α statistic was tabulated based on the random sample case
codes and the reader’s code in order to establish a measure of internal consistency and reliability
between the two codes. The Cronbach’s α statistic for this study was 0.918, which suggests that
the two case codes have a high level of internal consistency. Typically, a reliability coefficient
of 0.70 or higher for two codes is considered to be highly acceptable and possess excellent
agreement.
Table Two outlines the predicted probability estimation (PPE) of important data
observations within the full sample of Second Amendment state supreme court cases. PPE
estimates interpret the affect of significant independent variables on the dependent variable.
Coupled with several averaged PPE observations, Table Two presents sixteen PPE observations
from eight states that changed the most over the study period, 1960-2009. For instance, a state
that changed considerably from conservative to liberal regarding political ideology was
measured in the year the state was most conservative and the year the state was most liberal in
order to illustrate the full affect of significant independent variable on the dependent variable.
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Table Two: Predicted Probability Estimation (PPE) of State Supreme Court Second
Amendment Decisions, 1960-2009
Var. Score;

Gun Control

Gun Rights

Type of Estimation

Variable

Year

State

Ruling PPE

Ruling PPE

Average Sample Observation

--

--

--

55.3 percent

44.7 percent

Average State w/ GOP Majority Court

Party Aff.

--

--

21.5

78.5

Average State w/ DEM Majority Court

Party Aff.

--

--

76.3

23.7

Average Conservative Ideology State

Pol. Ideo.

--

--

29.7

70.3

Average Liberal Ideology State

Pol. Ideo.

--

--

78.4

21.6

Average Low Gun Ownership % State

Gun Own.

--

--

81.4

18.6

Average High Gun Ownership % State

Gun Own.

--

--

25.9

74.1

Conservative to Liberal Political Ideology

Pol. Ideo

2.27; 1965

NC

6.2

93.8

Conservative to Liberal Political Ideology

Pol. Ideo

53.86; 2006

NC

67.2

32.8

Conservative to Liberal Political Ideology

Pol. Ideo

1.26; 1965

SC

5.8

94.2

Conservative to Liberal Political Ideology

Pol. Ideo

53.50; 1999

SC

66.6

33.4

Liberal to Conservative Political Ideology

Pol. Ideo

73.83; 1972

AK

88.9

11.1

Liberal to Conservative Political Ideology

Pol. Ideo

16.66; 2000

AK

13.9

86.1

Liberal to Conservative Political Ideology

Pol. Ideo

63.11; 1964

KY

79.5

20.5

Liberal to Conservative Political Ideology

Pol. Ideo

8.45; 2002

KY

8.7

91.3

More Gun Ownership to Less

Gun Own.

23.4; 1970

NY

80.1

19.9

More Gun Ownership to Less

Gun Own.

18.0; 2000

NY

87.0

13.0

More Gun Ownership to Less

Gun Own.

15.9; 1970

MA

89.0

11.0

More Gun Ownership to Less

Gun Own.

12.6; 2000

MA

91.7

8.3

Less Gun Ownership to More

Gun Own.

32.4; 1970

LA

62.2

37.8

Less Gun Ownership to More

Gun Own.

44.1; 2000

LA

34.4

65.6

Less Gun Ownership to More

Gun Own.

15.2; 1970

NV

89.7

10.3

Less Gun Ownership to More

Gun Own.

33.8; 2000

NV

59.2

40.8

Sources: LexisNexis Legal Database, the American Judicature Society, the Federal Judicial Center, Berry, et. al.,
four Washington Post gun ownership surveys, the U.S. Census Bureau, and the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics69.
Note: n=269 cases.

Table Two illustrates averaged and state-level data regarding the predicted probability estimates
of the two significant variables from the study. The first estimation in the table provides an
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average sample observation in which 55.3 percent of the time a gun control ruling is expected,
while 44.7 percent of the time a gun rights ruling was expected.
By setting data values of the variables through usage of the standard deviation scores, I
can create average PPE values for significant state-level variable data. In an average state that
had a state supreme court majority of Republican-affiliated judges, 78.5 percent of the time a gun
rights ruling was expected 78.5 percent of the time, while a gun control ruling was expected only
21.5 percent of the time. In an average state that had a state supreme court majority of
Democratic-affiliated judges, 76.3 percent of the time a gun control ruling was expected, while
only 23.7 percent of the time a gun rights ruling was expected.
Since the Berry, et. al., state political ideology and state gun ownership percentage values
were continuous, the data set allows for easy analysis by means of PPE. By setting the state
political ideology value one standard deviation both above (liberal) and below (conservative) the
mean, I can create an average liberal and conservative state Second Amendment PPE. In an
average liberal state, a gun control ruling is predicted 78.4 percent of the time, while a gun rights
ruling is predicted only 21.6 percent of the time. Comparatively, in an average conservative
state, a gun rights ruling is predicted 70.3 percent of the time, while 29.7 percent of the time a
gun control decision is predicted. By setting the state gun ownership percentage value one
standard deviation both above (more gun ownership) and below (less gun ownership) the mean, I
can create an average low and high gun ownership percentage state Second Amendment PPE. In
an average high gun ownership state, a gun control ruling is predicted 25.9 percent of the time,
while a gun rights ruling is predicted 74.1 percent of the time. Conversely, in an average low
gun ownership state, a gun rights ruling is predicted only 18.6 percent of the time, while 81.4
percent of the time a gun control decision is predicted.
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Predicted probability estimates can also be used to track changes to the probabilities of
Second Amendment case rulings for state-level variable data that changed the most during the
fifty year study period by setting the variable values at the opposing scores. For instance, North
Carolina and South Carolina state political ideology scores moved from very conservative (2.27;
1.26 respectively) in 1965 to moderate (53.86; 53.50 respectively) in the 1990s and 2000s. In
these states, the PPE of a gun rights ruling in both states was very high (93.8 percent; 94.2
percent respectively) when the state political ideology values were at their most conservative.
After the state political ideologies moderated the two state in the 1990s and 2000s (53.86; 53.50
respectively), the PPE of a gun rights ruling decreased by more than 60 percent. In fact, by the
1990s and 2000s, the PPE of a gun control ruling was 67.2 percent in North Carolina and 66.6
percent in South Carolina that the state supreme court would rule in favor of gun control after
political ideologies changed from conservative to moderate. As state political ideologies move
from conservative to liberal, the probability of a state supreme court gun control ruling increases.
Comparatively, Alaska and Kentucky state political ideology scores moved from liberal
(73.83; 63.11 respectively) in the 1960s and 1970s to very conservative (16.66; 8.45
respectively) in the 2000s. In these states, the PPE of a Second Amendment gun control ruling
in both states was high (88.9 percent; 79.5 percent respectively) when the state political ideology
values were at their most liberal. After the state political ideologies became very conservative in
the two state in the 2000s (16.66; 8.45 respectively), the PPE of a gun rights ruling increased by
more than 70 percent. In fact, by the 2000s, the PPE of a gun rights ruling was 86.1 percent in
Alaska and 91.3 percent in Kentucky that the state supreme court would rule in favor of gun
rights after political ideologies changed from liberal to conservative. As state political ideologies
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moved from liberal to conservative, the probability of a state supreme court gun rights ruling
increased.
Predicted probability estimates can also be used to track changes to the probabilities of
Second Amendment case rulings for state gun ownership percentage variable data that changed
the most during the fifty year study period by setting the variable values at the opposing scores.
For instance, New York and Massachusetts state gun ownership percentage values were the only
two states that decreased (New York from 23.4 percent in 1970 to 18 percent in 2000;
Massachusetts from 15.9 percent in 1970 to 12.6 percent in 2000) during the fifty year study
period. For these two states, the affect of decreasing state gun ownership percentage is not as
great because the earlier values were already very low, as compared to other states. After the
state gun ownership percentage decreased, the PPE of a gun control ruling increased by 7 percent
in New York (80.1 percent in 1970 to 87 percent to 2000), while the PPE of a gun control ruling
increased by only 3 percent in Massachusetts (89.0 percent in 1970 to 91.7 percent in 2000). As
state gun ownership percentages move lower, the probability of a state supreme court gun control
ruling increases.
Comparatively, Louisiana and Nevada state gun ownership percentage values increased
the most (Louisiana from 32.4 percent in 1970 to 44.1 percent in 2000; Nevada from 15.2
percent in 1970 to 33.8 percent in 2000) during the fifty year study period. For these two states,
the affect of increasing state gun ownership percentage is quite significant. After the state gun
ownership percentage increased in these two states, the PPE of a gun rights ruling increased by
nearly 30 percent in Louisiana (37.8 percent in 1970 to 65.6 percent to 2000), while the PPE of a
gun rights ruling increased by more than 30 percent in Nevada (10.3 percent in 1970 to 40.8
percent in 2000). As state gun ownership percentages move higher, the probability of a state
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supreme court gun rights ruling increases. The following section provides the conclusions of this
chapter.
Conclusions
This study posed the research question, what is the extent and determinants of Second
Amendment rulings in state supreme courts, 1960-2009? This study theorized that electoral
accountability, institutional factors, public opinion, and specific policy interests affect the way
judges that sit on state supreme courts rule on polarizing political issues, such as the Second
Amendment. This theory was then operationalized into six independent variables, with the
actual Second Amendment case ruling being the dependent variable. The operationalizations of
the study included electoral accountability. This variable was developed into a dichotomous
variable, state judicial selection method, which measured whether a state used elections or
another means of selecting judges to state supreme courts. Second, institutional factors were
operationalized into a dichotomous variable, the presence of state intermediate appellate courts,
which measures whether or not a state had an intermediate appellate court when a Second
Amendment ruling was handed down. Third, public opinion aspect of the study was
operationalized to continuously measure state political ideology and population density. Forth,
specific policy interests were operationalized to continuously measure state gun ownership
percentage and homicide rate.
Using logistic regression analysis, this study found that the extent and determinants of
Second Amendment rulings in state supreme courts, 1960-2009, were limited to select public
opinion and specific policy interests. More specifically, state political ideology and state gun
ownership percentage variables had a direct impact on the outcomes of Second Amendment state
supreme court rulings during the fifty year study period. As such, the four hypotheses associated
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with these two independent variables are accepted and the null hypotheses are rejected. State
judicial selection method, the presence of a state intermediate appellate court, state population
density, and state homicide rate did not have a statistically significant relationship with the
dependent variable, and thus the eight hypotheses associated with these independent variables
cannot be accepted and the null hypotheses cannot be rejected. The logistic regression model
performance measures illustrated the fact that the model made predictions correctly more than 90
percent of the time and had a good fit, while the coding schema employed in the study was
shown to provide high consistency between coders because of the Cronbach’s α statistic.
The effect of state political ideology on Second Amendment state supreme court rulings
is no surprise. Political institutions and state judicial systems are populated by political
appointees or judges who have won elective office. Political actors, even ones who are supposed
to have some level of political independence, possess a personal political ideology. This set of
personal ideas, goals, expectations, and actions, affects the actions of most political actors when
they carry out their political role, and state supreme court judges are no different.
Corresponding directly to traditional notions about political ideology and support for or
opposition to gun rights, this study shows that state supreme court judges in states with
conservative political ideologies are much more likely to rule in favor of gun rights than gun
control. Comparatively, this study also shows that state supreme court judges in states with
liberal political ideologies are much more likely to rule in favor of gun control than gun rights.
Traditionally, people with conservative political ideologies support greater gun rights, while
individuals with liberal political ideologies support greater gun control measures. The findings
in this study affirm traditional political ideology considerations, especially regarding the Second
Amendment at the state supreme court level.
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Like the state political ideology variable, the affect of state gun ownership percentage on
Second Amendment state supreme court decisions is not a surprising revelation. State gun
culture across the country varies widely. States with higher gun ownership rates have
traditionally been associated with rural and conservative areas, while states with lesser gun
ownership rates have traditionally been associated with urban and liberal areas. Since judges are
political actors and possess an individual political ideology, the connection should be made
between ideology and specific policy interests. While judges are not often directly lobbied
regarding these cases, the make-up of a personal political ideology includes goals and actions.
These goals and actions frequently include specific policy interests, such as gun
ownership and the Second Amendment. Related directly to the creation of individual political
ideologies and the support for specific policy interests, this study shows that state supreme court
judges in states with higher gun ownership percentages are more likely to rule in favor of gun
rights than gun control. Comparatively, this study also shows that state supreme court judges in
states with lower gun ownership percentages are much more likely to rule in favor of gun control
than gun rights. Traditionally, support for gun rights breeds an atmosphere that respects gun
ownership, while laws that curtail the ownership or possession of firearms creates a scenario
through which gun ownership is frowned upon. The findings in this study affirm traditional
specific policy interest considerations, especially regarding the Second Amendment.
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CHAPTER FOUR

SECOND AMENDMENT DECISIONS IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS

For target shooting, that's okay. Get a license and go to the range. For defense of
the home, that's why we have police departments.
--James Brady, former White House Press Secretary and Gun
Control Advocate, 1988
Just as the First and Fourth Amendment secure individual rights of free speech
and security respectively, the Second Amendment protects an individual right
to keep and bear arms. This view of the text comports with the all but unanimous
understanding of the Founding Fathers.
--John Ashcroft, former U.S. Attorney General and U.S. Senator
(R-MO), 2002

By the fall of 2005, Alan Klebig had gained the reputation around his neighborhood as
being a bit of a pack rat. The yard and fence in front of his Watertown, Wisconsin, home was
adorned with dozens of squirrel tails from hunting trips, along with shiny compact disc cases
collected from the town dump. Containers filled with acidic chemicals and other substances
littered the backyard area, while various odds-and-ends were strewn across the garage and
kitchen. An extensive assortment of other items were scattered across his bedrooms, while his
living room was in complete disarray.1
On 18 October 2005, the Watertown Police Department executed a search warrant on
Klebig’s home. Officers on the scene found two unregistered firearms around the house. One
of the firearms was a .22-caliber rifle with a sawed-off barrel, a missing stock, and two
ammunition magazines taped together. An illegal silencer was found inside the bedroom
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closet. Both the .22 caliber rifle and silencer were seized during the search, and Klebig was
charged under Sections §5861(d) and §5871 of the United States Code “with knowingly
possessing a firearm and silencer which were not registered to him in the National Firearms
Registration and Transfer Record.”2
In the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Klebig was convicted
of possessing an unregistered rifle and illegal silencer. Subsequently, Klebig appealed to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The appeal challenged the district court’s
decision to admit firearms-related evidence and to permit the completion of gun
demonstrations during closing arguments. The appellate decision was authored by Judge Ilana
Rovner, a George H.W. Bush appointee. Other case panelists included Judge Richard
Cudahy, a Jimmy Carter appointee, and Judge Richard Posner, a Ronald Reagan appointee.3
Judge Rovner’s Republican-majority panel ruled that the government should not have
allowed firearms articles to be placed into evidence and should not have allowed gun
demonstrations to occur during closing arguments. Rovner wrote in the decision that “without
the improperly admitted evidence (and gun demonstrations), the prosecution’s case here
would have been considerably weaker.”4 Because of these findings, Rovner’s decision
reversed Klebig’s firearms convictions and remanded the case for a new trial consistent with
the decision.5
Using the firearms issues related to the Klebig case as a starting point, this study
focuses on the decision-making and judicial behavior of U.S. Courts of Appeals judges
regarding Second Amendment decisions. This study attempts to do two different things.
First, I provide readers with a descriptive study of U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment
decisions between 1960 and 2009. Second, I present an explanatory analysis that estimates
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whether partisan accountability, public opinion, and specific exogenous factors affect the way
U.S. Courts of Appeals judges rule on polarizing political issues, such as the Second
Amendment between 1960 and 2009.
Potential Influences on U.S. Courts of Appeals Judicial Behavior and Decision-Making
In this study, I am interested in the political aspects that affect Second Amendment
rulings in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. This study theorizes that partisan accountability, public
opinion, and specific exogenous factors affect the way judges who sit on the U.S. Courts of
Appeals rule on the polarizing political issue of Second Amendment rights. Rejecting the legal
model of decision-making and building upon recent U.S. Courts of Appeals work produced by
Donald Songer, Susan Haire, and others, this study attempts to uncover specific institutional and
appellate circuit-level political aspects that effect U.S. Courts of Appeals gun rulings.
Focusing on the judicial behavior of U.S. Courts of Appeals judges, Frank Cross explored
the nature of federal appellate court decision-making over the last twenty years by focusing on
political ideology, the law, judicial background, political institutions, litigants, panel effects,
procedural thresholds, and legal precedent. Cross argued that a judge’s judicial and personal life,
personal experience, and background affect how they rule on important cases. In particular,
Cross found that judges of the U.S. Courts of Appeals are influenced in their decision-making
processes by political ideology and by the appointing president.6
The U.S. Courts of Appeals are the concern of this study because of their position as an
integral part of the federal public policy-making process. In fact, Frank Cross argued that the
U.S. Courts of Appeal have a profound impact on the law because judges issue many more
decisions in more areas of law than the U.S. Supreme Court.7 The Second Amendment policy
area also gives particularly good mileage towards understanding the U.S. Courts of Appeals
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because the right to bear arms is a part of the Bill of Rights in the U.S. Constitution, and
therefore also is a civil liberty that the federal government should be unable to take away from
American citizens. Work regarding the U.S. Courts of Appeals has been concerned with
judicial decision-making on cases, partisanship, and policy-making. One of the barriers to the
study of decision-making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals was the three-judge panel decision
structure. According to John McIver, panel decisions on issues from the U.S. Courts of
Appeals provided information only a subset of the judges of the court on any case, regardless
of issue. In an attempt to create a new model for the study of U.S. Courts of Appeals decisionmaking, McIver created a general decentralized model that scaled case issues and decisions
including unanimous and non-unanimous decisions.8
In one of the first attempts to empirically measure the decision-making of the U.S.
Courts of Appeals judges, Sheldon Goldman created a model of decision-making for all U.S.
Courts of Appeals decisions rendered between 1961 and 1964. Most important for this study,
Goldman included in his model a measure of case issue and of voting position, and found that
criminal cases, including several Second Amendment cases, were not evenly distributed across
the U.S. Courts of Appeals circuits. Some appellate circuits, such as the Fifth Circuit, dispose
of a disproportionate number of criminal cases than other appellate circuits.9 Sheldon
Goldman updated his earlier work to extend to decisions rendered during the late 1960s and
early 1970s, finding that patterns of judicial decision-making regarding specific case issues,
such as criminal cases, were effected by interrelated political attitudes and values held by the
judges who rendered a decision.10
Later scholarship started to focus specifically on case issues and decision-making
outcomes in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. John Gruhl found that libel cases decided before the
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U.S. Courts of Appeals were not always consistent with decisions rendered by the U.S.
Supreme Court. Even though 88 percent of U.S. Courts of Appeals decisions were consistent,
Gruhl argued that certain political aspects accounted for this inconsistency between the
decision-making of the U.S. Courts of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court regarding libel
cases.11 In a similar study, Steve Koh found that the decision-making processes of the eleven
U.S. Courts of Appeals circuits vary widely regarding immigration cases. Some circuits have
different standards of review than others. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, a sprawling
appellate circuit covering much of the western U.S. has long had to deal with immigration
cases because of its proximity to foreign countries, possessed different standards of review of
than other circuits.12
Donald R. Songer, alone and with others, has published extensively regarding issues
relating to the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Judicial decision-making has been the central focus of
some of his work. For instance, Donald Songer and Susan Haire explored integrated
approaches to the study of judicial decision-making regarding obscenity cases within the halls
of the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Creating an integrated multivariate model that combined five
approaches to judicial voting, the authors found that their new model correctly predicted about
80 percent of the judges’ votes on obscenity cases with an error reduction of almost 46
percent.13 Susan Haire, Stefanie Lindquist, and Roger Hartley considered judicial decisionmaking through the lens of litigant success, finding that U.S. Courts of Appeals judges were
less likely to support the position of plaintiffs when represented by an attorney appearing for
the first time before the appellate circuit.14
Brandon Denning provided case analysis of several important U.S. Courts of Appeals
cases the focused on the Second Amendment, including Cases v. United States (1942), United
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States v. Tot (1942), and United States v. Warin (1976). Denning argued that the decisions
made by federal appellate judges in these cases created an exceedingly irregular view of the
Second Amendment. In fact, Denning argued that two cases, Cases and Warin, presenting the
virtually the same facts, but came to two completely different decisions.15 Not only has the
Second Amendment been politically polarizing in nature, but the U.S. Courts of Appeals have
offered vastly different decisions based on similar case facts.
Donald Kilmer and Gary Harding surveyed the Second Amendment case of Nordyke v.
King (2004). In the decision, as of the start of 2010, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided
to offer no formal decision in the important case because the panel judges decided to wait until
the Parker and Heller cases were decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. According to Kilmer
and Harding, Nordyke was important regarding federal appellate decision-making because the
plaintiffs, local gun show promoters, challenged an Alameda County, California, ordinance
that made the possession of firearms on county property illegal.16
Christopher Keleher examined Parker v. District of Columbia (2006) and how it
related to the decisions of other federal appellate decisions. The Parker case was the first time
a federal appellate court found a law unconstitutional on Second Amendment grounds.
Keleher concluded that the decision did not forbid all state and local firearms regulations;
however, the banning of firearms would be outside their range of legality.17 Amanda Dupree
examined Parker v. District of Columbia (2007), a U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit case, which was the precursor to the U.S. Supreme Court case, District of
Columbia v. Heller (2008). Parker, then subsequently Heller, held that the District of
Columbia’s ban on handguns violated the Second Amendment and was unconstitutional.
Through examination of Second Amendment judicial decision-making analysis, Dupree
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argued that Parker firmly ushered in an era government sponsorship of an individual right
theory of the right to keep and bear arms.18
David Kopel surveyed thirty years (1977-2007) of decisions related to the Second
Amendment rendered by the plains and Rocky Mountains-based Tenth U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals (CO, KS, NM, OK, UT, WY). The author’s argument, established through intense
analysis of numerous Second Amendment cases, is that in light of U.S. Supreme Court’s
District of Columbia v. Heller decision, the case law of the Second Amendment in the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals have largely been wrongly decided. According to Kopel, the case
law has been incorrect because the vast majority of cases were decided in opposition to
Second Amendment precedents established in Heller. For instance, Bastible v. Weyerhaeuser
Co. (1985) and U.S. v. Great Guns, Inc. (2001) were two cases in which Tenth Circuit Second
Amendment decisions were wiped out by Heller.19 Using these analyses as a central
motivation point, this study suggests that partisan accountability, public opinion, and specific
exogenous factors affect the way judges that sit on federal appellate courts rule on polarizing
political issues, including the Second Amendment.
From this literature, it is apparent that there is wide-ranging literature regarding the
numerous issues that make-up the study of the decision-making and judicial behavior of U.S.
Courts of Appeals judges, and federal appellate decision-making regarding Second Amendment
cases; however, lengthy research suggests that no literature has focused on a statistical analysis
of the political aspects of Second Amendment case holdings in U.S. Courts of Appeals. This
study attempts to fill this void in the literature regarding analysis of the political characteristics
of U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment decisions. Since this topic has never served as
the focus of scholarship, it is my hope that this study will stimulate discussion of and improve
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explanations of the issues that affect decision-making regarding Second Amendment decisions in
the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
Design of the Research
In this study, I am interested in the political factors that help to explain the judicial
behavior and decision-making processes of judges on issue-based cases in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals. Specifically, this study elaborates on the theory that political context and the political
values of judges, including judicial partisan accountability, public opinion, and specific
exogenous factors, affect Second Amendment decisions. Because of this theory, the dependent
variable for the study is the Second Amendment case decision whether a U.S. Courts of Appeals
three-judge panel ruled in favor of gun control or gun rights. Although scholars have not created
a dependent variable in this way before, there is precedent for the usage of case outcomes as the
central focus of scholarly commentary.
John Kilwein and Richard Brisbin studied a sample of 1,040 state supreme court
decisions regarding intensified scrutiny doctrine.20 In different work, Sidney Ulmer provided a
systematic overview of the behavior of U.S. Supreme Court justices with regard to race-based
case outcomes during the Civil Rights Movement.21 Using the Harold Spaeth database on U.S.
Supreme Court decisions, Nancy Scherer and Banks Miller created a logistic regression model to
determine if membership in the Federalist Society affected the political ideology and decisionmaking of U.S. Courts of Appeals judges. Through consideration of case law, the authors found
that federal appellate judges who held membership in the Federalist Society were significantly
more conservative than non-members.22
A new logistic regression model was created for this chapter. This new model estimates
the effect of partisan accountability, public opinion, and specific exogenous factors regarding
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U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment decisions. The dependent variable for this new
logistic regression model were the Second Amendment case decisions, in which a U.S. Courts of
Appeals panel either ruled in favor of gun control or gun rights. Dependent variable data was
taken from the LexisNexis Academic Legal search engine. Second Amendment case data used
for this study spanned the last fifty years, between 1 January 1960 and 31 December 2009. A
total of 219 cases from all state supreme courts were included in the data. The dependent
variable was created so that if a case ruled in favor of gun control, then the case was labeled “0.”
If a case favored gun rights, then the case was labeled “1.” The mid-range theory of this study
was disaggregated into five independent variables, each including specific hypotheses, to
estimate their effect on the dependent Second Amendment decision variable.
Partisan Accountability
Partisan accountability provides reasoning for the way politicians vote and act, and
judges sitting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals are no different. Each of the 156 U.S. Courts of
Appeals individual judges that sit on the bench of one of the eleven appellate circuits across
the United States were appointed by a U.S. President. According to Jeff Gill and Richard
Waterman, presidential appointments to the federal courts system and the cabinet have
symbolized the greatest basis of executive influence over both the bureaucracy and the federal
judiciary.23
According to Sheldon Goldman federal appellate appointments are dramatically
important. This lack of attention can be attributed to the fact that the lower federal judiciary is
organized on a region and local basis. Often made behind closed doors, nominations to the
U.S. Courts of Appeals are often coupled with intense drama and significant public policy
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decisions. The decisions of U.S. Courts of Appeals judges in the 1960s and 1970s regarding
civil liberties and civil rights led the courts to become a political issue in elections.24
Following Ronald Reagan’s victory in 1980, his administration thought that the U.S.
Courts of Appeals had become too activist in nature, and thus had established an imbalance of
power between the federal and state systems that threatened the rights of the states. Because
of this perception, the Reagan administration saw judicial appointments to be an important
link to the potential success of the President’s domestic agenda. This sharp political turn to
the right sought to change direction of government through very partisan means. In fact,
Reagan trumped the traditional senatorial prerogative to help name judges to the federal
bench, by instead asking Republican Senators to submit three to five names for a federal
judgeship. After submission of names, the Reagan Administration would then study the
potential nominees and select the individual who would most likely favor Reagan’s agenda.
For one of the first recorded times, partisanship and ideology had changed the way U.S.
Courts of Appeals judges were selected.25
According to Sheldon Goldman and Elliot Slotnick, this overt partisanship that took
hold during the Reagan Administration regarding appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals
continued into the 1990s. President Clinton, facing a hostile political environment, was forced
into moderation, compromise, and accommodation when he made appointments to the U.S.
Courts of Appeals. Because the U.S. Senate and U.S. House Judiciary Committee was chaired
by Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Henry Hyde (R-IL) respectively, the Clinton Administration was
forced to contend with both during the nomination and confirmation process of judges to the
U.S. Courts of Appeals. The success of his efforts in getting many Democratic, left-leaning
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judges nominated, and ultimately confirmed, depended on funneling judicial nominations at
the right times.26
Sheldon Goldman, Elliot Slotnick, Gerard Gryski, Gary Zuk, and Sara Schiavoni
argued that while George W. Bush’s judicial appointees were made through coordinated effort
and expended significant resources to place judges who shared the President’s judicial
philosophy on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. In fact, a Bush aide was quoted as saying “(Bush)
is very interested in this (judicial selection) and thinks it is one of his most important
responsibilities on the domestic side”.27 The authors argued that Bush’s nomination process
for the U.S. Courts of Appeals became so politically motivated that the administration
deviated from the normal nomination process by not allowing the American Bar Association
to rate potential candidates before a nomination was made official. Because the U.S. Senate
had a poor record of confirming Bush judicial nominees, the administration attempted to
regulate the time parameters of the nomination process. This effort was ultimately
unsuccessful, but Bush’s partisan legacy of the U.S. Courts of Appeals nominees remains.28
Sheldon Goldman, Elliot Slotnick, Gerard Gryski, Gary Zuk, and Sara Schiavoni found
that the key to understanding the rancorous nature of the judicial nomination process under
George W. Bush was his want to continue to nominate politically partisan judges even though
his political capital was small after two type presidential elections. Even though the President
confronted a nasty environment within the advice and consent process, the Bush
Administration placed many highly qualified, ethnically diverse individuals on the U.S. Courts
of Appeals. Most importantly, the judges of the federal appellate circuits confirmed during
Bush’s first term shared the President’s judicial philosophy and many shared his partisan
nature.29
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Sheldon Goldman, Elliot Slotnick, Gerard Gryski, and Sara Schiavoni explored the
process through which the George W. Bush Administration picked U.S. Courts of Appeals
judges between 2005 and 2007, a time of widespread turmoil within his second term in office.
The authors found that despite the swirling negative atmosphere around Bush’s foreign policy
goals, the administration was still exceedingly successful in getting their nominees to the U.S.
Courts of Appeals passed through the U.S. Senate. During each of his two presidential
campaigns, Bush made it clear that he was going to nominate judges who agreed with him
from a policy/partisan standpoint, and this effort continued to be effective during the most
trying time of his presidency. 30 In a final work regarding Bush judicial appointments,
Sheldon Goldman, Sara Schiavoni, and Elliot Slotnick surveyed the judicial nomination record
of the George W. Bush Administration. In the article, the authors found, through numerous
interviews with individuals involved the process, that the Bush Administration legacy
appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals was one that included almost complete success in
selecting judges who espoused the similar political and partisan views.31
Scholars have also focused on the role of interest groups in the nomination process to
the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Nancy Scherer, Brandon Bartels, and Amy Steigerwald argued
that nominations to the U.S. Courts of Appeals have become lengthy, partisan proceedings not
because of an intense political environment or ideological extremism of nominees, but because
of increasing opposition to judicial nominees from concerned interest groups. In instances
when interests opposed U.S. Courts of Appeals nominees, the groups sounded a “fire alarm”
regarding the professional record of a nominee, which forced U.S. Senators politically-aligned
with the interest group to desert the traditional senatorial position of quickly confirming
judicial nominees.32 Through considerable analysis of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, Frank
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Cross found that judges of the U.S. Courts of Appeals are influenced in their decision-making
processes by political ideology and by the appointing president.33
According to scholarship, presidential appointments to the federal bench have become
exceedingly political in nature. Scholars have also shown that judicial appointees by
Democratic and Republican Presidents traditionally espouse the liberal and conservative
values often associated with the political parties of President who nominated the judge.
Presidential staffs assure policy agreement between the President and judicial nominees
through considerable assessment of candidates. Moreover, the Republican Party was often
associated with clear support for Second Amendment rights.34 To compare, the Democratic
Party was frequently connected with gun control efforts.35
Connecting this work together, it can be noted that the federal judicial appointment
process has become politicized as the executive branch of government has scrambled to make
appointments to the federal judiciary who are consistent with presidential ideological and
partisan boundaries.36 As such, this study hypothesizes that U.S. Courts of Appeals Second
Amendment decisions will be significantly affected by the partisan presidential nomination
make-up of appellate circuit panels because federal appellate judges often mirror the policy
preferences of the executives who they were nominated by because of an intense vetting
process. In particular, U.S. Courts of Appeals panels that have a majority of judges appointed
by Democratic presidents increase the probability that the panel will rule in favor of gun
control in Second Amendment decisions, while federal appellate circuit panels that have a
majority of judges appointed by Republican presidents increase the probability that the panel
will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions.
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The partisan accountability aspect of the theory was created to estimate the effect of
presidential party nomination majority appellate panels on Second Amendment U.S. Courts of
Appeals decisions. This variable indicates that if a Second Amendment federal appellate panel
had two Clinton appointments and one Reagan appointment, then the case variable would labeled
as a majority Democratic panel. This dichotomous variable was labeled “0” for panels with a
majority of judges appointed by Democratic Presidents, or labeled “1” for panels with a majority
of judges appointed by Republican Presidents. Variable data regarding U.S. Courts of Appeals
panel partisanship was collected from the judge biography section of the Federal Judicial Center
website.
Public Opinion
Even though the judges of the federal judiciary possess lifetime appointments, the
varying opinions of members of professional circles and the public affect the way that U.S.
Courts of Appeals judges rule on issues like the Second Amendment. This notion is backedup by a law review work that preceded a foundational effort by Frank Cross. In the piece,
Cross found that legal and political factors were statistically significant with regard to what
issues determined the way federal appellate judges decide cases. One of the political factors
measured in the article was an affirmance rate of lower court rulings by the U.S. Courts of
Appeals. The affirmance ruling rate was virtually the same regardless of the partisan make-up
on the appellate panel. Statistical analysis showed that political ideology was a significant
factor of judicial decision-making.37 Lawrence Baum argued that judicial colleagues, the
public, the executive and legislative branches of government, social and professional groups,
interested policy groups, and the media are all groups which judges are conscious of and seek
consent from when they are making decisions.38
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Not only does political ideology and public opinion affect judicial decision-making,
but evidence also suggests that there is a geographical factor involved when it comes to issues
that affect decisions. Steve Koh found that immigration decisions in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals differ significantly among the eleven federal appellate circuits. The Ninth Appellate
Circuit Court of Appeals, an appellate circuit that has long grappled with issues relating to
immigration because of its proximity to both the Mexican and Canadian borders, possess
different standards regarding review of immigration cases than the Eleventh Circuit, created in
1981, covering states along the Gulf of Mexico.39 In another important work, John Gruhl
found a similar result regarding the difference in adherence to U.S. Supreme Court libel cases
between the different circuits of the U.S. Courts of Appeals.40 This geographical factor is
important because it shows that different circuits and geographic regions affect how federal
appellate judges decide cases. This finding shows that the judiciary is aware of and seeks out
judicial positions that the general public agrees with.
Coupled together for this study, political ideology and geographical factors establish an
estimation of public opinion. J. Woodford Howard, Jr.’s analysis of his work on the role
perceptions and behavior of judges in two U.S. Courts of Appeals circuits suggests that there
is a common link. While many of the federal appellate judges saw their role and behavior on
the bench in a similar light, it was clear that judges coming from different political and
demographic background across the two appellate circuits acted differently regarding the law
then other judges. Based upon his experience as an elected local and state judge, a southern
newcomer to the U.S. Courts of Appeals argued that federal judges should merely interpret the
law, while a new northern judge felt that his job included more than simple legal
interpretation.41 Why did the two U.S. Courts of Appeals judges make these arguments? The
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first judge clearly understood that a judicial policy overreach was never seen as a positive by
the public, while the second judge believed that exact opposite. Even though U.S. Courts of
Appeals judges possess lifetime appointments, they still show attentiveness to public opinion
and political ideology.
The way U.S. Courts of Appeals judges decide cases has become an important issue
within this theory and the literature. The study of judicial behavior has focused on the types of
issues that affect the decisions rendered by judges. According to this assertion, judicial
behavior refers the types of activities and behaviors judges become involved with in their
capacity on the bench, and has an intense and enduring impact on the types of decisions
rendered by judges across all courts that comprise the American judiciary.42 There is also a
growing consciousness by scholars that judicial behavior includes more than just ruling on the
constitutionality of laws and public policy decisions.43
Lee Epstein and Jack Knight argued that the achievement of personal and professional
goals, calculated behaviors, and communication between justices effect the behavior of judges.
First, an essential assumption of strategic judicial behavior is that justices make decisions on
cases that are consistent with their personal goals and interests. Second, because judges want to
make the most of their goals and interests, they have to make decisions in a calculated fashion
that encompasses the opinions of others. Third, a complete account of strategic judicial behavior
is difficult to establish without an understanding of the institutions in which judges work.44
Lawrence Baum added to the study of judicial behavior in two recent works. In the
earlier effort, Baum addressed the sometimes perplexing issue of judicial behavior.45 Baum
analyzed the significance of striking a balance between a judge’s personal interests in a decision
and other professional goals, including personal, professional, and judicial popularity, in addition
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to the size of the docket. Baum also considered the extent to which judges think, act, and decide
cases in a strategic fashion. Strategic judicial behavior refers to the notion that judges develop
and select their own judicial policy positions following early assessments of the position of
colleagues and other decision-makers might assume.46
Building on his earlier scholarship, Lawrence Baum developed his investigation of
judicial behavior further by examining judges’ work and the environments in which it takes
place. Baum argued that judges are aware of, and look for, support from the people that occupy
their social and professional environment. Judicial colleagues, the public, other branches of
government, social and professional groups, policy groups, and the news media are all entities
judges are aware of, and seek approval from, as they do their job. Judges and their audiences,
people whose esteem they regard as important, provide a key viewpoint regarding overall
judicial behavior.47 Baum argued “that a judge’s motivation to win the approval of their
audiences can explain a good deal about their choices as decision-makers…”48 Epstein, Knight,
and Baum agree that judges care about the opinions of others when they decide particular cases.
This literature shows that public opinion and public political ideology affects how cases are ruled
upon in the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
The public opinion variables estimated the effect of appellate circuit political ideology
and population density on Second Amendment U.S. Courts of Appeals cases. This study
hypothesizes that U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment decisions will be significantly
affected by appellate circuit political ideology and population density. In particular, U.S. Courts
of Appeals circuits with a liberal political ideology increase the probability that their appellate
panels will rule in favor of gun control in Second Amendment decisions, while federal appellate
circuits with a conservative political ideology increase the probability that their appellate panels
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will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions. U.S. Courts of Appeals circuits
with high population density increase the probability that their appellate panels will rule in favor
of gun control in Second Amendment decisions, while federal appellate circuits with low
population density increase the probability that their appellate panels will rule in favor of gun
rights in Second Amendment decisions.
The appellate circuit political ideology measure was taken from the Berry, et. al. citizen
political ideology dataset. The variable was continuously measured between 1 and 100 with
lower numbers representing conservative political ideologies and higher numbers representing
liberal political ideologies. The appellate circuit population density measure was taken from the
U.S. Census Bureau dataset. This continuously measured variable represents the number of
people per square mile in each appellate circuit. Lightly populated appellate circuits have lower
population densities, while densely populated appellate circuits have higher population densities.
The data collected for both of these variables was aggregated from state-level data to account for
the eleven circuits that comprise the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
Specific Exogenous Factors
Specific exogenous factors might affect the way U.S. Courts of Appeals judges decide
Second Amendment cases. A variety of studies suggest that factors outside the judicial system
affect federal appellate cases. James Gibson found that specific external factors, including
contact with constituents and electoral defeat, affected the way judges made important decisions.
Through data analysis of a quasi-experimental design focusing on the circuit system used by the
Iowa trial courts, the author argued that this outside involvement was integral when judges made
case decisions.49
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Philip Fetzer argued that extralegal factors, such as tribal sovereignty, helped to explain
multifaceted American Indian legal rulings made in tribal courts. In several previous tribal
decisions, scholars questioned the confusing legal reasoning brought up in particular cases.
Exogenous factors, such as the way tribes ruled themselves, helped to explain why judges ruled
the way that did in several of these rulings inconsistent with other legal reasoning.50 James
Gibson argued that early studies of judicial behavior and decision-making rarely considered
multiple exogenous concepts, and that this was a failing in the literature. Gibson argued that far
too many studies that have included exogenous measures were created by considering the
personal life of judges, which Gibson believed were not exogenous in nature.51
John Ferejohn and Barry Weingast used a model of spatial theory to connect judicial
goals with distinct judicial behavioral and decision-making outcomes. According to the
Ferejohn and Weingast model, exogenous factors included those outside the scope of a judge’s
career.52 Pragati Patrick and Thomas Bak found that a powerful federal law that involved
increased penalties for individuals who were arrested for violent firearms-related drug crimes
affected the amount of firearms cases decided by the federal court system. This finding was
particularly interesting because judges seemed hesitant to become involved with these types of
cases.53
Gretchen Helmke and Mitchell Sanders argued that external factors, such as loyalty to a
national government and specific policy interests, helped to shape the behavior of judges on the
Argentine Supreme Court. The dominant framework created by the authors linked specific
external factors to the types of ideal-type behaviors carried out by judges in their national level
judicial careers, including: loyalists, policy seekers, institutionalists, and careerists.54 Matthew
Henry and John Turner analyzed a dataset of patent litigation case decisions from the Court of
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Appeals for the Federal Circuit occurring over the last fifty years. Henry and Turner found that
outside factors, including decisions made by other judicial levels, have dramatically affected
patent decisions made by judges of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.55 This literature
shows that specific exogenous factors have affected judicial rulings made at various levels of the
state and federal judiciary.
Specific exogenous factor variables estimated their effect on U.S. Courts of Appeals
Second Amendment decisions. Two firearms-related external factor variables, appellate circuit
gun ownership percentage and homicide rate, might be expected to influence case decisions.
U.S. Courts of Appeals gun ownership percentage was continuously measured from each
appellate circuit based on the findings from Washington Post gun ownership surveys completed
in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000. Lower gun ownership rates meant that fewer appellate circuit
residents own firearms, while higher gun ownership reflected elevated rates of gun ownership.
Appellate circuit homicide rate was a continuous measure of the total number of
homicides committed per 100,000 people in an appellate circuit population. Variable data
regarding appellate circuit homicide rate was collected from the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics.
Lower homicide rates meant that the appellate circuit has fewer murders, while more murders
reflected elevated rates of homicides in an appellate circuit. All appellate circuit-level data used
for this study was aggregated from state-level measures. The data collected for both of these
variables was aggregated from state-level data to account for the eleven circuits that comprise the
U.S. Courts of Appeals.
This study hypothesized that U.S. Courts of Appeals circuits with high gun ownership
percentages increase the probability that their appellate panels will rule in favor of gun rights in
Second Amendment decisions, while federal appellate circuits with low gun ownership
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percentages increase the probability that their appellate panels will rule in favor of gun control in
Second Amendment decisions. This study hypothesized that U.S. Courts of Appeals circuits
with low homicide rates increase the probability that their appellate panels will rule in favor of
gun rights in Second Amendment decisions, while federal appellate circuits with high homicide
rates increase the probability that their appellate panels will rule in favor of gun control in
Second Amendment decisions.
Study Methodology and Data Collection Format
Since my dependent variable is dichotomous I use logistic regression analysis.56 Logistic
regression allows researchers to predict a discrete outcome a set of variables that may be
continuous, discrete, dichotomous, or a mix of the three types.57 Logistic regression analysis was
designed to analyze the relationship between independent variable data and a dichotomous
dependent variable. A dichotomous variable can assume only two values and are just like the
indicator dummy variables used throughout the political science literature.58
U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment case data was collected separately from the
legal search engine within the LexisNexis Academic database. Search terms for data collection
in LexisNexis included the following phrases: Second Amendment, concealed weapons,
concealed weapons permits, automatic weapons, semi-automatic weapons, gun violence, gun
show loophole, background checks, right to bear arms, sawed-off shot gun, assault weapon,
convicts and firearms, and gun bans.
Second Amendment case data used for this study spanned the last fifty years, between 1
January 1960 and 31 December 2009. The starting point of this study was important because it
encompassed several years before firearms-related issues became important in the American
political lexicon, along with the inclusion of the era of peaked interest in gun ownership, gun
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control, important political assassinations, and Second Amendment issues that occurred between
1963 and 2009. Case coding was noted after reading the case twice to determine if the respective
U.S. Court of Appeals ruled in favor of gun rights or in favor of gun control cases. Only cases in
which a Second Amendment claim was forwarded or where an important Second Amendment
issue was broached were used in this study. In total, 219 cases from the U.S. Courts of Appeals
were found to be appropriate for coding in this project.
Predicted probability estimates were tabulated for average and interesting observations
within the data in order to interpret the affect of the independent variables on the dependent
variable and create observations that varied values and showed which variables were significant.
Inter-coder reliability for this study was established. Fifty-one cases of the 219 full case sample
were randomly selected and coded by another reader. A Cronbach’s α statistic was tabulated
based on the random sample case codes and the reader’s code in order to establish a estimate of
internal consistency and reliability between the two codes. The following section provides the
results and analysis of this study.
Political Aspects of Judicial Behavior and Second Amendment Cases: Results and Analysis
While the previous sections of this study has outlined important scholarly works,
theories, and methods that link partisan accountability, public opinion, and specific exogenous
factors to the types of Second Amendment decisions rendered by U.S. Courts of Appeals
judges, a direct connection between the suggested independent variables and Second
Amendment U.S. Courts of Appeals decisions also needs to be established.
Table One reports the estimated logistic regression coefficients of the U.S. Courts of
Appeals Second Amendment case model that was clustered for appellate circuits, along with
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several logistic regression model performance estimates presented at the bottom of the table,
1960-2009.
Table One: Logistic Regression Analysis of the U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment
Decisions, 1960-2009
U.S. Courts of Appeals Independent Variables

Estimated Coefficients

Panel Partisanship

0.203 (0.317)

Political Ideology

-0.033 (0.016)***

Population Density

-0.003 (0.002)

Gun Ownership Percentage

-0.025 (0.036)

Homicide Rate

0.044 (0.034)

Log-Likelihood Statistic

-122.578

Chi-Squared Statistic

0.083

% Correctly Predicted

0.867

Proportional Reduction of Error

0.039

R2P

0.864

PCP

0.823

AIC

303.8711

BIC

346.2649
***p<0.05
Sources: LexisNexis Legal Database, the American Judicature Society, the Federal Judicial Center, Berry,
et. al., four Washington Post gun ownership surveys, the U.S. Census Bureau, and the U.S. Bureau of
Justice Statistics59.
Note: n=219 cases.

The first variable, panel partisanship (X1), had an estimated coefficient of 0.203. The
estimated coefficient of panel partisanship was not statistically significant because zero was
included in the 95 percent confidence interval. Since this variable was not statistically
significant, the null hypotheses related to this variable cannot be rejected. The two specific
directional hypotheses, appellate circuits with a Republican majority panel increase the
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probability of a gun rights rulings and appellate circuits with a Democratic majority panel
increase the probability of a gun control ruling, are rejected.
Second, the federal appellate circuit political ideology variable (X2) had an estimated
coefficient of -0.033. The estimated coefficient of the political ideology variable was
statistically significant because zero was not included in the 95 percent confidence interval.
Because this variable was statistically significant, the null hypotheses associated with this
variable can be rejected. The two specific directional hypotheses, appellate circuits with a liberal
political ideology increase the probability of a gun control ruling and appellate circuits with a
conservative political ideology increase the probability of a gun rights ruling, are accepted.
Anticipated relationships between political ideology and U.S. Courts of Appeals Second
Amendment decisions are consistent with my hypotheses.
Third, the federal appellate population density variable (X3) had an estimated coefficient
of -0.003. The estimated coefficient of the population density variable was not statistically
significant because zero was included in the 95 percent confidence interval. Since the population
density variable was not statistically significant, the null hypotheses related to this variable
cannot be rejected. The two specific directional hypotheses, U.S. Courts of Appeals circuits with
a high population density increase the probability of a gun control ruling and federal appellate
circuits with a low population density increase the probability of a gun rights ruling, cannot be
accepted.
Fourth, the federal appellate gun ownership percentage variable (X4) had an estimated
coefficient of -0.025. The estimated coefficient of the gun ownership percentage variable was
not statistically significant because zero was included in the 95 percent confidence interval.
Since the gun ownership percentage variable was not statistically significant, the null hypotheses
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related to this variable cannot be rejected. The two specific directional hypotheses, U.S. Courts
of Appeals circuits with a high gun ownership percentage increase the probability of a gun rights
ruling and federal appellate circuits with a low gun ownership percentage increase the
probability of a gun rights ruling, cannot be accepted.
Fifth, the federal appellate homicide rate variable (X5) had an estimated coefficient of 0.044. The estimated coefficient of the homicide rate variable was not statistically significant
because zero was included in the 95 percent confidence interval. Since the homicide rate
variable was not statistically significant, the null hypotheses related to this variable cannot be
rejected. The two specific directional hypotheses, U.S. Courts of Appeals circuits with a low
homicide rate increase the probability of a gun rights ruling and federal appellate circuits with a
high homicide rate increase the probability of a gun control ruling, cannot be accepted.
The chi-squared statistic, 0.083, allows this study to reject the null hypothesis that all
variables in the model jointly equal zero. This also refers to the finding that the null hypothesis
of the model does not improve upon simply picking the model outcome. The percent correctly
predicted statistic for this study is 0.867, which means that the model predicts 86.7% of all cases
in the model. This high statistical value refers to the fraction of cases where the actual outcome
corresponds to the predictions described in the model. The third and final statistic that needs to
be addressed is the proportional reduction of error statistic, which is 0.289. This statistic refers
to the percentage of errors that occur from just picking the modal outcome. The reduction of
error is the percentage of these errors that your model eliminates. Because of this statistic, the
model presented in this study reduced chance error by 28.9%
Regarding the performance by the logistic regression model, the R2P value for the linear
probability model was 0.864. This value reflects that the logistic model makes correct
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predictions 86.4 percent of the time, which is almost forty percent better than pure chance. The
PCP value for the logistic regression model was 0.823. This value reflects that the logistic
regression model makes correct predictions 82.3 percent of the time, which means that the model
predicts potential outcomes much better than chance. The AIC and BIC values for the logistic
probability model are relatively low. This means that the logistic regression model has a good fit.
The logistic regression model was shown to predict outside the bounds of zero and one because
the minimum and maximum summation values for the predicted value of the dependent variable
of the model were -1.189 for the minimum value and 1.789 for the maximum value. These
model performance values were estimated following the initial execution of the model.
In order to estimate the inter-coder reliability and to measure the soundness of the coding
schema for this study, fifty-one cases of the full 219 case sample were randomly selected and
coded by another reader. A Cronbach’s α statistic was tabulated based on the random sample
case codes and the reader’s code in order to establish an estimate of internal consistency and
reliability between the two codes. The Cronbach’s α statistic for this study was 0.907, which
suggests that the two case codes have a high level of internal consistency. Typically, a reliability
coefficient of 0.70 or higher for two codes is considered to be highly acceptable and possess
excellent agreement.
Table Two outlines the predicted probability estimation (PPE) of important data
observations within the full sample of Second Amendment U.S. Courts of Appeals cases. PPE
estimates interpret the effect of significant or interesting independent variables on the dependent
variable. Coupled with several averaged PPE estimates, Table Two presents sixteen PPE
observations from eight appellate circuits changed the most over the study period, 1960-2009.
An appellate circuit that changed considerably from conservative to liberal regarding political
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ideology was measured in the year the circuit was most conservative and the year the circuit was
most liberal in order to illustrate the full affect of significant independent variable on the
dependent variable.
Table Nine: Predicted Probability Estimation (PPE) of the U.S. Courts of Appeals Second
Amendment Decisions, 1960-2009
Var. Score;

App.

Gun Control Gun Rights

Type of Estimation

Variable

Year

Circ.

Ruling PPE

Ruling PPE

Average Sample Observation

--

--

--

76.2 percent

23.8 percent

Average Conservative Appellate Circuit

Pol. Ideo.

--

--

69.2

30.8

Average Liberal Appellate Circuit

Pol. Ideo.

--

--

82.5

17.5

Average Low Pop. Den. App. Circuit

Pop. Den.

--

--

67.4

32.6

Average High Pop. Den. App. Circuit

Pop. Den.

--

--

83.6

16.4

Conservative to Liberal Political Ideology

Pol. Ideo.

33.55; 1966

4

66.8

33.2

Conservative to Liberal Political Ideology

Pol. Ideo.

55.99; 1999

4

80.8

19.2

Conservative to Liberal Political Ideology

Pol. Ideo.

15.42; 1971

5

52.7

47.3

Conservative to Liberal Political Ideology

Pol. Ideo.

43.21; 1994

5

73.5

26.5

Liberal to Conservative Political Ideology

Pol. Ideo.

53.92; 1960

6

79.7

20.3

Liberal to Conservative Political Ideology

Pol. Ideo.

36.53; 2000

6

68.9

31.1

Liberal to Conservative Political Ideology

Pol. Ideo.

58.99; 1960

9

82.2

17.8

Liberal to Conservative Political Ideology

Pol. Ideo.

41.46; 2000

9

72.3

27.7

Least Population Growth

Pop. Den.

32.37; 1960

8

67.1

32.9

Least Population Growth

Pop. Den.

43.06; 2007

8

67.9

32.1

Least Population Growth

Pop. Den.

16.57; 1960

10

65.9

34.1

Least Population Growth

Pop. Den.

31.22; 2007

10

67.0

33.0

Most Population Growth

Pop. Den.

394.6; 1960

1

86.9

13.1

Most Population Growth

Pop. Den.

506.1; 2007

1

89.9

10.1

Most Population Growth

Pop. Den.

432.9; 1960

3

88.1

11.9

Most Population Growth

Pop. Den.

630.4; 2007

3

92.3

7.7

Sources: LexisNexis Legal Database, the American Judicature Society, the Federal Judicial Center, Berry, et. al.,
four Washington Post gun ownership surveys, the U.S. Census Bureau, and the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics60.
Note: n=219 cases.
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Table Two illustrates averaged and appellate circuit-level data regarding the predicted
probability estimates of the significant variable from the study. The first estimation in the
table provides an average sample observation in which 76.2 percent of the time a gun control
ruling is expected, while 23.8 percent of the time a gun rights ruling was expected.
By setting data values of the variables through usage of the standard deviation scores, I
can create average PPE values for significant appellate circuit-level variable data. Since the
Berry, et. al., state political ideology and state gun ownership percentage values are continuous,
and I combined state-level data to establish appellate circuit level measures, the data set created
for this study allows for easy analysis by means of PPE. By setting the appellate circuit political
ideology value one standard deviation both above (liberal) and below (conservative) the mean, I
can create an average liberal and conservative appellate circuit Second Amendment PPE. In an
average liberal appellate circuit, a gun control ruling is predicted 82.5 percent of the time, while
a gun rights ruling is predicted only 17.5 percent of the time. Comparatively, in an average
conservative appellate circuit, a gun rights ruling is predicted 30.8 percent of the time, while 39.2
percent of the time a gun control decision is predicted.
By setting the appellate circuit population density values one standard deviation both
above (high population density) and below (low population density) the mean, I can create an
average high and low population density for appellate circuit Second Amendment PPE. In an
average high population density appellate circuit, a gun control ruling is predicted 83.6 percent
of the time, while a gun rights ruling is predicted 16.4 percent of the time. Conversely, in an
average low population density appellate circuit, a gun control ruling is predicted 67.4 percent of
the time, while 32.6 percent of the time a gun rights decision is predicted.
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Predicted probability estimates can also be used to track changes to the probabilities of
Second Amendment case rulings for appellate circuit-level variable data that changed the most
during the fifty year study period by setting the variable values at the opposing scores. For
instance, the Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals appellate circuit political ideology
moved from conservative to (33.55; 15.42 respectively) in 1960s and early 1970s to moderate
(55.99; 43.21 respectively) in the 1990s. In these appellate circuits, the PPE of gun rights rulings
were at their highest point (33.2 percent; 47.3 percent respectively) when the appellate circuit
political ideology values were at their most conservative. After the appellate circuit political
ideologies moderated in the 1990s (55.99; 43.21 respectively), the PPE of a gun rights ruling
decreased by about 15 percent. In fact, by the 1990s, the PPE of a gun control ruling was 80.8
percent in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and 73.5 percent in the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals that the federal appellate court would rule in favor of gun control after political
ideologies moved from conservative to moderate. As the political ideology of an appellate
circuit moves from conservative to liberal, the probability of a gun control ruling increases.
In comparison, the Sixth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals appellate circuit political
ideology scores moved the most from liberal (53.92; 58.99 respectively) in 1960 to conservative
(36.53; 41.46 respectively) in 2000. In these appellate circuits, the PPE of a Second Amendment
gun control in both appellate circuits was high (79.7 percent; 82.2 percent respectively) when the
appellate circuit political ideology values were at their most liberal in 1960. After the appellate
circuit political ideologies became more moderate/conservative in the two circuits in 2000
(36.53; 41.46 respectively), the PPE of a gun rights ruling increased by more than 10 percent. In
fact, by 2000, the PPE of a gun rights ruling was 31.1 percent in the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals and 27.7 percent in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that the federal appellate court
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would rule in favor of gun rights after political ideologies moved from moderate/liberal
moderate/conservative. As the political ideology of an appellate circuit moved from liberal to
conservative, the probability of a gun rights ruling increased.
Predicted probability estimates can also be used to track changes to the probabilities of
Second Amendment case rulings for appellate circuit population density variable data that
changed the most during the fifty year study period by setting the variable values at the opposing
scores. For instance, the Eighth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals appellate circuit population
density measures grew the least (Eighth from 32.37 in 1960 to 43.06 in 2007; Tenth from 16.57
in 1960 to 31.22 in 2007) during the fifty year study period. For these two appellate circuits, the
affect of low population growth had little impact on the PPE of gun control and gun rights
rulings because of the already significant gun control ruling skew in the full sample. In fact, the
PPE changed by only 0.8 percent (67.1 percent in 1960 to 67.9 percent in 2007) in the Eighth
Circuit Courts of Appeals from 1960 to 2007, while the PPE changed by only 1.1 percent (65.9
percent in 1960 to 67.0 percent in 2007) in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals during the same
period. As population growth increases, the probability of a federal appellate circuit ruling in
favor of gun control increases.
In comparison, the First and Third Circuit Courts of Appeals appellate circuit population
density values grew the most (First from 394.6 in 1960 to 506.1 in 2007; Third from 432.9 in
1960 to 630.4 in 2007) during the fifty year study period. For these appellate circuits, the affect
of significant population growth had little impact on the PPE of gun control and gun rights
rulings because of the already significant gun control ruling skew in the full sample. The PPE
changed by only 3.0 percent (86.9 percent in 1960 to 89.9 percent in 2007) in the First Circuit
Court of Appeals from 1960 to 2007, while the PPE changed by 4.2 percent (88.1 percent in

172

1960 to 92.3 percent in 2007) in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals during the same period.
Again, as population grows the probability of a federal appellate circuit ruling in favor of gun
control increases; however, the affect is not significant.
Conclusions
This study posed the research question, what is the extent and determinants of Second
Amendment rulings in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1960-2009? This study theorized that
partisan accountability, public opinion, and specific policy interests affect the way judges that sit
on the circuits of the U.S. Courts of Appeals rule on polarizing political issues, such as the
Second Amendment. This theory was then operationalized into five independent variables and
hypotheses, with the actual Second Amendment case ruling being the dependent variable. The
operationalizations of the study included partisan accountability. This variable was developed
into a dichotomous variable, panel partisanship, which measured the partisan make-up of federal
appellate panels. Second, the public opinion aspect of the study was operationalized to
continuously measure appellate circuit political ideology and population density. Third, specific
policy interests were operationalized to continuously measure appellate circuit gun ownership
percentage and homicide rate.
Using logistic regression analysis, this study found that the extent and determinants of
Second Amendment rulings in the U.S. Courts of Appeals between 1960 and 2009 were limited
to a single public opinion variable. More specifically, appellate circuit political ideology had a
direct impact on the outcomes of Second Amendment U.S. Courts of Appeals rulings during the
fifty year study period. As such, the two hypotheses associated with these two independent
variables are accepted and the null hypotheses are rejected. In particular, this study can conclude
that U.S. Courts of Appeals circuits with a liberal political ideology increase the probability that
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their appellate panels will rule in favor of gun control in Second Amendment decisions. U.S.
Courts of Appeals circuits with a conservative political ideology increase the probability that
their appellate panels will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions.
The four other variables in the study, panel partisanship, appellate circuit gun ownership,
and appellate circuit homicide rate did not have a statistically significant relationship with the
dependent variable, and thus the eight hypotheses associated with these independent variables
cannot be accepted and the null hypotheses cannot be rejected. The logistic regression model
performance measures illustrated the fact that the model made predictions correctly almost 90.7
percent of the time and had a good fit, while the coding schema employed in the study was
shown to provide high consistency between coders because of the Cronbach’s α statistic.
The affect of appellate circuit political ideology on Second Amendment U.S. Courts of
Appeals decisions provides no significant shock. Political institutions and federal judicial
circuits are filled with political appointees who have been given their position because of their
own personal political feelings or have feelings that closely mirror those of the individual doing
the appointing. Judicial actors, even ones that are supposed to possess political independence, do
have their own personal political ideology. This set of personal ideas, goals, expectations, and
actions, affects the actions of judicial actors when they carry out their role on the bench.
Corresponding directly to traditional notions about political ideology and support for or
opposition to gun rights, this study shows that U.S. Courts of Appeals judges with conservative
political ideologies are more likely to rule in favor of gun rights than gun control. This study
also shows that federal appellate judges with liberal political ideologies are more likely to rule in
favor of gun control than gun rights. Historical trends have shown that individuals with
conservative political ideologies support greater gun rights, while individuals with liberal
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political ideologies support greater gun control measures. The findings in this study affirm
traditional political ideology considerations, especially regarding the Second Amendment at the
federal appellate level.
Like the appellate circuit political ideology variable, the affect of appellate circuit of
other study variables on Second Amendment U.S. Courts of Appeals rulings provides an
interesting look into the uncertain nature of urban politics. Urban areas have traditionally been
much more likely to curtail the usage and possession of firearms in order to maintain stability
and decrease violence in cities that have seen their fair share of it in the past. Appellate circuits,
such as the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and the states associated with the circuit (Delaware,
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) often choose to deter gun violence through ownership because of
the density of their population.
For instance, New Jersey is the most densely populated state with 1171.1 people per
square mile (2007), while the state also has one the lowest gun ownership percentages in the
entire country with only 12.3 percent (2000) of people owning firearms. In comparison, Alaska
only has 1.2 people per square mile (2007) with 57.8 percent gun ownership (2000). Some states
and appellate circuits, especially those with densely populated areas, are more likely to restrict
gun ownership. Gun culture across the country varies widely. States and appellate circuits with
higher gun ownership rates have traditionally been associated with rural and conservative areas,
while states and appellate circuits with lesser gun ownership rates have traditionally been
associated with urban and liberal areas. The findings in this study affirm traditional population
density considerations, especially regarding the Second Amendment at the federal appellate
level.
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CODA
State Supreme Court and U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment Data Comparison
Because of the similar design of the studies completed in Chapter Three and Chapter
Four, the important findings in each study are easily comparable. For instance, Second
Amendment rulings by decade, gun rights/gun control ruling types, gun-related issues, tracking
Second Amendment cases, Second Amendment estimated logistic regression coefficients, and
Second Amendment predicted probability estimates (PPE) in state supreme courts and the U.S.
Courts of Appeals can be comparable in table format.
Table One outlines comparable Second Amendment ruling decade data, 1960-2009, for
state and federal appellate court
Table One: State and Federal Appellate Second Amendment Rulings by Decade, 1960-2009
Decade

State Supreme Courts

U.S. Courts of Appeals

All-Decade Totals

1960s

29 (10.8 percent)

4 (1.8 percent)

33 (6.8 percent)

1970s

89 (33.1)

31 (14.2)

120 (24.6)

1980s

59 (21.9)

24 (10.9)

83 (17.0)

1990s

57 (21.2)

88 (40.2)

145 (29.7)

2000s

35 (13.0)

72 (32.9)

107 (21.9)

Judicial Level Totals

269 (100 percent)

219 (100 percent)

488 (100 percent)

61

Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database .
Note: n=488 cases.

Comparing state and federal appellate rulings by decade, the most active decade for
Second Amendment cases in state supreme courts was the 1970s (33.1 percent; 89 cases), while
the most active decade for similar cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals was the 1990s (40.2
percent; 88 cases). A majority of Second Amendment state supreme court cases were decided in
the 1970s and 1980s (55 percent; 148 cases), while a super majority of similar cases in the U.S.
Courts of Appeals were decided in the 1990s and 2000s (73.1 percent; 160 cases). All-decade
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Second Amendment case totals (both state supreme courts and U.S. Courts of Appeals) found
that the 1970s (24.6 percent; 120 cases) and 1990s (29.7 percent; 145 cases) were the two most
active decades in terms of total decisions rendered at both levels of the state and federal
judiciary.
Table One illustrates the rising importance of the Second Amendment in the American
political system. In both the state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts of Appeals, the 1960s (6.8
percent; 33 cases) were the least active in terms of Second Amendment decisions. All other
decade totals from both judicial levels reported Second Amendment decision totals of more than
14 percent, except for the 1980s in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. The all-decade case total
percentages at both studied levels of the judiciary were fairly evenly distributed between
decades. Other than the 1960s (6.8 percent), all-decade decision percentages were not lower
than 17 percent in the 1980s and not higher than 29.7 percent in the 1990s.
Table Two illustrates comparable Second Amendment ruling type data, 1960-2009, from
the state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
Table Two: State and Federal Appellate Second Amendment Cases by Ruling Type, 19602009
Type of Ruling

State Supreme Courts

U.S. Courts of Appeals

Number of Cases

Gun Control Rulings

143 (53.2 percent)

160 (73.1 percent)

303 (62.1 percent)

Gun Rights Rulings

126 (46.8)

59 (26.9)

185 (37.9)

Total Rulings

269 (100 percent)

219 (100 percent)

488 (100 percent)

62

Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database .
Note: n=488 cases.

Second Amendment case ruling types at both the state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts of
Appeals provided interesting comparable data. The spread between state supreme courts and
U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment decisions that favored gun control and rights was
significant. According to the data, a Second Amendment case was 19.9 percent more likely to
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favor gun rights in state supreme courts than in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, while the same
spread favored gun control in the U.S. Courts of Appeals over state supreme courts.
In state supreme courts, Second Amendment cases were 6.4 percent more likely to be
decided in favor of gun control then gun rights. In the U.S. Courts of Appeals, Second
Amendment cases were 46.2 percent more likely to be decided in favor of gun control. This
finding represents a 39.8 percent difference between the likelihood of a particular ruling in the
two levels of the state and federal judiciary. Regarding the full state and federal appellate
Second Amendment case sample, 303 (62.1 percent) of the 488 cases were decided in favor of
gun control. The balance of the case sample, 185 (37.9 percent), were decided in favor of gun
rights. This represents a 24.2 percent spread between the likelihood of a gun control ruling (62.1
percent) and a gun rights ruling (37.9 percent) in the full state and federal case sample.
Table Three illustrates comparable Second Amendment case issue data, 1960-2009, from
the state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
Table Three: State and Federal Appellate Second Amendment Cases by Issue, 1960-2009
Litigated Second Amendment Issues

State Supreme

U.S. Courts of

Courts

Appeals

Felon in Possession of a Firearm

51 (19.0 percent)

38 (17.4 percent)

89 (18.2 percent)

Concealed Weapons Violation

31 (11.5)

17 (7.8)

48 (9.8)

Denial of Personal Firearms License

24 (8.9)

28 (12.8)

52 (10.7)

Possession of Automatic/Assault Weapon

23 (8.5)

24 (11.0)

47 (9.6)

Unregistered Firearms Violation

20 (7.4)

16 (7.3)

36 (7.4)

Local Ban on Gun Show Sales/Exhibition

9 (3.3)

14 (6.4)

23 (4.7)

Gun Club Related Issues

8 (3.0)

13 (5.9)

21 (4.3)

Total Cases

269 (100 percent)

219 (100 percent)

488 (100 percent)

Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database63.
Note: n=488 cases in the full sample.
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Number of Cases

The types of Second Amendment issues decided in both state supreme courts and U.S.
Courts of Appeals can be compared much like the chronological and rulings data. Table Three
outlines the Second Amendment case issue data, 1960-2009, from both levels of the judiciary in
the study. In particular, the Second Amendment that was litigated the most during the fifty year
study period in the state and federal appellate levels was possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon. In fact, almost 20 percent (89 cases; 18.2 percent) of the full 488 case sample dealt with
the felon possession issues. Given the numerous issues associated with the Second Amendment,
it is a significant to show that one particular issue, such as felony possession, made up nearly
one-fifth of the full case issue sample.
Three other issues made up more than 30 percent of the full case issue sample. Denial of
personal firearms license, concealed weapons violations, and possession of automatic/assault
weapon accounted for 30.1 percent of the issues decided in the 488 full state and federal Second
Amendment case sample. In particular, all three firearms-related issue-based case types
accounted for about 10 percent of the full case sample. The final issues listed in the table,
unregistered firearms violations, local ban on gun show sales/exhibitions, and gun club-related
issues accounted for 16.4 percent of the full case sample, or about 5.4 percent each. The balance
of the Second Amendment case issues decided in state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 35.3 percent of all cases, varied between the levels of the judiciary and between
different types of issues consistent with state and federal systems.
Table Four illustrates comparable Second Amendment case tracking data, 1960-2009,
from the state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
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Table Four: Tracking State and Federal Appellate Second Amendment Cases, 1960-2009
Type of Action

State Courts

U.S. Courts

Number

of Last Resort

of Appeals

of Cases

None

219 (81.4 percent)

183 (83.6 percent)

402 (82.4 percent)

Case Reheard (State)/Reviewed En Banc (Fed.)

5 (1.9)

3 (1.4)

8 (1.6)

Original Ruling Overturned (Same Level)

2 (0.7)

1 (0.4)

3 (0.06)

Case Appealed

45 (16.7)

33 (15.1)

78 (16.0)

Case in which Certiorari was Denied

40 (14.9)

24 (11.0)

64 (13.1)

Case Reviewed

5 (1.9)

9 (4.1)

14 (2.9)

Case Overturned

3 (1.1)

5 (2.3)

8 (1.6)

269 (100 percent)

219 (100 percent)

488 (100 percent)

Total Cases
64

Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database .
Note: n=488 cases.

Table Four shows that 402 (82.4 percent) Second Amendment cases ended with a
decision rendered in the state supreme courts of the U.S. Courts of Appeals. In all 402 of these
cases, no further action by either side was formally attempted. Several litigants in the sample
looked into possibly appealing their decision to the U.S. Supreme Court; however, ultimately
there was no appeal made. Only 8 cases of the full case sample were either re-heard (5; state
supreme courts) or reviewed en banc (3; U.S. Courts of Appeals). Of these 8 cases, 3 of the
original rulings were overturned at the same of the judiciary.
78 total Second Amendment cases in the full sample (16.0 percent) were appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court. In 64 of these cases (13.1 percent), certiorari, an official writ for review by
a judicial body, was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court. This finding means that 14 cases (2.9
percent; 5 from state supreme courts; 9 from the U.S. Courts of Appeals) were accepted for
review by the U.S. Supreme Court. After review, 8 original Second Amendment case outcomes
(1.6 percent; 3 from state supreme courts; 5 from U.S. Courts of Appeals) were overturned by
the U.S. Supreme Court. Taken as a whole, only 11 original Second Amendment case decisions
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(3 decisions overturned at original judicial level; 8 decisions overturned on appeal in the U.S.
Supreme Court) were eventually overturned through re-hearings or on appeal. This rate of
success was only 2.3 percent.
Table Five illustrates comparable estimated logistic regression coefficients for Second
Amendment case data, 1960-2009, from the state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
Table Five: Comparable Estimated Logistic Regression Coefficients of State and Federal
Appellate Second Amendment Decisions, 1960-2009
Independent Variables

State Supreme Courts

U.S. Courts of Appeals

Political Ideology

0.000 (0.014)***

0.036 (0.015)***

Population Density

0.345 (0.211)

0.039 (0.001)

Gun Ownership Percentage

0.000 (0.020)***

0.487 (0.395)

Homicide Rate

0.117 (0.059)

0.192 (0.033)

R2P

0.901

0.864

PCP

0.897

0.823

AIC

235.2367

303.8711

BIC

265.5498

346.2649

Cronbach’s α Statistic

0.918

0.907

***p<0.05
Sources: LexisNexis Legal Database, the American Judicature Society, the Federal Judicial Center, Brisbin &
Kilwein, Judgepedia, Berry, et al., four Washington Post gun ownership surveys, the U.S. Census Bureau, and the
U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics65.
Note: n=269 cases in the state supreme courts; n=219 in the U.S. Courts of Appeals; 488 total cases.

Considering the logistic regression coefficients for similar measurable variables at both
the state and federal appellate levels, Table Five illustrates the differences between continuously
measured variables in the full Second Amendment case sample. In particular, two variables in
the state supreme courts and one in the U.S. Courts of Appeals proved to be significant. In the
state supreme courts, state political ideology and gun ownership percentage were significant. In
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, appellate circuit political ideology was significant.
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In terms of the two statistical models, the state supreme court regression model makes
correct predictions regarding Second Amendment decisions better based upon the R2P values.
However, according the outlined PCP values, the U.S. Courts of Appeals regression model
makes correct predictions better than the state supreme court model. The AIC and BIC values
were all low and have a good fit for each model. Finally, the Cronbach’s α statistic for
intercoder reliability for both models was high and acceptable. In particular, the state supreme
court statistic had a slightly higher rate of internal consistency than the U.S. Courts of Appeals
model.
Table Six illustrates comparable predicted probability estimates (PPE) for Second
Amendment case data, 1960-2009, from the state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
Table Six: Comparable Predicted Probably Estimates (PPE) of State and Federal Appellate
Second Amendment Decisions, 1960-2009
Type of Estimation

Variable

State Supreme

State Supreme

U.S. Courts

U.S. Courts

Courts Gun

Courts Gun

of Appeals

of Appeals

Control

Rights Ruling

Gun Control

Gun Rights

Ruling PPE

PPE

Ruling PPE

Ruling PPE

Average Sample Observation

--

55.3 percent

44.7 percent

76.2 percent

23.8 percent

Average State Conservative Ideology

Pol. Ideo.

29.7

70.3

--

--

Average State Liberal Ideology

Pol. Ideo.

78.4

21.6

--

--

Average Conservative App. Circuit

Pol. Ideo.

--

--

69.2

30.8

Average Liberal App. Circuit

Pol. Ideo.

--

--

82.5

17.5

Sources: LexisNexis Legal Database, the American Judicature Society, the Federal Judicial Center, Brisbin &
Kilwein, Judgepedia, Berry, et al., four Washington Post gun ownership surveys, the U.S. Census Bureau, and the
U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics66.
Note: n=269 cases in the state supreme courts; n=219 in the U.S. Courts of Appeals; 488 total cases.

The predicted probability estimates (PPE) outlined above show the differences in the
predicted outcomes of Second Amendment case outcomes in the state supreme courts and the
U.S. Courts of Appeals. The most striking difference between the two judicial levels was the
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average sample observation. In the U.S. Courts of Appeals sample a gun control ruling was
expected 21.9 percent more than in the state supreme courts sample. These estimates show a
much greater percentage of gun control rulings were decided in the U.S. Courts of Appeals level
than in state supreme courts.
Comparable PPE estimates were tabulated for political ideology, which was the lone
variable significant in both the state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts of Appeals Second
Amendment case samples. PPE estimates show how much of an affect the independent variable
has on dependent variable. In this scenario, even though political ideology was shown to be
significant in both state supreme courts and U.S. Courts of Appeals regarding Second
Amendment decisions, the effect of this significant variable was greater in the state supreme
courts. The likelihood of a gun control decision in the state court of last resort in a conservative
was 29.7 percent, while the likelihood of a gun control ruling in the state court of last resort in a
liberal state was 78.4 percent. This statistic represents a difference of 48.7 percent between the
likelihood of a gun control decision in two different states from a political ideology perspective.
In comparison, the same statistic tabulated in for conservative and liberal appellate circuits
shows a difference of only 13.3 percent between the likelihood of a gun control decision. This
represents a difference of 35.4 percent between the state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts of
Appeals with regard to political ideology.

Endnotes
1

United States v. Klebig, 600 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 2009).

2

Ibid.

3

Ibid.

4

Ibid.

5

Ibid.

183

6

Cross, F.B. (2007). Decision-Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, p.
11-65.
7

Ibid.

8

McIver, J.P. (1976). Scaling Judicial Decisions; The Panel Decision-making Process of the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
American Journal of Political Science 20, 4: p. 750-754.

9

Goldman, S. (1966). Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1961-1964. The American Political
Science Review 60, 2: p. 375-379.

10

Goldman, S. (1975). Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited. The American Political
Science Review 69, 2: p. 502-505.
11

Gruhl, J. (1982). Patterns of Compliance with United States Supreme Court Rulings; The Case of Libel in Federal
Courts of Appeals and State Supreme Courts. Publius 12: p. 109-126.
12

Koh, S.Y. (1991). Nonacquiescence in Immigration Decisions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Yale Law & Policy
Review 9, 2: p. 433-437.

13

Songer, D.R., & Haire, S. (1992). Integrating Alternative Approaches to the Study of Judicial Voting: Obscenity
Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. American Journal of Political Science 36, 4: 963-971.
14

Haire, S.B., Lindquist, S.A., & Hartley, R. (1999). Attorney Expertise, Litigant Success, and Judicial Decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Law & Society Review 33, 3: p. 670-678.

15

Denning, B.P. (1996). Can the Simple Cite be Trusted? Lower Court Interpretations of the United States v. Miller
and the Second Amendment. Cumberland Law Review 26: p. 961-982.
16

Kilmer, D.E.J., & Harding, G.M. (2005). The Intersection of the First and Second Amendments; Nordyke v. King.
Lincoln Law Review 33: p. 43-65.
17

Keleher, C. (2008). Will Parker v. District of Columbia Signal the End of Illinois Municipality Handgun Bans?
Journal of the DuPage County Bar Association 20: p. 10-19.
18

Dupree, A.C. (2008). A Shot Heard ‘Round the District; The District of Columbia Circuit Puts a Bullet in the
Collective Right Theory of the Second Amendment. American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy, and the
Law 16: p. 414-426.
19

Kopel, D.B. (2009). The Second Amendment in the Tenth Circuit; Three Decades of (Mostly) Harmless Error.
Denver University Law Review 86, 3: p. 901-939.
20

Kilwein, J.C., & Brisbin, R.A. (1997). Policy Convergence in a Federal Judicial System; The Application of
Intensified Scrutiny Doctrines by State Supreme Courts. American Journal of Political Science 41, 1: p. 129-130.

21

Ulmer, S.S. (1962). Supreme Court Behavior in Racial Exclusion Cases; 1935-1960. The American Political
Science Review 56, 2: p. 326-328.
22

Scherer, N., & Miller, B. (2009). The Federalist Society’s Influence on the Federal Judiciary. Political Science
Quarterly 62, 2: p. 366-373.
23

Gill, J., & Waterman, R.W. (2004). Solidary and Functional Costs: Explaining the Presidential Appointment
Contradiction. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 14, 4: p. 547.

184

24

Goldman, S. (1997). Picking Federal Judges; Lower Court Selection from Roosevelt Through Reagan. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 1-15, 285-340.
25

Ibid.

26

Goldman, S., & Slotnick, E. (1998). Clinton’s Second Term Judiciary; Picking Judges Under Fire. Judicature 82,
4: p. 265-285.
27

Goldman, S., Slotnick, E., Gryski, G., Zuk, G., & Schiavoni, S. (2002). W. Bush Remaking the Judiciary; Like
Father, Like Son. Judicature 85, 6: p. 282- 305.
28

Ibid.

29

Goldman, S., Slotnick, E., Gryski, G., Zuk, G., & Schiavoni, S. (2004). W. Bush’s Judiciary; The First Term
Record. Judicature 88, 5: p. 244-270.
30

Goldman, S., Slotnick, E., Gryski, G., & Schiavoni, S. (2007). Picking Judges in a Time of Turmoil; W. Bush’s
Judiciary During the 109th Congress. Judicature 90, 6: p. 252-283.

31

Goldman, S., Schiavoni, S., & Slotnick, E. (2009). W. Bush’s Judicial Legacy; Mission Accomplished. Judicature
92, 6: p. 258-288.
32

Scherer, N., Bartels, B.L., & Steigerwald, A. (2008). Sounding the Fire Alarm; The Role of Interest Groups in the
Lower Federal Court Confirmation Process. The Journal of Politics 70, 4: p. 1026-1039.
33

Cross, 2007, p. 11-65.

34

Woolley, J.T., & Peters, G. (2008), The American Presidency Project; Republican Party 2008 Platform (online).
Retrieved 28 October 2010 from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29612.
35

Woolley, J.T., & Peters, G. (2008), The American Presidency Project; Democratic Party 2008 Platform (online).
Retrieved 28 October 2010 from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25849.
36

Stidham, R., Carp, R.A., & Rowland, C.K. (1984). Patterns of Presidential Influence on the Federal District
Courts: An Analysis of the Appointment Process. Presidential Studies Quarterly 14, 4: p. 548-554.

37

Cross, 2003, p. 1467-1470, 1479-1481, 1499-1508.

38

Baum, 2006, p. 1-20.

39

Koh, 1991, p. 433-437.

40

Gruhl, 1982, p. 109-126.

41

Howard, Jr., J.W. (1977). Role Perceptions and Behavior in Three U.S. Courts of Appeals. The Journal of Politics
39, 4: p. 916-926.

42

Baum, L. (2000). The Puzzle of Judicial Behavior. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, p. 3-15.

43

Baum, L. (2006). Judges and Their Audiences; A Perspective on Judicial Behavior. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, p. 1-20.

44

Epstein, L., & Knight, J. (1998). The Choices Justices Make. Washington, DC: CQ Press, p. 10-18.

185

45

Baum, 2000, p. 57-125

46

Ibid.

47

Baum, 2006, p. 1-20.

48

Ibid., p. 21-23.

49

Gibson, J.L. (1980). Environmental Concerns on the Behavior of Judges; A Representational Model of Judicial
Decision-making. Law & Society Review 14, 2: p. 343-356.
50

Fetzer, P.L. (1981). Jurisdictional Decisions in Indian Law; The Importance of Extralegal Factors in Judicial
Decision-making. American Indian Law Review 9, 2: p. 256-268.

51

Gibson, J.L. (1983). From Simplicity to Complexity; The Development of Theory in the Study of Judicial
Behavior. Political Behavior 5, 1: p. 7-49.
52

Ferejohn, J.A., & Weingast, B. (1992). A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation. International Review of Law
and Economics 12, 2: p. 263-274.
53

Patrick, P.B., & Bak, T. (2003). Firearms Prosecutions in the Federal Courts; Trends in the Use of 18 U.S.C. §
924(C). Buffalo Criminal Law Review 6, 3: p. 1189-1208.
54

Helmke, G., & Sanders, M.S. (2006). Modeling Motivations; A Method for Inferring Judicial Goals from
Behavior. The Journal of Politics 68, 4: p. 867-878.
55

Henry, M.D., & Turner, J.L. (2006). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s Impact on Patent Litigation.
Journal of Legal Studies 35, 1: p. 95-104.

56

Shively, W.P. (2009). The Craft of Political Research, 7th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice-Hall, p.
139-141.

57

Pollock, III, P.H. (2006). A Stata Companion to Political Analysis. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, p. 182-187.

58

Studenmund, A.H. (2006). Using Econometrics; A Practical Guide, 5th ed. Boston: Pearson Addison-Wesley, p.
463-464.
59

LexisNexis. (2009). U.S. State and Federal Cases. Retrieved between March 2010 and May 2010 from LexisNexis
at http://www.lexisnexis.com.www.libproxy.wvu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic; American Judicature Society. (2010).
Judicial Selection. Retrieved between May 2010 and June 2010 from the American Judicature Society at
http://www.ajs.org/selection/index.asp.; Federal Judicial Center. (2010). History of the Federal Judiciary. Retrieved
in June 2010 from the Federal Judicial Center at http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/index.html; Berry, W.,
et.al. (2009). Citizen and Government Ideology. Retrieved June 2010 from http://mailer.fsu.edu/~wberry/garnetwberry/a.html; Washington Post. (2006). Gun Ownership by State. Retrieved June 2010 from
http://www.washingtonpost.com/health/interactives/guns/ ownership.html; U.S. Census Bureau. (2010). Archived
Census Data. Retrieved June 2010 from http://2010.census.gov/2010census/data/; U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics.
(2010). All Data Collections. Retrieved June 2010 from http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=dca.
60

Ibid.

61

LexisNexis, 2009.

62

Ibid.

186

63

Ibid.

64

Ibid.

65

Ibid.; American Judicature Society, Brisbin & Kilwein, Judgepedia, Federal Judicial Center, Berry, W., et.al.,
Washington Post, U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics.
66

Ibid.

187

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS

The ruling class doesn't care about public safety. Having made it very difficult
for states and localities to police themselves, having left ordinary citizens with
no choice but to protect themselves as best they can, they now try to take our
guns away. In fact they blame us and our guns for crime. This is so wrong that
it cannot be an honest mistake.
--Malcolm Wallop, former U.S. Senator (R-WY), 1992

I think there should be a law—and I know this is extreme—that no one can
have a gun in the United States. If you have a gun, you go to jail. Only the
police should have guns.
--Rosie O’Donnell, American Television Personality, 1999

This study surveyed important literature regarding the Second Amendment, provided
interview analysis about the operations of Second Amendment legal operations and cause
lawyers, and outlined the nature of Second Amendment litigation and judicial decision-making
in state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts of Appeals between 1960 and 2009. This chapter
will provide some analysis about potential implications of the research provided in the
preceding pages and chapters. Finally, this final chapter will outline the most important
concluding thoughts complied as the various studies were completed. The next section
provides a summary of the findings of this dissertation.
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Summary of Findings
Three separate studies were completed in the course of this dissertation. By using data
collected from telephone interviews with twenty-one Second Amendment gun rights and gun
control cause lawyers, Chapter Two found that there were distinct differences between local,
state, and national Second Amendment interest groups with regard to legal participation,
litigation strategies, judicial venue-shopping, coordination and networking, and organization.
More specifically, local, state, and national Second Amendment interest groups deal with all five
of the interview issues differently. Because of this finding, the five research hypotheses
associated with these variable relationships were accepted and the null hypotheses were rejected.
This study found that there were distinct differences between heavily funded and lesser funded
interest groups with regard to legal participation, litigation strategies, judicial venue-shopping,
coordination and networking, and organization. Heavily funded and lesser funded Second
Amendment interest groups deal with the five interview areas very differently. Because of this
finding, the five research hypotheses associated with these variable relationships were accepted
and the null hypotheses were rejected.
Along with the first two sets of theories, this study found that there were clear differences
between gun rights and gun control interest groups with regard to litigation strategies, judicial
venue-shopping, and organization. More specifically, gun rights and gun control interest groups
deal with these three interview areas in significantly different ways. As such, the three research
hypotheses associated with the variable relationships are accepted and the null hypotheses are
rejected. Interview responses from the cause lawyers regarding legal participation and
coordination/networking showed that gun rights and gun control lawyers actually participate and
coordinate in Second Amendment cases in similar manners, and thus, the two research
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hypotheses associated with these two variable relationships cannot be accepted and the null
hypotheses cannot be rejected.
Using logistic regression analysis, Chapter Three found that the nature and determinants
of Second Amendment rulings in state supreme courts, 1960-2009, were limited to select public
opinion and specific policy interests. More specifically, state political ideology and state gun
ownership percentage variables had a direct impact on the outcomes of Second Amendment state
supreme courts rulings during the fifty year study period. As such, the four hypotheses
associated with these two independent variables were accepted and the null hypotheses were
rejected.
State judicial selection method, the presence of a state intermediate appellate court, state
population density, and state homicide rate variables did not have a statistically significant
relationship with the dependent variable, and thus the eight hypotheses associated with these
independent variables cannot be accepted and the null hypotheses cannot be rejected.
Furthermore, the logistic regression model performance measures illustrated the fact that the
model made predictions correctly more than 90 percent of the time and had a good fit, while the
coding schema employed in the study was shown to provide high consistency between coders
because of the kappa statistic.
Similar to the study completed in Chapter Three, Chapter Four found that the effect of
political aspects on Second Amendment rulings in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1960-2009, were
limited to public opinion variables. More specifically, appellate circuit political ideology and
population density variables had a direct impact on the outcomes of Second Amendment U.S.
Courts of Appeals rulings during the fifty year study period. Because of these relationships, the
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four hypotheses associated with these two independent variables are accepted and the null
hypotheses are rejected.
Panel partisanship, appellate circuit gun ownership, and appellate circuit homicide rate
did not have a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable, and thus, the six
hypotheses associated with these independent variables cannot be accepted and the null
hypotheses cannot be rejected. The logistic regression model performance measures illustrated
the fact that the model made predictions correctly more than 83 percent of the time and had a
good fit, while the coding schema employed in the study was shown to provide high consistency
between coders because of the tabulated kappa statistic.
Research Implications
This work has outlined a number of findings regarding Second Amendment cause
lawyering and cases in state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Given the
findings previously outlined, several important research implications become apparent. First,
it is important to discuss the “so what” question regarding power and empowerment in
American politics. In the data collected, cause lawyers who represented national level interest
groups wielded significant monetary power to participate in more Second Amendment cases,
utilize more litigation strategies, shop between potential judicial venues, coordinate and
network with other interest groups, and possess a larger legal team and organization for
litigation purposes. The local, state, and federal court system empowers local cause lawyers to
bring Second Amendment litigation as an outlaw to obtain a remedy from an unjust law.
Although many local gun rights and gun control lawyers do not possess the same resources as
their national level colleagues, the court system in itself sanctions litigation for laws thought to
be unfair.
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In state supreme court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment rulings, the
issues of power and empowerment were fairly divided. Because state supreme court judges
were much more likely to rule in favor of gun rights, and thus more gun rights, than their
federal appellate court colleagues, the public were empowered with more rights in these states.
Once state residents attained greater rights in these Second Amendment cases, they were
empowered through the authority of the state. In this respect, state supreme court judges
possessed significant power to determine what rights should be given to the public and the
rights that should not be given. The wielding of power in the federal court was much
different. In the U.S. Courts of Appeals, almost three-quarters of the time a gun control ruling
was expected. In significantly more rulings, federal appellate judges ruled in favor of gun
control, and thus did not allow citizens to gain more rights and liberties associated with
firearms. In this respect, U.S. Courts of Appeals judges and the federal government retained
significant power concerning firearms and federal law.
Second, the three studies that comprise my dissertation establish a clear argument with
regard to the American federal system because of distinct and lasting differences between the
ways Second Amendment cases are decided in both state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts
of Appeals. It was clear from the data that state supreme courts judges were much more likely
to rule in favor of gun rights than their federal appellate counterparts.
There were distinct differences in the political aspects that affected the ways Second
Amendment cases were decided. In reading and taking notes on the cases in the full sample,
state supreme courts judges often focused on the civil liberties aspect of the Second
Amendment, even if they ultimately choose to rule in favor of gun control. In comparison, in
only 16 cases did U.S. Courts of Appeals three-judge panels even mention the importance of
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the Second Amendment in the same analysis as civil liberties. This analysis was included in
more than 50 decisions from the state supreme courts and shows the differences regarding how
both sets of judges saw Second Amendment cases. State supreme courts judges often saw
Second Amendment cases through the lens of the Bill of Rights and civil liberties, while U.S.
Courts of Appeals judges focused on firearms cases through the applicability of the federal
statute being questioned in a particular case.
Even though the logistic regression model showed that the electoral component of
judicial selection did not have an effect on state supreme court Second Amendment decisionmaking, it seems to me that the closeness engendered by their position on the supreme court of
a state, rather than on the federal appellate bench was important regarding this federalism
argument. Because federal appellate court judges possess lifetime appointments and rarely
have to comply with the feelings of the public they serve, U.S. Courts of Appeals judges were
able to simply interpret federal law without having to discuss rights and liberties issues.
Because federal appellate courts only have appellate jurisdiction they only review decisions
from lower trial courts for errors of law. The U.S. Courts of Appeals only considers the record
from the trial court, and the legal arguments of the parties involved. Different from federal
appellate judges, state supreme court judges are often forced to comply with public pressure.
In this way, state supreme court judges discussed these rights and liberties issues in decisions
frequently neglected by federal appellate judges because of this intimacy with the public.
A surrogate measure of political party identification was used in each decision-making
study. For the state supreme court chapter, party affiliation of the court was used, while
partisan panel appointment was used for the U.S. Courts of Appeals study. Estimation of both
models revealed that only the party identification from the state supreme court chapter was
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significant. This estimation reports that political party affiliation is still an important part of
the daily activities of state supreme court judges when they render decisions. However, party
identification did not affect judicial decision-making in the federal appellate circuit decisions.
This provides us with a key difference between the two judicial levels. Why does party
affiliation matter at the state level, but not the federal appellate level? First, state supreme
court judges are more intimate with their constituents and show some level of connection to a
political party, while federal judges want to be seen as being above the political fray. Second,
federal appellate judges have lifetime appointments and are not beholden to electorate for their
position, while a large amount of state supreme court judges are elected on a partisan level,
non-partisan level, or face retention elections, and must comply with public sentiments in
order to remain in office.
A third research implication is the notion that this type of logistic regression model
could potentially be used to predict case outcomes and outline judicial decision-making
regarding previously decided and future Second Amendment cases in state supreme courts and
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, along with other important political issues when litigated in
judicial levels below the U.S. Supreme Court. Although this is not a new idea, a new model,
such as the two used in this dissertation, could be updated to account for the political aspects
that affect many issues. In this scenario, variables, such as state/appellate circuit political
ideology, population density, gun ownership percentage, homicide rate, and judicial-level
specific measures could be estimated to determine a possible case outcome before a decision is
rendered. This model could then be revised to utilize only the significant variables to
determine the type of decision that is expected.
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Similar predictive models could be created to consider the judicial decision-making
impact of state supreme courts and U.S. Courts of Appeals judges regarding Second
Amendment, other Bill of Rights issues, and other important political issues. Immigration
reforms issues, including deportation and differences between state and federal immigration
law, could be used to determine potential political aspects that determine case outcomes
regarding this issue. Using estimated models such as this, would give judicial scholars a better
understanding of the types of political aspects and variables that affect the outcome of
important political or Bill of Rights related cases decided by state supreme courts and U.S.
Courts of Appeals judges. Moreover, mainstream judicial politics studies, such as the three
completed in this work and proposed in the previous paragraphs, would certainly be a positive
addition to the literature regarding the two judicial levels and literature focusing on judicial
decision-making.
A fourth research implication is that the findings in Chapter Two affirmed what E.E.
Schattschneider argued more than fifty years ago. According to Schattschneider, the
American democratic system was comprised of many competing interest groups, and that the
pressure system where these interest groups compete was biased toward the wealthiest groups.
The range of the pressure group system was amazingly narrow, and the system spoke with an
“upper-class bias.”1 In Chapter Two, Second Amendment cause lawyers and interest groups
that had more resources were able to employ more people to search of cases, utilize more
litigation strategies, have larger legal teams, and possess more avenues for organizational
funding. According to those respondents who did not have significant resources, often times
they were forced to complete many of these litigation tasks by themselves or with only limited
help. This is at least some clear proof of Marc Galanter’s the “haves come out ahead” thesis.
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In the piece, Galanter argued that “repeat players”, known as the “haves”, anticipate having
repeated litigation, and thus have more resources than the “one shotter”, known as the “havenots”.2
Second Amendment cause lawyers who worked as gun rights and gun control lawyers
were found that they actual participate and coordinate/networking in similar manners. This
finding was particularly interesting in that both groups are fighting for very different issues,
yet they decide to take cases, coordinate with other groups, and network with other groups in a
comparable fashion. In particular, several gun rights lawyers and gun control lawyers reported
that they had local chapter case referrals, had central search team referrals, and intervened on
appeal. Both gun rights and gun control lawyers reported that they coordinated with both state
and national groups.
The issue of litigation success was a bit different. From the study, cause lawyers
affiliated with national level interest groups obviously had more success than local or state
interests simply because of the level of resources they had at their disposal. However, local
and state groups still were able to prevail under several circumstances. For instance, local gun
control interests in the state of Colorado were very successful in getting the state gun-show
loophole overturned because of the public will following the Columbine High School
shootings of the late 1990s. SAFE Colorado had limited funds, yet they were able to
sufficiently buoy public support in favor of their litigation. In other instances, local cause
lawyers were able to help individuals who were less fortunate beat firearms related charges.
In several of cases, the local group had more resources than groups from other states. The
cause lawyers who brought and argued these cases seemed to be meticulous in preparation,
paid close attention to detail, and possessed impressive persuasive skills.
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Another implication would be that the findings in Chapter Two could potentially be
used to explain the behavior of interest group cause lawyers working on behalf of other
politically-important issues being litigated in judicial levels below the U.S. Supreme Court. A
large amount of research has been focused on the cause lawyering of the African-American
civil rights movement, the gay rights movement, and other disparate groups. However, little
work has been published regarding civil liberties related groups, such as those associated with
the Second Amendment. Not only does the study completed in Chapter Two outline the legal
participation, litigation strategies, court venue-shopping, coordination/networking, and
organizational structure of gun rights and gun control Second Amendment interest groups, but
also at local, state, and national levels.
Although much work has been published regarding civil rights related organization,
less has been completed civil liberties groups, such as Second Amendment groups, freedom of
speech groups, and other liberties groups. Given the structure of the study completed in
Chapter Two, other civil liberties related groups could be interviewed for a similar study. An
adaptation of the questionnaire would be easy to complete and applicable to similar interest
group cause lawyering literature. Groups supporting free speech have been active litigants in
the courts regarding First Amendment issues. The study framework established in Chapter
Two would be easily manipulated so as to consider the structure, performance, and output of
other civil liberties related interest groups.
1

Schattschneider, E.E. (1960). The Semi-Sovereign People; A Realist’s View of Democracy in America. Stamford,
CT: Wadsworth Publishing, p. 38-112.
2

Galanter, M. (1974). Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead; Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change. Law &
Society Review 9, 1: p. 95-160.
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Appendix A
Interview Participants and Relevant Demographic Information from Chapter Two
Respondent
One
Two
Three
Four
Five
Six
Seven
Eight
Nine
Ten
Eleven
Twelve
Thirteen
Fourteen
Fifteen
Sixteen
Seventeen
Eighteen
Nineteen
Twenty
Twenty-One

Cause Lawyer Type
Gun Rights
Gun Rights
Gun Rights
Gun Control
Gun Rights
Gun Rights
Gun Control
Gun Control
Gun Control
Gun Rights
Gun Rights
Gun Control
Gun Control
Gun Rights
Gun Control
Gun Rights
Gun Control
Gun Rights
Gun Control
Gun Control
Gun Rights

Funding Level
Low
High
High
High
Moderate
Moderate
Low
Moderate
Moderate
High
High
High
High
High
Low
Low
Moderate
High
High
High
Moderate
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Interest Group Scope
Local
National
National
National
State
State
Local
State
State
National
National
National
National
National
Local
Local
State
National
National
National
State

Appendix B
Interest Group Cause Lawyer Interview Questions Used in Chapter Two
A. Introduction
a. Do you mind if I use your name in my report?
b. Do you mind if I tape this telephone interview?
c. Do you agree with what the interest group you work for/worked for stands for
from a philosophical standpoint?
i. If so, have you always supported the interest group philosophically?
ii. Does your level of support for your interest group change based on
positions that they take on certain issues?
iii. If so, what types of issues make you re-think your levels of support?
B. Participation
a. How do Second Amendment cases get to you and your legal team?
i. Are cases referred to you from local interest group chapters, as the
NAACP does?
ii. Does your legal team employ a central team that searches for cases to be
litigated?
iii. Does your litigation team intervene in cases on appeal?
1. If so, how do trial court actions affect the appeal?
2. How are further legal actions pursued?
3. What is the trigger for legal intervention?
b. How does your legal team decide to participate/litigate in certain Second
Amendment cases?
c. Are there any Second Amendment issue-based cases that you would refuse to
participate in?
i. If so, what types of issue-based cases would you always refuse to
participate in?
ii. Are there specific issue-based cases that you would always accept
participation in, if asked?
d. What is the single most important factor, such as changing an unjust law, making
legal and constitutional history, taking a legal stand, ensuring constitutional
standards, or others, that determines your participation in certain cases?
i. What others factors are foremost in your mind when deciding to
participate in certain cases?
ii. Do you and your legal team have full say over the types of cases that you
participate in?
iii. If not, then who else has a say in the types of cases that you participate in?
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C. Litigation Strategies
a. What litigation strategies, such as amicus curiae, test cases, financial support of
litigants, and other strategies, have you found to be most productive during
litigation of Second Amendment cases?
i. How important are amicus curiae briefs for your legal team’s litigation
strategy?
ii. How important is the litigation of test cases for your legal team’s litigation
strategy?
iii. How important is the financial support of litigants for your legal team’s
litigation strategy?
b. What litigation strategies have you found to be least productive during litigation
of Second Amendment cases?
i. Have these unproductive litigation strategies forced you change the way
you were going to litigate before, during, or after a Second Amendment
case?
ii. Why do you think this litigation strategy that was least productive for your
interest group was unsuccessful?
c. Has your legal team’s litigation strategy changed over time?
i. What types of legal situations have caused your legal team to change
litigation strategies?
ii. Please explain how your legal team’s litigation strategy choice has
evolved in your time working for your interest group.
d. What level of influence does the opposing legal counsel have over your legal
team’s choice of litigation strategies and tactics?
i. What level of influence do judicial attitudes have over your legal team’s
choice of litigation strategies and tactics?
ii. How has the text of existing law shaped your choice of litigation strategy
and tactics?
iii. Have aspects of legislative or executive politics and policy preferences
influenced your choice of litigation strategy and tactics?
iv. Have legal experts or any form of social or scientific evidence affected
your choice of litigation strategy or tactics?
D. Venue-Shopping
a. When litigating Second Amendment cases, does your legal team shop for court
venues?
i. If so, does your legal team you favor a certain level of the state or federal
judiciary?
1. In the state court system, does your legal team shop for venues
between urban or rural jurisdictions?
2. In the federal court system, does your legal team shop for court
venues between urban or rural jurisdictions?
3. In diversity cases, does your legal team decide to favor a certain
party’s state court or federal district?
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a. If so, how/why?
b. If not, why?
ii. How much of a factor is venue choice when deciding where to bring
Second Amendment litigation?
iii. What are the chief reasons behind shopping for a potential court venue?
b. Does your litigation strategy change depending on the venue selected in which
your litigation is brought?
i. If so, how?
ii. If not, why?
E. Coordination/Networking
a. In your capacity as an interest group lawyer, did you coordinate with other
interest groups when trying a case?
i. If so, what types of groups?
ii. If so, what groups did you coordinate with?
iii. If so, what level of coordination existed between interest groups, group
legal counsels, or legal teams?
b. Does your interest group have both state and national organizations?
i. If so, what level of coordination existed between the levels of your
organization?
ii. Who normally takes the lead when your interest group is trying a case in
state courts?
iii. Who normally takes the lead when your interest group is trying a case in
federal courts?
c. Does your organization network with similar state and national organizations?
i. What types of interdependencies (friendship, kinship, common interest,
financial exchange, dislike, or relationships of beliefs, knowledge or
prestige) connects your interest group to other similar interest groups?
ii. To what degree does interest group networking help to litigate cases?
iii. Does networking effect the patterns of litigation that can be seen in
Second Amendment cases (i.e.: topical cases, such as federal or state gun
bans)?
F. Organization
a. Is organization an important part of your day-to-day activities?
i. How integral is your legal team to the day-to-day activities of the interest
group?
ii. Is litigation a focal point of your interest groups mission?
b. How is your legal team organized?
i. Does your interest group employ its own internal legal counsel (unions do
this)?
ii. Does your interest group have an adjunct legal organization, such as
NAACP Legal Defense Fund and other models?
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c.

d.

e.

f.

iii. Does your interest group rely on a group devoted to legal change for its
counsel, such as the Pacific Legal Defense Fund’s support of pro-business
causes and pursuing anti-affirmative action policies?
iv. Does your interest group ever use pro bono legal counsel?
v. Does your interest group ever hire outside legal counsel?
vi. Is there any other information that your would like to share with me
regarding the organization of your interest group’s legal team?
How organized is your interest group’s legal team?
i. What types of people make up your legal team?
ii. What types of personal and professional backgrounds does your legal team
possess?
iii. How many Second Amendment cases has your legal team litigated
together?
iv. How many Second Amendment cases has your legal team litigated all
together?
v. What types of topical cases has your legal team litigated?
What types of organizational strategies does your legal team employ?
i. Does your legal team have a vision for litigation on future cases and
issues?
ii. If so, what types of issues would you be most likely to focus on?
How is your interest group’s legal team funded?
i. Does your legal team receive funding from mass membership drives?
ii. Does your legal team receive funding from a few contributors?
iii. Does your legal team receive funding from corporations?
Why do you think gun groups are more likely to use the court system rather than
to seek legislation that advances their policy aims?
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Appendix C
Second Amendment State Supreme Court Cases Surveyed for Chapter Three
Case Name

Year

State

Anderson v. Maryland
A.P.E. v. Colorado
Arizona v. Belcher
Arizona v. Doyle, Jr.
Arizona v. Rascon
Arnold v. City of Cleveland
Artis v. Virginia
Bailleaux v. Gladden
Balentine v. Arkansas
Baron v. New Jersey
Bearden v. City of Boulder
Beason v. Kentucky
Benjamin v. Bailey
Bergeson v. Georgia
Bernstein v. New Jersey
Bilinski v. Delaware
Blore v. Mossey
Blumenauer v. Keisling
Blumenfeld v. Codd
Boston Housing Authority v. Guirola
Brewer v. Georgia
Bristow v. Alabama
Brown v. Wyoming
Burton v. Sills
Busch v. Maryland
CA Rifle and Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of West Hollywood
California v. Bland
California v. King
Carfield v. Wyoming
Carson v. Georgia
Castillo v. Texas
CBS, Inc. v. Block
Chenault v. Georgia
Chimel v. California
City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corporation
City of Chicago v. Taylor

1992
2001
1975
1977
1974
1993
1972
1962
1976
1971
1973
1977
1995
2000
1971
1990
1976
1992
1977
1991
2006
1982
1979
1968
1981
1998
1995
1978
1982
1978
1967
1986
1975
1969
2002
2002

Maryland
Colorado
Arizona
Arizona
Arizona
Ohio
Virginia
Oregon
Arkansas
New Jersey
Nevada
Kentucky
Connecticut
Georgia
New Jersey
Delaware
Minnesota
Oregon
New York
Massachusetts
Georgia
Alabama
Wyoming
New Jersey
Maryland
California
California
California
Wyoming
Georgia
Texas
California
Georgia
California
Illinois
Illinois
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City of Junction City v. Lee
City of Lakewood v. Pillow
City of Las Vegas v. Moberg
City of Portland v. Lodi
City of Princeton v. Buckner
City of St. Paul v. Azzone
Coalition of New Jersey Sportsmen, Inc. v. Whitman
Cobb v. Georgia
Colorado v. Blue
Colorado v. Brown
Colorado v. Ford
Colorado v. Garcia
Colorado v. Taylor
Colorado v. Ulibarri
Davis v. Florida
Des Moines Register & Tribune Co. v. Hildreth
Disciplinary Counsel v. LoDico
Doe v. Portland Housing Authority
Dolph v. Oklahoma
Douglass v. Kelton
Eary v. Kentucky
Estate of Heck v. Stoffer
Ex parte Lancaster
Ex parte Portis
Farrakhan v. Virginia
Foote v. Mississippi State Bar Association
Ford v. Texas
Fryar v. Oklahoma County
Fuller v. Wyoming
Gaber v. Florida
Gabrielle v. Alaska
Galvan v. Superior Court of San Francisco
Garcia v. Indiana
Gardner v. Jenkins
Gilio v. Oklahoma
Gooden v. Board of Appeals of the WV Dept. of Public Safety
Green v. Green
Grimm v. New York City
Hampton v. Thurmand
Hand v. Nevada
Harris v. Nevada
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1975
1972
1971
1989
1988
1970
1999
2008
1975
1975
1977
1979
1975
1975
1962
1970
2008
1995
1974
1980
1983
2003
1973
1982
2007
1987
1993
1969
1977
1996
2007
1969
1973
1988
2001
1977
1997
1968
1981
1991
1967

Kansas
Colorado
New Mexico
Oregon
West Virginia
Minnesota
New Jersey
Georgia
Colorado
Colorado
Colorado
Colorado
Colorado
Colorado
Florida
Iowa
Ohio
Maine
Oklahoma
Colorado
Kentucky
Indiana
Texas
Alabama
Virginia
Mississippi
Texas
Oklahoma
Wyoming
Florida
Alaska
California
Indiana
Pennsylvania
Oklahoma
West Virginia
Delaware
New York
Missouri
Nevada
Nevada

Harris v. Virginia
Hasan v. Virginia
Hawaii v. Goudy
Hawaii v. Mendoza
Hawaii v. Ogata & Sullivan
Hawaii v. Onishi
Hazel v. Texas
Hilly v. City of Portland
Hollander v. Warden Nevada State Prison
Hunt v. Daley
Hyde v. City of Birmingham
Idaho v. McNary
Iley v. Harris
In Interest of J.V.R. (J.V.R. v. Wisconsin)
In re 1969 Plymouth Roadrunner, etc.
In re Atkinson
In re Brickley
In re Cueto
In re DuBois
In re Goots
In re Metheny
In re Ramadass
In re Rinker
In re Robb
In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases--No. 2005-1
In re Thomas
In re Ware
Iowa v. Rupp
Iowa v. Werner
J.L. v. Florida
James v. Mississippi
Johnson v. Arkansas
Jones v. Arkansas
K.W. v. Florida
Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove
Kansas v. Davis
Kansas v. Porter, Green, and Smith
Kasler v. Lockyer
Kellogg v. City of Gary
King v. Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation
Klein v. Leis
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2001
2008
1971
1996
1977
1972
1976
1990
1970
1997
1980
1979
1977
1985
1970
1980
1982
1990
1968
1990
1990
1971
1990
1998
2007
1981
1984
1979
1970
1998
1999
1998
1993
1996
1984
1985
1980
2000
1990
2004
2003

Virginia
Virginia
Hawaii
Hawaii
Hawaii
Hawaii
Texas
Maine
Nevada
Illinois
Alabama
Idaho
Florida
Wisconsin
Missouri
Minnesota
Idaho
West Virginia
Nevada
West Virginia
West Virginia
Pennsylvania
West Virginia
Mississippi
Florida
Maine
Delaware
Iowa
Iowa
Florida
Mississippi
Arkansas
Arkansas
Florida
Illinois
Kansas
Kansas
California
Indiana
Wyoming
Ohio

Knowles v. Langlois
Kolokouris v. Georgia
LaBate v. New Jersey
Landers v. Georgia
Lansdown v. Virginia
Lehman v. Pennsylvania State Police
Lightfoot v. Maryland
Louisiana v. Amos
Louisiana v. Blanchard
Louisiana v. Hamlin
Louisiana v. Landry
Louisiana v. Reddix
Louisiana v. Robinson
Louisiana v. Sanders
Louisiana v. Sandifer
Louisiana v. Wiggins
Louisiana v. Williams
M.P. v. Florida
Mackall v. Maryland
Maine v. Brown
Maine v. Friel
Maine v. Goodno
Maryland v. Crawford
Massachusetts v. Alvarado
Massachusetts v. Davis
Massachusetts v. Johnson
Massachusetts v. Wilson
Masters v. Texas
Matthews v. Indiana
McGuire v. Texas
McKenna v. Nevada
Mecikalski v. Office of the Attorney General
Metzger v. Metzger
Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Lansing
Michigan v. Alexander
Michigan v. Beauregard
Michigan v. Brintley
Michigan v. Henderson
Michigan v. Johnson
Michigan v. McDonald
Michigan v. McFadden
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1960
1999
1971
1983
1983
2003
1976
1977
2001
1986
1977
1986
1977
1978
1996
1983
1999
1996
1978
1990
1986
1986
1987
1996
1976
1992
2004
1985
1960
1976
1982
2000
1987
1985
1979
1970
1979
1974
1981
1968
1971

Rhode Island
Georgia
New Jersey
Georgia
Virginia
Pennsylvania
Maryland
Louisiana
Louisiana
Louisiana
Louisiana
Louisiana
Louisiana
Louisiana
Louisiana
Louisiana
Louisiana
Florida
Maryland
Maine
Maine
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Massachusetts
Massachusetts
Massachusetts
Texas
Indiana
Texas
Nevada
Wyoming
Pennsylvania
Michigan
Michigan
Michigan
Michigan
Michigan
Michigan
Michigan
Michigan

Michigan v. Nix
Michigan v. Panknin
Michigan v. Robinson
Michigan v. Smelter
Michigan v. Tavolacci
Milligan v. Texas
Minnesota v. Paige
Missouri v. Booker
Missouri v. Bordeaux
Missouri v. Whitworth
Mohammad v. Kentucky
Montana v. Bar-Jonah
Montana v. Broken Rope
Montana v. Guillaume
Montana v. Krantz
Montana v. Smith
Moosani v. Texas
Morgan v. Town of Heidelberg
Mosely v. Kentucky
Mosher v. City of Dayton
Nebraska v. Comeau
Nebraska v. LaChapelle
Nebraska v. Rush
New Hampshire v. Beckert
New Hampshire v. Fox
New Hampshire v. Sanne
New Hampshire v. Smith
New Hampshire v. Taylor
New Jersey v. Nelson
New Mexico v. Dees
New York v. King
New York v. Moore
New York v. Pugach
Nicholas v. Wisconsin
Nichols v. Keisling
North Carolina v. Dawson
North Carolina v. Fennell
North Dakota v. Chaussee
North Dakota v. Ricehill
O'Brien v. Keegan
O'Connor v. Scarpino
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1987
1966
1978
1989
1981
1977
1977
1982
1960
1986
2006
2004
1996
1999
1990
2000
1995
1963
1964
1976
1989
1990
1989
1999
2004
1976
1990
1976
1998
1983
1985
1973
1964
1971
1992
1968
1989
1965
1987
1996
1994

Michigan
Michigan
Michigan
Michigan
Michigan
Texas
Minnesota
Missouri
Missouri
Missouri
Kentucky
Montana
Montana
Montana
Montana
Montana
Texas
Mississippi
Kentucky
Ohio
Nebraska
Nebraska
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Hampshire
New Hampshire
New Hampshire
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
New York
New York
Wisconsin
Oregon
North Carolina
North Carolina
North Dakota
North Dakota
New York
New York

Office Disciplinary Counsel v. Cushion
Ohio v. Waldbillig
Oklahoma v. Warren
Oregon v. Blocker
Oregon v. Cartwright
Oregon v. Delgado
Oregon v. Hash
Oregon v. Kessler
Oregon v. Krogness
Oregon v. Smoot
Ozenna v. Alaska
Pagel v. Franscell
Pennsylvania v. Cartagena
Pennsylvania v. Hawkins
Pennsylvania v. Ray
Perez v. Virginia
Posey v. Kentucky
Pruitt v. Virginia
Rainey & Harton v. Hartness
Reilly v. New Jersey
Rhode Island v. Storms
Rinzler v. Carson
Robertson v. City & County of Denver
Robinson v. Howard Bros. of Jackson, Inc.
Runo v. Texas
Sardis v. Second Judicial District Court
Savior v. Georgia
Schaaf v. Virginia
Sheppard v. Texas
Short v. Delaware
Siccardi v. New Jersey
Simmons v. Virginia
Simonton v. Huiskamp
Smith v. County of Missoula
Smith v. Delaware
South Carolina v. Mitchum
South Carolina v. Muller
South Carolina v. Spinks
South Dakota v. Coe
Spurrier v. Maryland
St. John v. Tennessee
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2001
1964
1998
1981
1966
1984
1978
1980
1963
1989
1980
2002
1978
1997
1970
2007
2006
2007
1999
1971
1973
1972
1994
1979
1977
1969
2008
1979
1979
1991
1971
1977
1964
1999
2005
1972
1984
1973
1979
1962
1972

Ohio
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Oregon
Oregon
Oregon
Oregon
Oregon
Oregon
Alaska
Wyoming
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania
Virginia
Kentucky
Virginia
Arkansas
New Jersey
Rhode Island
Florida
Colorado
Mississippi
Texas
Nevada
Georgia
Virginia
Texas
Delaware
New Jersey
Virginia
Iowa
Montana
Delaware
South Carolina
South Carolina
South Carolina
South Dakota
Maryland
Tennessee

Superintendent of Police v. Freedom of Information Comm.
Suter v. City of LaFayette
Tennessee v. McDowell
Texas v. Trujillo
US v. Brooks
Utah v. Beorchia
Utah v. Garfield
Utah v. Hansen
Van Der Hule v. Mukasey
Vermont v. Duranleau
Washington v. Eker
Washington v. Mak
Washington v. Sabala
Washington v. Schelin
Washington v. Tongate
Wayne County Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge
Webb v. Texas
Williams v. Oklahoma
Wilson v. Cook County
Wisconsin v. Chambers
Wisconsin v. Fry
Wisconsin v. Kerr
Wisconsin v. Medrano
Wisconsin v. Williamson
Wisconsin v. Wisumierski
Wright v. City of Anchorage
Wyoming v. McAdams

1992
1997
1978
1972
1995
1974
1976
1968
2009
1969
1985
1986
1986
2002
1980
1979
1969
1977
2009
1972
1986
1994
1978
1983
1982
1979
1986

Connecticut
California
Tennessee
Texas
Montana
Utah
Utah
Utah
Montana
Vermont
Washington
Washington
Washington
Washington
Washington
Michigan
Texas
Oklahoma
Illinois
Wisconsin
Wisconsin
Wisconsin
Wisconsin
Wisconsin
Wisconsin
Alaska
Wyoming

Zanders v. Anderson

1996

Ohio
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Appendix D
Second Amendment United States Court of Appeals Cases Surveyed for Chapter Four

Case Name
Akins v. US
American Arms International v. Herbert
Article II Gun Shop, Inc. v. Gonzales
Bach v. Pataki

Year
2009
2009
2006
2005

Appellate
Circuit
11th
4th
7th
2nd

Baranski v. Fifteen Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of
A.T.F.
Bastible v. Weyerhaeuser Co.
Blaustein & Reich, Inc. v. Buckles
Camden County Bd. Of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta
Casanova Guns, Inc. v. Connally
City of Chicago v. United States Dept. of Treasury
City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.
Cody v. US
CT Coastal Fishermen's Assoc. v. Remington Arms Co., Inc.
Dick's Sporting Center, Inc. v. Alexander
Eckert v. City of Philadelphia, PA
Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, NC
Egan v. City of Aurora, IL
Farmer v. Higgins
Forrest v. Florida Department of Corrections
Fresno Rifle and Pistol Club v. Van De Kamp
Gardner v. Vespia
Georgiacarry.org, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, GA
Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis
Gun Owners' Action League v. Swift
Gun South, Inc. v. Brady
Hamblen v. US
Haymond v. Hall
HC Gun & Knife Shows, Inc. v. City of Houston
Hickman v. Block
Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, WV
Hunter v. US
Ileto v. Glock, Inc.
In re Shaffaat
In re Weitzman

2006
2006
2004
2001
1972
2005
2008
1972
1993
2007
1973
1999
1960
1990
2009
1992
2001
2009
1999
2002
1989
2009
2009
2000
1996
1996
1996
2009
1998
1970

6th
10th
4th
3rd
7th
7th
2nd
8th
2nd
6th
3rd
4th
7th
11th
11th
9th
1st
11th
7th
1st
11th
6th
11th
5th
9th
4th
9th
9th
4th
8th
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Jackson v. County of Marlboro Board Of Commissioners
Jennings v. Mukasey
Johnson v. Acevedo
Justice v. Elrod
Justice v. Town of Cicero, IL
Kwan v. Federal Bureau of A.T.F.
Love v. Pepersack
Maloney v. Cuomo
McCoy v. Newsome
McGrath v. US
Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan
Milwaukee Gun Club v. Schulz

1997
2007
2009
1987
2009
2007
1995
2009
1992
1995
1991
1992

4th
9th
7th
7th
7th
9th
4th
2nd
11th
2nd
6th
7th

Morgan v. Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms
National Rifle Association of America v. Brady
National Rifle Association of America v. Magaw
New Banner Institute, Inc. v. Dickerson
Nordyke v. King

2007
1990
1997
1980
2009

6th
4th
6th
4th
9th

Northern Indiana Gun & Outdoor Shows v. City of South Bend,
IN
NRA of America v. City of Chicago and Village of Oak Park, IL
NRA of America v. Handgun Control Federation of OH
Ohntrup v. Firearms Center, Inc.
Olympic Arms v. Buckles
On Target Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Attorney General of the US
People's Rights Organization, Inc. v. City of Columbus, OH
Perkins v. F.I.E. Corporation
Plona v. UPS, Inc.
Presley v. US
Procaccio v. Lambert
Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove
Rafferty v. US
Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry
Richmond Boro Gun Club, Inc. v. City of New York
Rowlands v. Pointe Mouille Shooting Club
RSM, Inc. v. Buckles
San Diego County Gun Rights Committee v. Reno
Silveira v. Lockyear

1998
2009
1994
1985
2002
2007
1998
1984
2009
1988
2007
1982
1973
2009
1996
1999
2001
1996
2002

7th
7th
6th
3rd
6th
8th
6th
5th
6th
8th
6th
7th
5th
2nd
2nd
6th
4th
9th
9th

Sipes v. US

1963

8th

Sklar v. Byrne
Springfield Armory, Inc. v. City of Columbus
Stevens v. US

1984
1994
1971

7th
6th
6th
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The General Store, Inc. v. Van Loan
Thomas v. City Council of Portland, ME
Thomas v. New England Firearms Co.
Thompson v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
Tomas v. Holder

2009
1984
1994
1964
2009

9th
1st
10th
7th
7th

US v. 16,179 Molso Italian .22 Caliber Winlee Derringer
Convertible Starter Guns
US v. Ardoin
US v. Arrington
US v. Barry
US v. Bass
US v. Battle
US v. Beavers
US v. Bergeman
US v. Berry
US v. Beuckelaere
US v. Billue
US v. Bostic
US v. Bournes
US v. Cabbler
US v. Cardoza
US v. Cassidy
US v. Chesney
US v. Clarke
US v. Coleman
US v. Cooper
US v. Corliss
US v. Currier
US v. Dahms
US v. Dalton
US v. Daniels
US v. DeBerry
US v. Driscoll
US v. Elliott
US v. Emerson
US v. Engesser
US v. Essick
US v. Evans
US v. Farmer
US v. Farrell
US v. Frechette

1971
1994
1980
1996
1970
2009
2000
1979
1992
1996
1993
1998
2003
1970
1997
1990
1996
2000
1983
2009
1960
1980
1991
1992
1970
1996
1992
1997
2001
1986
1991
1991
1993
1995
2006

2nd
5th
5th
8th
2nd
11th
6th
9th
5th
6th
11th
4th
6th
4th
1st
6th
6th
7th
9th
4th
2nd
1st
9th
10th
9th
7th
6th
8th
5th
9th
4th
9th
4th
8th
1st
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US v. Friel
US v. Fryer
US v. Glover
US v. Gomez
US v. Gooden
US v. Gravenmeir
US v. Graves
US v. Gray
US v. Great Guns, Inc.
US v. Griley
US v. Grinkiewicz
US v. Hager
US v. Hale
US v. Hale
US v. Hall
US v. Hamm
US v. Haney
US v. Hanna
US v. Harkrider
US v. Hemmings
US v. Herrell
US v. Hinostroza
US v. Jackson
US v. Jackubowski
US v. Johnson
US v. Johnson
US v. Jones
US v. Kafka
US v. Kenney
US v. Kirk
US v. Klebig
US v. Knutson
US v. Kolter
US v. Lawton
US v. Luna
US v. Mack
US v. Mastrangelo
US v. Matassini
US v. McLean
US v. Meade
US v. Meza-Corrales
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1993
1976
2005
1990
2009
1997
1977
1982
2001
1987
1989
2001
1992
1992
1996
2005
2001
1995
1996
2001
1978
2002
2007
2003
1974
1971
1992
2000
1996
1995
2009
1997
1988
2004
1999
1999
1984
1978
1990
1999
1999

1st
6th
11th
9th
7th
9th
3rd
5th
9th
4th
11th
4th
8th
8th
11th
11th
10th
9th
5th
7th
9th
9th
11th
7th
4th
5th
4th
9th
7th
5th
7th
5th
11th
7th
5th
9th
11th
5th
4th
1st
9th

US v. Michael R.
US v. Minnick

1996
1991

9th
1st

US v. Miscellaneous Firearms, Explosives, Destructive
Devices, & Ammunition
US v. Mitchell
US v. Napier
US v. Nelson
US v. Nelson

2009
2000
2000
1983
1993

7th
4th
6th
9th
8th

US v. Ninety-Three Firearms & Assorted Firearm Parts and
Ammunition
US v. Nix
US v. Oakes
US v. Oliver
US v. Paz
US v. Pearson
US v. Pelusio
US v. Peters
US v. Potts
US v. Price
US v. Purgason
US v. Rambo
US v. Ramos
US v. Reavis
US v. Reddick
US v. Rene E.
US v. Rivera
US v. Rose
US v. Ross
US v. Rybar
US v. Salamone
US v. Scanio
US v. Seven Firearms and Ammunition
US v. Seventeen Firearms and 3,005 Rounds of Ammunition
US v. Skoien
US v. Smith
US v. Smith
US v. Sorrentino
US v. Sweeting
US v. Synnes
US v. Taylor
US v. Thirty-Five Firearms

2003
2006
1977
1994
1991
1993
1983
2005
1975
2003
1977
1996
1992
1995
2000
2009
1995
1982
1993
1996
1986
1998
2004
2006
2009
1991
1999
1995
1991
1971
1971
2005

6th
11th
10th
11th
4th
8th
2nd
11th
9th
7th
4th
9th
1st
4th
10th
1st
11th
10th
7th
3rd
3rd
2nd
8th
6th
7th
1st
8th
2nd
11th
8th
8th
6th
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US v. Thomas
US v. Thomas

1993
1978

5th
5th

US v. Three Winchester 30-30 Caliber Lever Action Carbines
US v. Throneburg
US v. Tinker
US v. Tous
US v. Turner
US v. Waller
US v. Warin
US v. Wesela
US v. Whitfield
US v. Whitman
US v. Wihbey
US v. Wiley
US v. Wilks
US v. Williams
US v. Wilson
US v. Wilson
US v. Winchester
US v. Wright
US v. Wright
US v. Ziskowski
Williams v. Beemiller, Inc.
Wyoming ex. Rel. Crank v. US

1974
1990
1992
1972
1996
2000
1976
2000
1990
1996
1996
1971
1995
1971
1971
1998
1990
1997
1981
1972
2008
2008

7th
6th
6th
9th
6th
8th
6th
7th
8th
1st
1st
8th
10th
5th
6th
7th
11th
11th
8th
3rd
2nd
10th

York v. Secretary of the Treasury

1985

10th
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Appendix E
Randomly Selected Second Amendment State Supreme Court Cases;
Used to Establish Inter-coder Reliability for Chapter Three
Case Title
Anderson v. Maryland
Arizona v. Rascon
Bilinski v. Delaware
Burton v. Sills
Busch v. Maryland
City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corporation
City of St. Paul v. Azzone
Colorado v. Blue
Colorado v. Brown
Colorado v. Ford
Colorado v. Garcia
Colorado v. Taylor
Colorado v. Ulibarri
Davis v. Florida
Douglass v. Kelton
Foote v. Mississippi State Bar Association
Green v. Green
Grimm v. New York City
Hawaii v. Mendoza
Hunt v. Daley
Iley v. Harris
In re Robb
In re Thomas
Jones v. Arkansas
Knowles v. Langlois
Landers v. Georgia
Lehman v. Pennsylvania State Police
Lightfoot v. Maryland
Louisiana v. Amos
Louisiana v. Blanchard
Louisiana v. Hamlin
Louisiana v. Reddix
Mackall v. Maryland
Maryland v. Crawford
Massachusetts v. Alvarado
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Year
1992
1974
1990
1968
1981
2002
1970
1975
1975
1977
1979
1975
1975
1962
1980
1987
1997
1968
1996
1997
1977
1998
1981
1993
1960
1983
2003
1976
1977
2001
1986
1986
1978
1987
1996

State
Maryland
Arizona
Delaware
New Jersey
Maryland
Illinois
Minnesota
Colorado
Colorado
Colorado
Colorado
Colorado
Colorado
Florida
Colorado
Mississippi
Delaware
New York
Hawaii
Illinois
Florida
Mississippi
Maine
Arkansas
Rhode Island
Georgia
Pennsylvania
Maryland
Louisiana
Louisiana
Louisiana
Louisiana
Maryland
Maryland
Massachusetts

Massachusetts v. Johnson
Massachusetts v. Wilson
Masters v. Texas
Missouri v. Whitworth
Morgan v. Town of Heidelberg
Mosher v. City of Dayton
Pennsylvania v. Cartagena
Posey v. Kentucky
Rainey & Harton v. Hartness
Rinzler v. Carson
Robertson v. City & County of Denver
Short v. Delaware
Smith v. Delaware
Spurrier v. Maryland
Superintendent of Police v. Freedom of Information
Comm.
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1992
2004
1985
1986
1963
1976
1978
2006
1999
1972
1994
1991
2005
1962

Massachusetts
Massachusetts
Texas
Missouri
Mississippi
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Kentucky
Arkansas
Florida
Colorado
Delaware
Delaware
Maryland

1992

Connecticut

Appendix F
Randomly Selected Second Amendment United States Courts of Appeals Cases;
Used to Establish Inter-coder Reliability for Chapter Four

Case Title
American Arms International v. Herbert
Article II Gun Shop, Inc. v. Gonzales

Year
2009
2006

Appellate
Circuit
4th
7th

Baranski v. Fifteen Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms
Blaustein & Reich, Inc. v. Buckles

2006
2004

6th
4th

Camden County Bd. Of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta
Casanova Guns, Inc. v. Connally
City of Chicago v. United States Dept. of Treasury
CT Coastal Fishermen's Assoc. v. Remington Arms Co., Inc.
Dick's Sporting Center, Inc. v. Alexander
Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, NC
Egan v. City of Aurora, IL
Fresno Rifle and Pistol Club v. Van De Kamp
Georgiacarry.org, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, GA
Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis
Gun Owners' Action League v. Swift
HC Gun & Knife Shows, Inc. v. City of Houston
Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, WV
In re Shaffaat
Jackson v. County of Marlboro Board Of Commissioners
Jennings v. Mukasey
Justice v. Town of Cicero, IL
Kwan v. Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms
Maloney v. Cuomo
Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan
Milwaukee Gun Club v. Schulz

2001
1972
2005
1993
2007
1999
1960
1992
2009
1999
2002
2000
1996
1998
1997
2007
2009
2007
2009
1991
1992

3rd
7th
7th
2nd
6th
4th
7th
9th
11th
7th
1st
5th
4th
4th
4th
9th
7th
9th
2nd
6th
7th

Morgan v. Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms
National Rifle Association of America v. Brady
New Banner Institute, Inc. v. Dickerson
Nordyke v. King

2007
1990
1980
2009

6th
4th
4th
9th

Northern Indiana Gun & Outdoor Shows v. City of South
Bend, IN

1998

7th

NRA of America v. City of Chicago and Village of Oak Park,
IL

2009

7th
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NRA of America v. Handgun Control Federation of OH
Ohntrup v. Firearms Center, Inc.
Olympic Arms v. Buckles

1994
1985
2002

6th
3rd
6th

On Target Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Attorney General of the
US
Perkins v. F.I.E. Corporation
Procaccio v. Lambert
Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry
Rowlands v. Pointe Mouille Shooting Club
RSM, Inc. v. Buckles
The General Store, Inc. v. Van Loan
Thomas v. New England Firearms Co.
Thompson v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
Tomas v. Holder

2007
1984
2007
2009
1999
2001
2009
1994
1964
2009

8th
5th
6th
2nd
6th
4th
9th
10th
7th
7th

US v. 16,179 Molso Italian .22 Caliber Winlee Derringer
Convertible Starter Guns
US v. Great Guns, Inc.

1971
2001

2nd
9th

US v. Miscellaneous Firearms, Explosives, Destructive
Devices, & Ammunition

2009

7th

US v. Ninety-Three Firearms & Assorted Firearm Parts and
Ammunition
US v. Seven Firearms and Ammunition
US v. Seventeen Firearms and 3,005 Rounds of Ammunition
US v. Thirty-Five Firearms

2003
2004
2006
2005

6th
8th
6th
6th
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Appendix G
Research Hypotheses
Chapter Two; Second Amendment Interest Group Leaders and Lawyers
H1: There will be clear differences between gun rights and gun control interest groups with
regard to legal participation.
H2: There will be clear differences between gun rights and gun control interest groups with
regard to litigation strategies.
H3: There will be clear differences between gun rights and gun control interest groups with
regard to judicial venue-shopping.
H4: There will be clear differences between gun rights and gun control interest groups with
regard to legal coordination and networking.
H5: There will be clear differences between gun rights and gun control interest groups with
regard to interest group organization.
H6: There will be clear differences between heavily funded and lesser funded Second
Amendment interest groups with regard to legal participation.
H7: There will be clear differences between heavily funded and lesser funded Second
Amendment interest groups with regard to litigation strategies.
H8: There will be clear differences between heavily funded and lesser funded Second
Amendment interest groups with regard to judicial venue-shopping.
H9: There will be clear differences between heavily funded and lesser funded Second
Amendment interest groups with regard to legal coordination and networking.
H10: There will be clear differences between heavily funded and lesser funded Second
Amendment interest groups with regard to interest group organization.
H11: There will be clear differences between local, state, and national Second Amendment
interest groups with regard to legal participation.
H12: There will be clear differences between local, state, and national Second Amendment
interest groups with regard to litigation strategies.
H13: There will be clear differences between local, state, and national Second Amendment
interest groups with regard to judicial venue-shopping.
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H14: There will be clear differences between local, state, and national Second Amendment
interest groups with regard to interest group coordination and networking.
H15: There will be clear differences between local, state, and national Second Amendment
interest groups with regard to interest group organization.

Chapter Three; Second Amendment Cases in State Courts of Last Resort
H1: Elected state courts of last resort increase the probability of a Second Amendment decision
that will favor gun rights.
H2: Selected or appointed state courts of last resort increase the probability of a Second
Amendment decision that will favor gun control.
H3: State courts of last resort judges affiliated with the Democratic Party increase the probability
of a Second Amendment decision that will favor gun control.
H4: State courts of last resort judges affiliated with the Republican Party increase the probability
of a Second Amendment decision that will favor gun rights.
H5: The presence of a state intermediate appellate court increase the probability that state courts
of last resort will rule in favor of gun control in Second Amendment decisions.
H6: States without an intermediate appellate court increase the probability that state courts of last
resort will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions.
H7: States with a liberal political ideology increase the probability that their state courts of last
resort will rule in favor of gun control in Second Amendment decisions.
H8: States with a conservative political ideology increase the probability that their state courts of
last resort will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions.
H9: States with high population density increase the probability that their state courts of last
resort will rule in favor of gun control in Second Amendment decisions.
H10: States with low population density increase the probability that their state courts of last
resort will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions.
H11: States with high gun ownership percentages increase the probability that their state courts of
last resort will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions.
H12: States with low gun ownership percentages increase the probability that their state courts of
last resort will rule in favor of gun control in Second Amendment decisions.
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H13: States with high homicide rates increase the probability that their state courts of last resort
will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions.
H14: States with low homicide increase the probability that their state courts of last resort will
rule in favor of gun control in Second Amendment decisions.

Chapter Four; Second Amendment Cases in U.S. Courts of Appeals
H1: U.S. Courts of Appeals panels that have a majority of judges appointed by Democratic
presidents increase the probability that the panel will rule in favor of gun control in Second
Amendment decisions.
H2: U.S. Courts of Appeals panels that have a majority of judges appointed by Republican
presidents increase the probability that the panel will rule in favor of gun rights in Second
Amendment decisions.
H3: Appellate circuits with a liberal political ideology increase the probability that their appellate
panels will rule in favor of gun control in Second Amendment decisions.
H4: Appellate circuits with a conservative political ideology increase the probability that their
appellate panels will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions.
H5: Appellate circuits with high population density increase the probability that their appellate
panels will rule in favor of gun control in Second Amendment decisions.
H6: Appellate circuits with low population density increase the probability that their appellate
panels will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions.
H7: Appellate circuits with high gun ownership percentages increase the probability that their
appellate panels will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions.
H8: Appellate circuits with low gun ownership percentages increase the probability that their
appellate panels will rule in favor of gun control in Second Amendment decisions.
H9: Appellate circuits with low homicide rates increase the probability that their appellate panels
will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions.
H10: Appellate circuits with high homicide rates increase the probability that their appellate
panels will rule in favor of gun control in Second Amendment decisions.
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APPENDIX H
Relevant State-Level Data Set Tables
State Courts of Last Resort Judicial Selection Method Changes, 1960-2009
State
Arkansas
Arizona
California
Colorado
Florida
Florida
Georgia
Iowa
Indiana
Kentucky
Maryland
Mississippi
Nebraska
New Mexico
Oklahoma
South Dakota
Tennessee
Tennessee
Tennessee
Utah

Old Selection Method
Partisan Elections
Partisan Elections
Non-Partisan Elections
Partisan Elections
Partisan Elections
Non-Partisan Elections
Partisan Elections
Partisan Elections
Partisan Elections
Partisan Elections
Partisan Elections
Partisan Elections
Partisan Elections
Partisan Elections
Partisan Elections
Non-Partisan Elections
Partisan Elections
Merit Plan Selection
Partisan Elections
Non-Partisan Elections

New Selection Method
Non-Partisan Elections
Merit Plan Selection
Merit Plan Selection
Merit Plan Selection
Non-Partisan Elections
Merit Plan Selection
Non-Partisan Elections
Merit Plan Selection
Merit Plan Selection
Non-Partisan Elections
Merit Plan Selection
Non-Partisan Elections
Merit Plan Selection
Merit Plan Selection
Merit Plan Selection
Merit Plan Selection
Merit Plan Selection
Partisan Elections
Merit Plan Selection
Merit Plan Selection

Source: the American Judicature Society.
Note: n=21 total changes.

State Courts of Last Resort Cases by Review/Ruling Type, 1960-2009
Type of Review/Ruling
En Banc Review
Per Curiam Ruling

# of Cases
20
24

Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database.
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Year
2000
1974
1979
1966
1971
1976
1983
1962
1970
1975
1970
1994
1962
1988
1967
1980
1971
1974
1994
1967

State Courts of Last Resort Judges by Majority Rulings Authored, 1960-2009
Judge Name
Walter F. Marcus, Jr.
William T. Brotherton, Jr.
Robert B. Lee
Donald W. Lemons
Thomas G. Kavanagh
William E. Hunt, Sr.
William G. Callow
Lawrence L. Koontz, Jr.
Jean A. Turnage
David Zenoff
Nathan L. Jacobs
John C. Mowbray
Masaji Marumoto
Berkeley B. Lent
Vincent L. McKusick
William A. Grimes
Leslie Boslaugh
Andrew D. Christie
John R. Dethmers

State
LA
WV
CO
VA
MI
MT
WI
VA
MT
NV
NJ
NV
HI
OR
ME
NH
NE
DE
MI

Opinions Authored
7
4
4
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Office Tenure
1973-2000
1984-1995
1969-1983
2000-Present
1969-1984
1985-2000
1977-1992
1995-Present
1985-2000
1966-1976
1952-1975
1967-1992
1959-1995
1977-1988
1977-1992
1966-1981
1961-1994
1983-1992
1946-1970

Position
Associate Justice
Associate/Chief Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Associate/Chief Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Associate/Chief Justice
Associate/Chief Justice
Associate/Chief Justice
Associate Justice
Associate/Chief Justice
Associate/Chief Justice

Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database and state judicial websites of the state in the table.
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State Supreme Court Second Amendment Rulings by Year, 1960-2009
Year
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1960s Total
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1970s Total
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

Number of Rulings
3
0
3
2
4
1
2
2
6
6
29 (10.8 percent)
7
10
8
6
4
7
10
16
9
12
89 (33.1 percent)
7
6
7
6
4
6

Year
1986
1987
1988
1989
1980s Total
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
1990s Total
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2000s Total
Total Cases

Number of Rulings
10
5
2
6
59 (21.9 percent)
11
3
5
3
3
5
9
4
6
8
57 (21.2 percent)
4
5
4
3
4
1
3
5
4
2
35 (13.0 percent)
269 (100 percent)

Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database.

This table demonstrates that more than thirty percent (33.1 percent) of all cases in the full
sample of cases were decided during the 1970s, while less than eleven percent (10.8 percent) of
the full case sample were decided during the 1960s. This finding shows that the three political
assassinations and other causation from the 1960s did bring the Second Amendment to the
forefront of American political thought as people fought for their perceived to right to bear arms
in a society that continued to see the Second Amendment as a collective, instead of an individual
right.
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State Supreme Court 2nd Amendment Rulings by State, 1960-2009
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

Gun
Rights
Rulings
3
3
0
3
1
3
0
0
4
5
0
2
0
3
0
3
2
10
1
0
0
4
1
5
4

Gun
Control
Rulings
0
0
3
1
7
7
2
5
4
3
4
0
5
1
3
0
3
0
5
6
5
10
3
0
1

Total
Rulings
3
3
3
4
8
10
2
5
8
8
4
2
5
4
3
3
5
10
6
6
5
14
4
5
5

Gun
Rights
Rulings
Montana
5
Nebraska
3
Nevada
3
New Hampshire 2
New Jersey
0
New Mexico
1
New York
1
North Carolina
2
North Dakota
2
Ohio
4
Oklahoma
5
Oregon
3
Pennsylvania
2
Rhode Island
0
South Carolina
3
South Dakota
1
Tennessee
2
Texas
9
Utah
2
Vermont
0
Virginia
5
Washington
0
West Virginia
6
Wisconsin
1
Wyoming
7
State

Gun
Control
Rulings
3
0
4
3
8
1
6
0
0
3
0
7
5
2
0
0
0
3
1
2
4
5
0
8
0

Total
Rulings
8
3
7
5
8
2
7
2
2
7
5
10
7
2
3
1
2
12
3
2
9
5
6
9
7

Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database.

This table shows that the five states with the most total Second Amendment rulings were
divided between gun rights and gun control in nature. Texas and Louisiana had the most gun
rights rulings, with nine and ten respectively, and two of the highest amounts of total full sample
rulings. Michigan, Colorado, and Oregon had three of the highest numbers of gun control
rulings and three of the highest amounts of total full sample rulings. This table also illustrates
the differences between states when it comes to Second Amendment court rulings. Few of the
state supreme courts split rulings between gun rights and gun control. In fact, only Florida,
Kentucky, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Utah, and Virginia, had at least one of
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each type of gun ruling and the amounts of each type of gun ruling were within one of the other
ruling. For instance, Virginia has five gun rights rulings and four gun control rulings.

State Supreme Court Second Amendment Cases by Ruling Types, 1960-2009
Majority Ruling Type
Gun Control
Gun Rights
TOTAL

Number of Rulings
143 (53.2 percent)
126 (46.8)
269 (100 percent)

Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database.

State Supreme Court Second Amendment Rulings by Selection Method, 1960-2009
State Supreme Court Selection Method
Life-Time Appointments
Merit Plan Selection
Non-Partisan Elections
Partisan Elections
TOTAL

Number of Rulings
57 (21.2 percent)
66 (24.5)
84 (31.2)
62 (23.0)
269 (100 percent)

Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database and the American Judicature Society.

This table demonstrates that a plurality of all cases in the sample were litigated in state
supreme courts where the judges were elected on a non-partisan basis, while more than fifty
percent of all cases in the sample (54.3 percent) were litigated in state supreme courts where
judges were either elected on a partisan or a non-partisan basis. The balance of cases in the
sample (45.7 percent) was heard in state supreme courts where judges are appointed for lifetime
or selected through a commission.
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State Supreme Court Second Amendment Rulings by Judicial Selection Method, 1960-2009
Judicial Selection Method
Gun Rights Rulings by Selection Method
Lifetime Appointments
Merit Plan Selection
Non-Partisan Elections
Partisan Elections
Total Gun Rights
Gun Control Rulings by Selection Method
Lifetime Appointments
Merit Plan Selection
Non-Partisan Elections
Partisan Elections
Total Gun Control
TOTAL

Number of Rulings
--13 (4.8 percent)
36 (13.4)
36 (13.4)
41 (15.2)
126 (46.8 percent)
--44 (16.4 percent)
30 (11.2)
48 (17.8)
21 (7.8)
143 (53.2 percent)
269 (100 percent)

Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database and the American Judicature Society.

This table provides some interesting data regarding Second Amendment case rulings over
the last fifty years. Partisan elections and merit plan selection judicial selection methods each
had a majority of cases in which the state supreme court ruled in favor of gun rights, while
lifetime appointments and non-partisan election judicial selection methods had a majority of
cases that ruled in favor of gun control. However, only in life-time appointments and partisan
elections the percentage of gun rulings types were heavily weighted in one way or the other.
States that use partisan elections to select their state supreme court judges had only 33.9 percent
of cases rule in favor of gun control, while 66.1 percent of cases ruled in favor of gun rights.
Lifetime appointment judicial selection method states had only 22.8 percent of Second
Amendment cases rule in favor of gun rights, while 77.2 percent of lifetime appointment states
ruled in favor of gun control. Nine of the eleven states that had life-appointments processes for
state supreme court judges during the sample period were located in the northeast United States.
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State Supreme Court Second Amendment Rulings by Intermediate Appellate Court, 19602009
Intermediate Appellate Court at Time of Ruling?
Yes
No
TOTAL

Number of Rulings
186 (69.1 percent)
83 (30.9)
269 (100 percent)

Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database and the American Judicature Society.

According to this table, almost seventy percent (69.1 percent) of all supreme court
sample cases were litigated in a situation where an intermediate appellate court was present at
the time when a decision was handed down. 30.9 percent of cases in the sample did not have a
state intermediate appellate court during litigation and final ruling. During the fifty year period
of the study, thirteen states added intermediate appellate courts, and this is reflected in the data
sample findings. For instance, Arkansas added an intermediate appellate court in 1978. Cases
prior to 1978 were coded as not having an intermediate appellate court, while cases after 1978
were coded as having an intermediate appellate court. According to the American Judicature
Society, ten states (DE, ME, MT, NV, NH, RI, SD, VT, WV, WY) continue to have state judicial
systems that do not include intermediate appellate courts.
State Supreme Court Second Amendment Cases by Issue, 1960-2009
Ten Most Litigated Second Amendment Case Issues
Felon in Possession of a Firearm
Concealed Weapons Violation
Denial of Personal Firearms License
Possession of Semi-Automatic/Automatic/Assault Weapon
Unregistered Firearms Violation
Required Background Check Information Violation
Local/State Gun Registration Violation
Local Firearms Ban
Local Ban on Gun Show Sales/Exhibition
Gun Club Related Issues
Various Other Issues
TOTAL
Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database.
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# of Cases
51 (19.0 percent)
31 (11.5)
24 (8.9)
23 (8.5)
20 (7.4)
13 (4.8)
12 (4.5)
11 (4.1)
9 (3.3)
8 (3.0)
67 (24.9)
269 (100 percent)

This table presents some interesting findings regarding the issues associated with Second
Amendment state supreme court cases. This study originally supposed that the sample would be
smaller than the final number of 269 cases. Finding that fifty-one cases in which a felon arrested
for possession of a firearm increased the number of sample cases significantly. In each of these
felony firearms possession cases, the felon that was arrested made the claim that state laws
banning the possession of firearms by formerly incarcerated individuals violated their right to
bear arms under the Second Amendment. Only two of the fifty-one cases regarding felons in
possession of a firearm were successful in regaining the right to bear arms for the defendant. An
issue area where Second Amendment defendants were exceedingly successful was in local gun
registration violation cases. In these cases, state supreme courts uniformly allowed defendants to
correct their gun registration information, and then re-register their firearms on the local/state
level.
Tracking Second Amendment Cases in State Supreme Courts, 1960-2009
Type of Judicial Action
None
Case Reheard
Original Ruling Overturned
Case Appealed
Case in which Certiorari was Denied
Case Reviewed
Case Overturned
TOTAL

Judicial Level
--State Supreme Court
State Supreme Court
U.S. Supreme Court
U.S. Supreme Court
U.S. Supreme Court
U.S. Supreme Court
---

Number of Rulings
219 (81.4 percent)
5 (1.9)
2 (0.7)
45 (16.7)
40 (14.9)
5 (1.9)
3 (1.1)
269 (100 percent)

Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database.

The vast majority (81.4 percent) of all sample Second Amendment cases ended when the
respective state supreme court handed down a ruling, while five (1.9 percent) of the 269 cases
were reheard in the same state court of resort. Of the five cases reheard in state supreme courts,
only two (0.7 percent) of the original case rulings were eventually overturned. In both of these
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cases, the original state supreme court ruling was overturned several years later with different
judges rehearing the case.
All cases appealed beyond the state supreme courts went directly to the U.S. Supreme
Court. Forty-five (16.7 percent) total sample cases were appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme
Court. On Second Amendment cases, the U.S. Supreme Court’s rate of review was 11.1 percent
on appealed cases, while the rate of successfully getting the original ruling overturned was 6.7
percent. Certiorari was denied in the U.S. Supreme Court 88.9 percent of the time. Both the rate
of review and overturn rate on Second Amendment cases coming from state supreme courts were
higher than the traditional rates often cited by scholars.
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APPENDIX I
Relevant Appellate Circuit-Level Data Set Tables
U.S. Courts of Appeals by Sample Three-Judge Panel Appearance, 1960-2009
Name

Circuit

William J. Bauer
James Wilkinson, III
Ilana K.D. Rovner
Richard A. Posner
Richard F. Suhrheinrich
Diane P. Wood
Juan R. Torruella
Stephan R. Reinhardt
Phyllis A. Kravitch
Gerald W. Heaney
Peter T. Fay
Arthur L. Alarcon
Edward E. Carnes
Frank H. Easterbrook
Michael S. Kanne
Gilbert S. Merritt, Jr.
Kenneth F. Ripple
Norman H. Stahl
William W. Wilkins

7
4
7
7
6
7
1
9
5, 11
8
5, 11
9
11
7
7
6
7
1
4

Panel
Appearances
10
9
9
8
7
6
6
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

Tenure
1974-Present
1984-Present
1992-Present
1981-Present
1990-Present
1995-Present
1984-Present
1980-Present
1979-Present
1966-2006
1976-Present
1979-Present
1992-Present
1985-Present
1987-Present
1977-Present
1985-Present
1992-Present
1986-2008

Appointing
President
Gerald Ford
Ronald Reagan
George H.W. Bush
Ronald Reagan
George H.W. Bush
Bill Clinton
Ronald Reagan
Jimmy Carter
Jimmy Carter
Lyndon Johnson
Gerald Ford
Jimmy Carter
George H.W. Bush
Ronald Reagan
Ronald Reagan
Jimmy Carter
Ronald Reagan
George H.W. Bush
Ronald Reagan

Party
R
R
R
R
R
D
R
D
D
D
R
D
R
R
R
D
R
R
R

Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database and the Federal Judicial Center.

U.S. Courts of Appeals by Sample Majority Rulings Authored, 1960-2009
Name

Circuit

Bobby R. Baldock
William J. Bauer
Theodore McMillian
Ilana K.D. Rovner
James Wilkinson, III

10
7
8
7
4

Opinions
Authored
3
3
3
3
3

Tenure
1985-Present
1974-Present
1978-2006
1992-Present
1984-Present

Appointing
President
Ronald Reagan
Gerald Ford
Jimmy Carter
George H.W. Bush
Ronald Reagan

Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database and the Federal Judicial Center.

U.S. Courts of Appeals by Review/Ruling Type, 1960-2009
Type of Review/Ruling
En Banc Review
Per Curiam Ruling

# of Cases
3
43

Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database.
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Party
R
R
D
R
R

U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment Rulings by Year, 1960-2009
Year
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1960s Total
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1970s Total
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

Number of Rulings
2
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
4 (1.8 percent)
4
8
4
2
2
1
2
3
3
2
31 (14.2 percent)
3
1
3
3
4
2

Year
1986
1987
1988
1989
1980s Total
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
1990s Total
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2000s Total
Total Cases

Number of Rulings
2
2
2
2
24 (10.9 percent)
8
8
11
8
5
9
18
7
6
8
88 (40.2 percent)
9
7
4
4
3
6
6
7
3
23
72 (32.9 percent)
219 (100 percent)

Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database.
Note: n=219 cases.

This table shows that the last two decades, 1990-2009, provided the vast majority of
Second Amendment activity in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. In fact, 73.1 percent (160) of
cases in the entire fifty year sample were decided between 1990 and 2009. The most active
year for Second Amendment decisions was 2009, as 10.5 percent (or 23 cases) of all cases in
the sample were decided in the calendar year. The least active decade for Second Amendment
decisions were the 1960s. Only four sample cases (1.8 percent) were decided during the entire
ten year period (1960-1969), while seven years during the period didn’t even have one Second
Amendment case decided during the year.
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The findings from this table suggest that litigants on both side of the Second
Amendment gun debate only started to chiefly use the federal court system to litigate gun
issues until the last twenty years. Seeing the success of gun rights litigants in cases, such as
Heller, others have attempted to bring selected Second Amendment cases and issues before
the federal courts to a larger degree in recent years. Unlike the state supreme courts, when
33.1 percent of all cases in the full sample of cases were decided during the 1970s, the federal
appellate courts reaction to the three political assassinations and other causation from the
1960s happened two decades later when American conceptions of the Second Amendment
where changing.

U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment Cases by Ruling Types, 1960-2009
Majority Ruling Type

Number of Cases

Gun Control

160 (73.1 percent)

Gun Rights

59 (26.9)

TOTAL

219 (100 percent)

Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database.
Note: n=219 cases.

This table illustrates the extent of U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment majority
ruling types. 73.4 percent of all federal appellate Second Amendment cases were decided in
favor of gun control, while only 26.6 percent of all cases in the full sample supported gun
rights. When compared with the same findings in the state supreme courts (53.1 percent of
cases supported gun control), this finding suggests that when federal appellate judges are
forced to decide matters regarding the gun statutes they are much more likely to ere on the
side of gun control than their state court of last resort colleagues.
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U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment Rulings by Appellate Circuit, 1960-2009
Appellate Circuit
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth
Eleventh
TOTAL

Gun Rights Rulings
1
2
4
4
5
6
9
2
10
4
12
59 (29.6 percent)

Gun Control Rulings
13
12
3
20
12
24
21
18
20
6
11
160 (73.1 percent)

Total Rulings
14
14
7
24
17
30
30
20
30
10
23
219 (100 percent)

Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database.
Note: n=219 cases.

This table demonstrates how both types of Second Amendment Second Amendment
ruling were divided among the eleven appellate circuits. Only two appellate circuits out of the
eleven had a majority of Second Amendment gun rights rulings. In fact, seven of the eleven
appellate circuits had majority Second Amendment gun control ruling totals which surpassed
gun rights rulings by more than ten rulings. Only the Third, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit
Courts of Appeals had gun control ruling totals that were within ten rulings of the total gun
rights rulings. Only the Third (Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) and the Eleventh
(Alabama, Florida, and Georgia) Circuit Courts of Appeals had total rulings that favored gun
rights. In both instances, the majority gun rights rulings total only surpassed gun control
rulings by a single decision. This table also shows that the total amount of gun control rulings
far exceeded the amount of total gun rights rulings in the full sample.
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U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment Majority Partisan Appointment Panels, 19602009
Majority DEM Panels
Majority GOP Panels
Total Majority Panels

Gun Control Rulings
59 (26.9 percent)
101 (46.1)
160 (73.0 percent)

Gun Rights Rulings
21 (9.6 percent)
38 (17.4)
59 (27.0 percent)

Total Majority Panels
80 (36.5 percent)
139 (63.5)
219 (100 percent)

Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database and the Federal Judicial Center.
Note: n=219 cases.

During the fifty year study period, Republican President’s controlled the White House
for twenty-nine of the fifty years. This table illustrates this fact. Because Republican’s held
the executive branch for eight more years than Democrat’s, they held the power of judicial
appointments for a longer time. In fact, Republican-appointed federal appellate judges held
the majority on the three-judge U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment panels in 63.5
percent of all cases during the study period. However, traditional conceptions about the policy
preferences of the two political parties did not hold with regard to Second Amendment cases.
Traditionally, the Republican Party has supported gun rights, while the Democratic
Party has not. In spite of this, the two political parties had a very similar rate of support for
gun rights when each held the majority on the three-judge federal appellate panels. Only 27.3
percent of the Republican-appointed majority U.S. Courts of Appeals panels supported gun
rights, while 26.3 percent of the Democratic-appointed majority panels supported gun control.
These findings support and back-up the statistics found regarding support for gun rights in the
full sample and outlined in other tables.
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U.S. Presidential Appellate Nominations and Sample Appellate Panel Judges, 1960-2009
U.S. President
Herbert Hoover
Franklin Roosevelt
Harry Truman
Dwight Eisenhower
John Kennedy
Lyndon Johnson
Richard Nixon
Gerald Ford
Jimmy Carter
Ronald Reagan
George H.W. Bush
Bill Clinton
George W. Bush
Barack Obama
Total Democrat
Total Republican
TOTAL

Political Party
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
7 DEM // 7 GOP

# of Judges Nominated
1 (0.3 percent)
4 (1.1)
8 (2.2)
13 (3.5)
24 (6.5)
31 (8.4)
24 (6.5)
27 (7.3)
28 (7.5)
61 (16.4)
45 (12.2)
52 (14.0)
51 (13.7)
2 (0.5)
149 (40.2 percent)
222 (59.8 percent)
371 (100 percent)

Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database and the Federal Judicial Center.
Note: 371 total federal appellate judges served on Second Amendment case panels, 1960-2009.

This table demonstrates the figures of partisan presidential appointments to the U.S.
Courts of Appeals as they appeared in the full case sample. Because the full sample had 219
cases, a total of 657 judges could have been a part of these Second Amendment three-judge
panels. However, only a total of 371 judges took part. This is because multiple federal
appellate judges were randomly assigned numerous sample panels. As for presidential
nominations, it is no surprise that Republican President’s federal appellate appointments vastly
outnumbered those of Democratic President’s.
Of the 371 federal appellate judges to sit on a Second Amendment panels in the
sample, 59.8 percent were appointed by Republican presidents. In fact, the last three
Republican President’s, serving during the heart of the study period, Reagan, Bush (41), and
Bush (43), accounted for the nominations of 42.3 percent of the federal appellate judges in the
full sample. President’s who served for two full terms during the study period also appointed
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more judges then their counterparts to the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Another interesting aspect
of the sample of judges that heard Second Amendment cases are the judges that were
appointed by President Franklin Roosevelt and President Herbert Hoover each of whom
served in the first part of the 1900s. These judges heard Second Amendment cases during the
1960s and had served twenty to thirty years on the U.S. Courts of Appeals before their
appearances in the full case sample.
U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment Cases by Issue, 1960-2009
Ten Most Litigated Second Amendment Issues
Felon in Possession of a Firearm
Denial of Personal Firearms License
Denial of Federal Firearms Marketing/Sale License
Possession of Semi-Automatic/Automatic/Assault Weapon
Concealed Weapons Violation
Unregistered Firearms Violation
Local Ban on Gun Show Sales/Exhibitions
Gun Club Related Issues
Local Firearms Ban
Local Gun Registration Issues
Various Other Issues
TOTAL

# of Cases
38 (17.4 percent)
28 (12.8)
25 (11.4)
24 (11.0)
17 (7.8)
16 (7.3)
14 (6.4)
13 (5.9)
11 (5.0)
9 (4.1)
24 (11.0)
219 (100 percent)

Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database.
Note: n=219 cases in the full sample.

This table presents finding regarding the issues associated with Second Amendment
U.S. Courts of Appeals cases in the full sample. Much like the Third Chapter, the most
prevalent issue associated with the Second Amendment cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals
was felons arrested for possessions of firearms. In these felony firearms possession cases, the
felon that was arrested claimed that state or federal laws banning the possession of firearms by
formerly incarcerated individuals violated their constitutional right to bear arms that is
protected under the Second Amendment. The stringent nature of federal gun laws forbade
future legal purchase, possession, and usage of firearms for all defendants in these cases.
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An issue area where Second Amendment defendants were exceedingly successful was
in denial of federal firearms marketing/sale license cases. In these sample cases, U.S. Courts
of Appeals defendants had a 76 percent (19 of 25 cases) rate of success in getting the federal
courts to over turn U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (A.T.F.) directives that
forbade companies from purchasing federal firearms licenses that allow the marketing and
selling of registered firearms to qualified individuals based on mandated background checks.
In several case instances, the U.S. Courts of Appeals that made a ruling regarding A.T.F.
firearms marketing permits called the denial of these permits arbitrary or completely based off
personal discretion.
Tracking Second Amendment Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1960-2009
Type of Action
None
Case Reviewed En Banc
Original Ruling Overturned
Case Appealed
Case in which Certiorari was Denied
Case Reviewed
Case Overturned
TOTAL

Judicial Level
--U.S. Courts of Appeals
U.S. Courts of Appeals
U.S. Supreme Court
U.S. Supreme Court
U.S. Supreme Court
U.S. Supreme Court
---

# of Cases
183 (83.6 percent)
3 (1.4)
1 (0.4)
33 (15.1)
24 (11.0)
9 (4.1)
5 (2.3)
219 (100 percent)

Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database.
Note: n=219 cases.

This table shows how cases in the full sample were dispensed with in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals and beyond. The vast majority (83.6 percent) of all sample Second Amendment cases
ended when the respective U.S. Courts of Appeals panel handed down a ruling, while three of
the 219 cases we re-tried en banc in the same federal appellate circuit with 33 percent (1 of the 3
cases) rate of overturning the original decision during review. Because the U.S. Courts of
Appeals are the federal appellate circuit directly below the U.S. Supreme Court in terms of
hierarchy, most of the cases that were appealed (91.7 percent) went to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The rate of review of Second Amendment U.S. Courts of Appeals cases in the U.S. Supreme
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Court was high at 27.3 percent. Of the nine Second Amendment cases which were granted
certiorari was granted, five (55.6 percent) of those cases were successful in getting the original
U.S. Courts of Appeals decision overturned. Certiorari was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court
72.7 percent of the time.
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